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ABSTRACT 
Paperwork, Governance, and Archive in the British Empire 
During the Age of Revolutions 
 
Asheesh Kapur Siddique 
 
 What role did documents play in the governance of the British Empire during an 
age of unprecedented geopolitical transformation? Paperwork, Governance, and Archive 
in the British Empire During the Age of Revolutions answers this question by examining 
the role of paperwork in British imperial governance in the Atlantic World during the 
eras of the American and French Revolutions. The dissertation argues that paperwork 
served as the facilitative technology through which administrative interactions between 
metropolitan officials and their imperial servants were conducted. Through the creation 
and circulation of particular material forms, late eighteenth century bureaucrats across the 
different offices involved in imperial administration–including the Board of Trade, the 
Admiralty, the Secretary of State, and the Customs–articulated and enforced an ‘imperial 
constitution’ that elevated the power of royal sovereignty in the governance of the British 
empire. This role of paperwork remained consistent throughout the late eighteenth 
century despite the pressures of revolution and war that transformed the imperial state in 
other respects. But at the end of the eighteenth century, imperial administrators developed 
a new approach to documents that had previously been pronounced only in domestic 
governance: the transformation of the archive from its role as a container of documents, 
into an active site of policy-making.  
 Paperwork–meaning any document produced either in response to official 
demand, or written by bureaucrats in the execution of the processes of administration; 
 
and the constellations of practices in which bureaucrats engaged when using them–made 
Britain’s otherwise ungovernable empire cohere across vast oceanic and territorial 
expanses. Through the dispatch and circulation of particular forms, the different 
institutions responsible for exercising authority over imperial possessions in the Atlantic 
Basin enacted the specific administrative tasks that preserved the political viability of the 
imperial constitution. Every act of governance involved the seemingly limitless 
production of paperwork: from collecting taxes (reliant upon keeping account books and 
receipts) and navigating ships (dependent upon logbooks and geographical atlases), to 
negotiating treaties (through diplomatic letter writing and drafting) and maintaining order 
(requiring the composition and circulation of legal codes). The first chapter of the 
dissertation provides an overview of the structure and growth of imperial bureaucracy 
and communications in the British empire during the long eighteenth century. The 
second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters examine how the central institutions involved in 
governing the British empire in the Atlantic world, including the Board of Trade; the 
Secretary of State; the Admiralty; and the Customs and Treasury, used documents. While 
each of these different institutions relied upon different kinds of documents in executing 
their administrative tasks, in each case the administrative use of paperwork articulated, 
enforced, and facilitated the relationships of hierarchy and deference between 
metropolitan and colonial administrators that characterized sovereignty in the British 
empire. The administrative use of paperwork, these chapters show, centered upon 
bureaucrats’ use of documents to demonstrate to their superiors that they understood 
expectations for proper official conduct, and were acting accordingly.  
 
 This constitutional and facilitative role of documents, the dissertation argues, 
continued to inhere in administrative culture during the late eighteenth century despite a 
set of significant political challenges–notably the American and French Revolutions–to 
British imperial power. Yet, in one key respect, the material practices of imperial 
bureaucracy changed in this period. Beginning in the 1790s, administrators began to 
systematically use the vast archives of paperwork accumulating in the offices and 
repositories of the British state as sources of knowledge and evidence to inform the 
development of imperial strategy against the French in Asia, Europe, North America, and 
the Caribbean. These practices of archival use revived modes of bureaucratic governance 
that had been developed centuries earlier, and were characteristics of a distinctively 
‘early modern’ style of administration. The dissertation concludes by suggesting the 
complications that this history of the bureaucratic archive introduces for extant accounts 
of British ‘modernity.’  
 For over a century, scholarship has fruitfully attended to the ideological origins, 
political development, and administrative history of the British empire in the long 
eighteenth century. But virtually all of this research has looked through paperwork for 
evidence of other phenomena, rather than attempting to understand the significance that 
contemporaries ascribed to the material forms they used. By accounting for the role of 
documents in the history of British imperial governance, the dissertation also models an 
approach to writing the histories of states and empires that departs from both structuralist 
and poststructuralist perspectives on governance by attending instead to the specificities 
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In 1789, William Knox, former under-Secretary of State for the American 
colonies, anonymously published a two-volume work entitled Extra Official State 
Papers. Addressed to the Right Hon. Lord Rawdon, and the Other Members of the Two 
Houses of Parliament, Associated for the Preservation of the Constitution and Promoting 
the Prosperity of the British Empire. Knox critiqued Parliament’s efforts, in the aftermath 
of the American Revolution, to wrestle control over imperial governance from its 
traditional locus in the executive power of the Crown. He proposed reforms that would 
augment the power of administrative, rather than Parliamentary management of imperial 
affairs, through which he believed the British empire would be restored to its pre-
Revolutionary greatness. Among other several suggestions, Knox called for a 
reconfiguration of the system of imperial communication. The management of “the 
general correspondence” was “essential to the existence of the state,” Knox asserted. But 
while “great improvements,” “lately made in the English post-office,” had “brought the 
whole inland correspondence” under the control of government, Knox contended that 
only “a very small part . . . of that between Great Britain and our American Colonies” 
was effectively regulated. Hence, Knox suggested “placing the whole correspondence 
between Great Britain, Ireland, and America, in the hands of Government”; doing so, he 
argued, would “increase trade” and imperial prosperity.1   
                                                
1 [William Knox], Extra Official State Papers. Addressed to The Right Hon. Lord Rawdon, and the Other 
Members of the Two Houses of Parliament, Associated for the Preservation of the Constitution and 




Knox’s emphasis that the correct management of “the general correspondence” 
was crucial to the effective governance of the British empire raises a question that 
scholarship has yet to explore. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, paper had 
become a ubiquitous administrative technology across Europe. Over the next hundred 
years, Great Britain and its empire experienced transformative political and structural 
development, including expansion in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War; civil war 
during the American Revolution; and existential confrontation with Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic France from the 1790s. During this half-century of major reconfiguration in 
the political contours of the British imperial state, what changes, if any, did its 
bureaucratic culture experience? If Knox was right–that the state’s ability to manage its 
“general correspondence” was “essential” to its “existence”–, then what can attention to 
the history of bureaucratic documents reveal about the British empire’s history during an 
era of revolutionary pressure?  
Paperwork, Governance, and Archival Knowledge in the British Empire During 
the Age of Revolutions answers this question by examining the role of what Knox and his 
contemporaries referred to as “State Papers”–or, in modern parlance, paperwork–in 
British imperial governance during the long eighteenth century, with particular attention 
to the use of these papers in the administration of Britain’s Atlantic world empire. “State 
Papers” was one of several descriptors that Knox and his contemporaries used when they 
referred to any document produced either in response to a demand by the state, or by 
bureaucrats in the transaction of administration, and over whose production and 
circulation the state asserted control. The phrase originated in early modern British 
                                                                                                                                            
29. On the significance of Knox’s text in imperial politics, see Leland J. Bellot, William Knox: The Life & 





administrative discourse to refer to these types of documents, and it continued to be used 
in the same way through the nineteenth century. In examining the role of “State Papers” 
in eighteenth century imperial governance, this dissertation seeks to account for how the 
material infrastructure of the British empire was arranged, and how it changed over time. 
While the literature on both the political culture of the British empire during the age of 
the American and French Revolutions has emphasized the significance of media, notably 
print and correspondence, as sites for expressing political argumentation and ideas, little 
attention has been paid to the role of unprinted, bureaucratic records in the work of 
imperial governance.2 Although the intrinsic centrality of documentation and paper 
technology to the constitution and operation of empire was articulated in modern 
scholarship from at least 1950 with the appearance of Harold Innis’ Empire and 
Communications, paperwork has only recently come to be investigated on its own terms.3 
                                                
2 Key work engaging the question of communications and the British empire includes Harold A. Innis, 
Empire and Communications (1950; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007); C. A. Bayly, Empire and 
Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Miles Ogborn, Indian Ink: Script and Print in the Making of the 
English East India Company (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); D. F. Mackenzie, Oral Culture, 
Literacy and Print in Early New Zealand (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Robert 
Darnton, “Literary Surveillance in the British Raj: The Contradictions of Liberal Imperialism,” Book 
History, 4 (2001), 133-176; Priya Joshi, In Another Country: Colonialism, Culture, and the English Novel 
in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Isabel Hofmeyr, The Portable Bunyan: A 
Transnational History of The Pilgrim’s Progress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Rimi B. 
Chaterjee, Empires of the Mind: A History of the Oxford University Press in India under the Raj (New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006); Tony Ballantyne, “What Difference Does Colonialism Make? 
Reassessing Print and Social Change in an Age of Global Imperialism,” in Sabrina Alcorn Baron, Eric N. 
Lindquist, and Eleanor F. Shevlin (eds.), Agent of Change: Print Culture Studies after Elizabeth L. 
Eisenstein (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 342-352; and Antoinette Burton and Isabel 
Hofmeyr (eds.), Ten Books That Shaped the British Empire: Creating an Imperial Commons (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2014).  
 
3 See Innis, Empire and Communications. On the limited influence of Innis’ work in his own time, see Paul 
Heyer, Harold Innis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 52-55. For the emerging 
work on paperwork in imperial contexts, see Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An 
Exploration of Communication and Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Kenneth J. 
Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002); Bhavani Raman, Document Raj: Writing and Scribes 
in Early Colonial India (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); and Sylvia Sellers-Garcia, Distance 




Indeed, even as social historians in the late 1960s and 1970s began to attend to the 
historical significance of the printed word, relatively little attention was focused on 
paperwork itself until historians in the late 1980s began to investigate the role of 
bureaucracy in state-formation.4 Since that time, a steady stream of interdisciplinary 
scholarship by historians, anthropologists, and media theorists has endeavored to 
understand the mutual constitution between state formation, bureaucratic paperwork, and 
archival knowledge in a variety of national and imperial contexts.5 This research has 
                                                                                                                                            
parallel historiographies on document and information management in early modern scholarly and 
commercial contexts: see, for example, Deborah E. Harkness, “Accounting for Science: How a Merchant 
Kept His Books in Elizabethan London,” in Margaret C. Jacob and Catherine Secreten (eds.), The Self-
Perception of Early Modern Capitalists (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 205-228; and Ann M. 
Blair, Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010).  
 
4 An influential exception in English language scholarship was Michael Clanchy’s From Memory to 
Written Record: England: 1066-1307 (London: E. Arnold, 1979); for the late 1980s and early 1990s, see 
Susan Migden Socolow, The Bureaucrats of Buenos Aires, 1769-1810: Amor al Real Servicio (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1987); Mark R. Beissinger, Scientific Management, Socialist Discipline, and Soviet 
Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, 
Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); and JoAnne 
Yates, Control Through Communication: The Rise of System in American Management (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1993). This shift is discussed in Ben Kafka, “Paperwork: The State of the 
Discipline,” Book History, 12 (2009), 341-344. See also Kafka, The Demon of Writing: Powers and 
Failures of Paperwork (New York: Zone Books, 2012). For a more recent overview of relevant literature, 
see Matthew Hull, “Documents and Bureaucracy,” Annual Review of Anthropology, 41 (2012), 251-267. 
See also Andrew Prescott, English Historical Documents (London: The British Library, 1988). There has 
long been a more popular literature on the history of the office: see, for example, Alan Delgado, The 
Enormous File: A Social History of the Office (London: John Murray, 1979); Gideon Haigh, The Office 
(Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2012); and Nikil Saval, Cubed: A Secret History of the Workplace 
(New York: Doubleday, 2014). 
 
5 See Nicholas B. Dirks, “Colonial Histories and Native Informants: Biography of an Archive,” in Carol 
Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer (eds.), Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 279-313; Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual 
Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Michel-
Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); 
Richard J. Cox, Closing an Era: Historical Perspectives on Modern Archives and Records Management 
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000); Peter Becker and William Clark (eds.), Little Tools of 
Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic Practices (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2001); Dirks, “Annals of the Archive: Ethnographic Notes on the Sources of History,” in 
Brian Keith Axel (ed.), From the Margins: Historical Anthropology and Its Futures (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 47-65; Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural History (Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002); Bruno Latour, The Making of Law: An Ethnography of the Conseil 
d’Etat (2002; Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010); Randolph Head, “Knowing Like a State: The 




shown that (in the words of Francis X. Blouin and William G. Rosenberg) “how the 
archivist forms and presents the historical records is itself a historical problem,” one that 
demands the reconstruction of the specific “institutional values and contexts embedded” 
in the organization of such repositories.6 It is especially important to account for how 
these processes of epistemological formation interface with the political and 
administrative priorities of governments, for they maintain ultimate custodianship over 
the contents of state archives, and thus the sources from which the past is understood. 
                                                                                                                                            
(2003), 745-782; Emma Tarlo, Unsettling Memories: Narratives of the Emergency in Delhi (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003); Antoinette Burton (ed.), Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the 
Writing of History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Clark, Academic Charisma and the Origins of 
the German Research University (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Annelise Riles (ed.), 
Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006); Francis X. 
Blouin, Jr. and William G. Rosenberg (eds.), Archives, Documentation and Institutions of Social Memory: 
Essays from the Sawyer Seminar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007); Deirdre Simmons, 
Keepers of the Records: A History of the Hudson’s Bay Company Archives (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2007); Ilana Feldman, Governing Gaza: Bureaucracy, Authority, and the Work of Rule, 
1917-1967 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008); Jacob Soll, The Information Master: Jean-Baptiste 
Colbert’s Secret State Intelligence System (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009); Ann Laura 
Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Commonsense (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009); Kathryn Burns, Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010); Patrick Joyce, “Filing the Raj: Political Technologies of the Imperial British 
State,” in Tony Bennet and Joyce (eds.), Material Powers: Cultural Studies, History and the Material Turn 
(New York: Routledge, 2010); Craig Robertson, The Passport: The History of a Document (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010); Akhil Gupta, Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in 
India (Durham: Duke University Press, 2012); Hull, Government of Paper: The Materiality of Bureaucracy 
in Urban Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Raman, Document Raj; Philipp Müller, 
“Archives and history: Towards a history of ‘the use of state archives’ in the 19th century,” History of the 
Human Sciences, 26 (2013), 27-49; Giora Sternberg, “Manipulating Information in the Ancien Régime: 
Ceremonial Records, Aristocratic Strategies, and the Limits of the State Perspective,” Journal of Modern 
History, 85 (2013), 239-279; Astrid M. Eckert, The Struggle for the Files: The Western Allies and the 
Return of German Archives after the Second World War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2014); Lisa Gittleman, Paper Knowledge: Toward a Media History of Documents (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014); and Kirsten Weld, Paper Cadavers: The Archives of Dictatorship in Guatemala 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). For the interest in paperwork among media theorists and 
philosophers, see Bruno Latour, “Visualisation and Cognition: Thinking with Eyes and Hands,” in H. 
Kukllick (ed.), Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past and Present, vi 
(Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1986), 1-40; and Cornelia Vismann, Files: Law and Media Technology, trans. 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (2000; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). This work has a somewhat 
distinct intellectual genealogy from that of the historiographical interest in paperwork, for it is rooted in the 
reception of French poststructuralist thought in Germany.    
 
6 Blouin and Rosenberg, Processing the Past: Contesting Authority in History and the Archives (Oxford: 





The dissertation extends this scholarship upon bureaucratic documentation by 
exploring the functions of paperwork in the British empire during an era of significant 
political challenge. “Paperwork” is a concise term that expresses the same set of 
meanings that Knox and his contemporaries attached to the phrase “State Papers”; and it 
encapsulates the actions that Knox and other bureaucrats performed when they produced, 
circulated, and archived “State Papers.” As a noun, “paperwork,” like “state papers,” 
refers to any document written by administrators in the process of transacting official 
business. As a verb, “paperwork” refers to the set of material practices–writing, 
circulating, copying, printing, archiving, reading, and editing–which bureaucrats like 
Knox performed as they went about the quotidian business of running an empire. The 
dissertation uses “paperwork” in both of these senses: the word refers to both a set of 
actions performed using documents, and to the documents themselves.  
Paperwork in British imperial governance in this period functioned as a 
structuring and facilitative technology. Through the circulation of paper forms, imperial 
government articulated and then enforced norms of proper conduct to bureaucrats an 
ocean away in the British empire in North America and the Caribbean, particularly in the 
geographical areas and administrative realms in which royal power was most interested in 
asserting its authority. This role of paperwork remained highly consistent throughout this 
period, apparently unaffected by the changes in the territorial and political configuration 
of empire resulting from the American and French Revolutions. In the final decade of the 
eighteenth century, however, imperial government began to change some of the ways in 
which it used paper. From the late 1780s, administrators engaged in the systematic use of 




They did so because they believed these archives provided valuable material precedents 
for countering the threat posed by revolutionary France to British imperial power, and to 
and new administrative challenges created by the government’s assertion of control over 
the East India Company. Furthermore, these administrators sought to reorganize state 
archives in order to institutionalize this forward-looking approach to paperwork as a 
standard administrative practice. Though its earlier function as a facilitative technology 
was never abrogated, paperwork now came to be treated by administrators not just as a 
conduit through which imperial authority was expressed and enforced, but also as a 
source of knowledge for policy-making. 
  
II 
 The production and management of written records has often been seen in 
essentialist terms as a permanent, intrinsic attribute of modern government.7 But such a 
perspective masks the complex and specific ways in which the administrative use of 
documents has changed over time, and been shaped by context. Although the practices of 
writing and keeping records have long been central to governments, the ascent of the 
modern constitutional state in mid-seventeen century Europe resulted in a major rise in 
the use of written “instruments” as a means of structuring administration.8 The purpose of 
                                                
7 T. R. Schellenberg, Modern Archives: Principles & Techniques (1956; Chicago: Society of American 
Archivists, 1996), 10. 
8 On the concept of the “instrument” in early modern English politics, see Blair Worden, God’s 
Instruments: Political Conduct in the England of Oliver Cromwell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). See also A Collection of Several Commissions, and Other Public Instruments, Proceeding from his 
Majesty’s Royal Authority, and Other Papers, Relating to the State of the Province in Quebec in North 
America, since the Conquest of it by the British Arms in 1760 Collected by Francis Maseres, Esquire, His 
Majesty’s Attorney General in the said Province (London, 1772), 13; and the Oxford English Dictionary 




these “instruments” was to render sovereigns accountable to representative bodies by 
specifying, in the form of tangible documents, the precise nature, limits, and divisions of 
executive power within polities.9 The way in which these paper “instruments” mattered to 
government is thus a matter of historical contingency and temporal specificity. It is 
therefore necessary to ask: what uses did British imperial government make of paper 
“instruments” during a period of significant political challenge? In the midst of the crisis 
caused by the rebellion of the North American colonies, critics of the British empire 
dismissed paperwork as a tool of metropolitan oppression. “Do not dream that your 
letters of office, and your instructions . . . are the things that hold together the great 
contexture of this mysterious whole,” Edmund Burke stated in his 1775 speech on 
conciliation with the American colonies. “Dead instruments, passive tools as they are, it 
is the spirit of the English communion that gives all their life and efficacy to them,” he 
emphasized, stressing the superior importance of “the spirit of the English Constitution” 
over the formality of imperial paperwork (“letters of office,” “instructions,” and “dead 
instruments”).10 Once that “spirit” had disappeared, the material forms had no meaning. 
American patriots and their British allies chastised the British administrators’ 
“Instructions to their Governors” for the opposite reason: on the grounds that they were 
                                                                                                                                            
document whereby a right is created or confirmed, or a fact recorded; a formal writing of any kind, as an 
agreement, deed, charter, or record, drawn up and executed in technical form, so as to be of legal validity.”  
9 Gerhard Oestreich, “From Contractual Monarchy to Constitutionalism,” in James B. Collins and Karen L. 
Taylor (eds.), Early Modern Europe: Issues and Interpretations (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2000), 320-325. 
 
10 Edmund Burke, “Speech on Moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies,” March 22, 
1775, in Peter J. Stanlis (ed.), Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches (1963; Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009), 221. On “Instructions,” see chapter 2 of this dissertation, as well as 
Leonard Woods Labaree (ed.), Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 1670-1776, 2 vols. (New 





an active, rather than lifeless, form through which “the Rights and Privileges of the 
subject may be taken from them . . .”11  
In targeting ‘state papers’ as (alternatively) “dead” or coercive at a moment of 
imperial fracture, these critics also pointed to their significance: from the origins of 
empire, paper “instruments” were precisely what allowed the constitutional relationship 
between metropole and colony to be forged and maintained across oceanic distance. As 
historians have recently emphasized, mid-seventeenth century England saw the 
emergence of a set of coherent arguments by politicians and political philosophers that 
effective government required the organized collection, collation, and use of information 
to execute its administrative tasks–even if such perspectives did not begin to seriously 
have an impact upon actual practice until after the Revolution of 1688.12 Furthermore, 
over the course of the seventeenth century, English political culture was characterized by 
a pronounced emphasis in both rhetoric and practice, on the need for mechanisms that 
would render bureaucrats accountable to higher authorities for their actions in office.13 
                                                
11 A True and Impartial State of the Province of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1759), 32.  
 
12 Paul Slack, “Government and Information in Seventeenth-Century England,” Past & Present, 184 
(2004), 33-68; Ted McCormick, William Petty: And the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); and William Peter Deringer, “Finding the Money: Public Accounting, Political 
Arithmetic, and Probability in the 1690s,” Journal of British Studies, 52 (2013), 638-668. See also Mary 
Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), esp. chapter 3; and Carl Wennerlind, Casualties of Credit: 
The English Financial Revolution, 1620-1720 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).  
 
13 Chris R. Kyle and Jason Peacey, “‘Under cover of so much coming and going’: Public Access to 
Parliament and the Political Process in Early Modern England,” in Kyle and Peacey (eds.), Parliament at 
Work: Parliamentary Committees, Political Power and Public Access in Early Modern England 
(Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press, 2002), 1-24; Paul Seaward, “Parliament and the Idea of 
Political Accountability in Early Modern Britain,” in Maija Jansson (ed.), Realities of Representation: State 
Building in Early Modern Europe and European America (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 45-62; 
Peacey, Print and Public Politics in the English Revolution (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), esp. chapter 11; and Noah Millstone, “Seeing Like a Statesman in Early Stuart England,” Past & 
Present, 223 (2014), 77-127. For the deeper chronological roots of ideas of accountable government in an 
English context, and the attendant development of modes of documentation to facilitate their 




The Crown’s assertion of power over colonial settlement in the English Atlantic world in 
the mid-seventeenth century saw metropolitan administrators articulate these expectations 
for imperial administration, and specify paper as the technology through which these 
expectations would be implemented and enforced. This development can be seen in the 
steps taken by the Crown as it asserted power over English colonization in North 
American in the aftermath of the Virginia Company’s chaotic attempt to settle at 
Jamestown.14 In the course of investigating the Virginia Company in the aftermath of its 
chaotic attempt to settle at Jamestown, the Privy Council created commissions that 
sought to improve procedures for the establishment of English imperial settlement.15 
During the first of these commissions, in 1623, the Privy Council issued an order 
demanding that “all charters, books, letters, and any other writings belonging to the 
plantations of Virginia and the Somers Islands be delivered to the Commissioners for 
those plantations, and that all boxes and packets of letters hereafter brought over from 
those parts . . . be immediately delivered . . . to be . . . broken open, perused, and disposed 
                                                                                                                                            
Crisis of the Twelfth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), part v, dating their rise to the 
twelfth century. 
 
14 On the assertion of royal sovereignty over English colonization in the context of the Virginia Company, 
see Wesley Frank Craven, Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1932); Elizabeth Mancke, “Chartered Enterprises and the Evolution 
of the British Atlantic World,” in Mancke and Carole Shammas (eds.), The Creation of the British Atlantic 
World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 237-262; and Ken Macmillan, Sovereignty and 
Possession in the English New World: The Legal Foundations of Empire, 1576-1640 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 104-105. On knowledge and the Virginia Company, see Peter C. 
Mancall, Hakluyt’s Promise: An Elizabethan’s Obsession for an English America (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2007). For the centrality of documents to the constitutional structure of early English 
colonization, see David D. Hall, “The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century,” in Hugh Amory and Hall 
(eds.), A History of the Book in America, Volume One: The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), esp. 55-68. 
 





of, as they shall find cause.”16 The Council’s commissioners established that, in addition 
to regular meetings, they would possess and manage “all charters, writings, and seals of 
the Company,” which would be “left in custody of the clerk and used by the 
Commissioners at their pleasure.”17  
This expectation that colonial authorities would regularly return paperwork to 
their metropolitan superiors as a means of demonstrating that the empire was properly 
administered was subsequently encoded in the initial “Instructions” issued to the 
representatives of royal sovereignty in the Americas: governors. Through these 
“Instructions,” the Privy Council delineated the specific tasks governors were to engage 
in while in power, and the boundaries of their authority. From the earliest issuances of 
such “Instructions,” the Privy Council established that paperwork was to operate as the 
facilitative tool through which the hierarchy of imperial bureaucracy would be expressed 
at a distance, and through which governors would be held accountable for the prosecution 
of their office: it included a clause that governors were to “once every year transmit a true 
and full State of that our Colony to Our Councill [sic] of Plantations here viz., a particular 
                                                
16 TNA, CO 5/1354, Privy Council, “Order for Bringing in Books &c.,” May 22, 1623, ff. 206-207; see 
also Edward D. Neill, History of the Virginia Company of London (Albany: J. Munsell, 1869), 411-415; 
Charles Maclean Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade and Plantations, 
1622-1675 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908), esp. 14; and A. Berriedale Keith, 
Constitutional History of the First British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 18-26. 
 
17 TNA, CO 1/3, Lord President Mandeville to Secretary Conway, enclosing “Orders sett [sic] down at a 
meetinge [sic] of the Commissioners for Virginia,” July 16, 1624, f. 68. See also TNA, CO 1/3, “Capt. John 
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Acct. together with the Invoyces [sic] concerning the late Corporation of Virginia, and the Lists of the 
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account of every Improvement . . . as well as of ye direction of ye Government in the 
year past.”18  
 The Council’s demand made in the context of the Virginia investigation 
established a precedent for Crown governance over the colonies, and demonstrated that 
the transaction of imperial sovereignty would rely upon the circulation of documents. 
Replicating the demand for documents in subsequent “Instructions” to governors in 
English (later British) America, metropolitan officials enforced a center-periphery 
relationship that placed the American colonies under the jurisdiction of the Crown. 
Consequently, the power of imperial government resided in the administrative institutions 
emanating from the executive, rather than in Parliament. Scholars of the early modern 
British empire refer to the cluster of laws, bureaucratic customs, and administrative 
policies that determined the power of executive government and the modes of its 
enforcement as the “imperial constitution.”19 But while the ideological contours of this 
“imperial constitution” are well-understood, little attention has been paid to the role of 
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the technology through which it was forged, enacted, and sustained: paper.20 Although it 
has long been fashionable to note the absence of a ‘written constitution’ structuring the 
British state,’ this assertion masks a much more complicated and interesting relationship 
between constitutional structure and British administration: the reliance of the state upon 
written documents as tools for enforcing and communicating constitutional norms, and in 
spite of no single codified text upon which the authority of the British state and empire 
rested.21 Financial records from the offices of imperial administration amply testify to the 
importance of written records; they are full of expense entries for supplies like blank 
“Almanacks” and sheets of paper; instruments such as “black Lead Pencills [sic]” and 
“Dutch Penns [sic]” for making inscriptions; funds earmarked for sending “packets to & 
from the Plantations,” and wax, tape, pasteboard, blotting paper; and money for “binding 
. . . written papers in Vellum as usual.” Indeed, these financial accounts suggest that 
running the British empire would have been impossible in the absence of these tools.22 
This dissertation attempts to account for the significance of the most important of these 
tools: paper.  
                                                
20 Halliday, “Authority in the Archives,” Critical Analysis of Law, 1 (2014), 110-142. 
 
21 On the idea of a ‘written constitution’ in regard to the British state and empire, see Linda Colley, 
“Empires of Writing: Britain, America, and Constitutions, 1776-1848,” Law and History Review, 32 
(2014), 237-266. See especially the comment by Vernon Bogdanor, the leading scholar of British political 
development, in The New British Constitution (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), 9: “Britain is peculiar . . . 
in lacking a written constitution. But perhaps this is a misleading way of putting the point. It is not as if in 
Britain the rules describing the distribution of governmental powers and the rights of the individual are 
passed down from generation to generation by word of mouth. Many, if not most, of our rules about the 
working of government are most certainly written down . . . . The real difference between Britain and 
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British imperial government used paper “instruments” in two, consistent ways 
during the long eighteenth century: as a tool by which sovereignty over the colonies 
could be expressed and maintained at a distance, and as a means for holding imperial 
bureaucrats accountable for their actions in office. Intrinsic to these roles of documents 
was a culture of shared expectations for good governance of the sort that had been 
articulated since the beginning of the seventeenth century (indeed, with particular force in 
the context of the Virginia Company dissolution), and codified in the initial Crown 
charters for settlement in the Americas that guaranteed “all liberties, franchises and 
immunities” of Englishmen to the colonists.23 Colonial publics and metropolitan 
administrators thus operated under the expectation that the British Atlantic would be 
“Governed Well and wisely, like a Prudent Magistrate,” as the General Assembly of New 
York put it in an address to their departing governor Robert Hunter in 1719–even if 
disagreements between the governors and the governed over the meaning of “Governed 
Well and wisely” would prove explosive a half-century later.24 Through the dispatch and 
circulation of particular forms of paper ‘instruments,’ the different institutions 
responsible for exercising authority over imperial possessions in both the Atlantic Basin 
and in India specified these expectations, and enacted corresponding practices to ensure 
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their enforcement. Every act of administration involved the production of paperwork: 
from collecting taxes (reliant upon keeping account books and receipts) and navigating 
ships (dependent upon logbooks and maritime journals), to negotiating treaties (through 
diplomatic letter writing and cyphers) and maintaining order (requiring the drafting of 
legal codes). Through paper ‘instruments,’ the British empire constituted its Atlantic 
possessions into a governed space. 
Chapter One of this dissertation provides an overview of the bureaucratic and 
material structure of the British empire in the Atlantic world, exploring how imperial 
government in the long eighteenth century organized its clerical bureaucracy and 
communications infrastructure. The next five chapters examine how key institutions 
involved in imperial government (including the Board of Trade; the Secretary of State; 
the Admiralty; and the Customs and Treasury) used paper ‘instruments.’ Each of these 
chapters analyzes a different component of this bureaucratic culture. Two of the chapters 
center the use of specific kinds of documents by respective administrative authorities. 
Chapter Two examines the Board of Trade’s use of “Instructions” and “Queries” to 
governors, arguing for the material foundations of the constitutional relationship of 
imperial government and the centrality of paperwork as a form of bureaucratic 
accountability. Chapter Three explores how the Admiralty used another paper 
‘instrument’–the “remark book”–in the production of hydrographic knowledge, 
demonstrating the discrepancy between the intention behind its formal invention as a 
source of information for government, and the bureaucratic delay in creating an apparatus 
to render the documents useful in this way. The next three chapters explore the use of 




of imperial documents into British negotiations with foreign governments. It shows how 
ambassadors used them as sources of information to facilitate negotiations with imperial 
rivals. Chapter Five studies the material architecture of customs bureaucracy, showing 
how government used documents as tools of bureaucratic accountability, not only at the 
level of form, but also at that of the archive. Chapter Six examines how the British state 
used paperwork to structure the creation and operation of a special bureaucratic 
formation: the imperial commission. In addition to making contributions to specific 
historiographies on different administrative institutions, the chapters cumulatively argue 
that paper ‘instruments’ collectively played two roles in imperial bureaucracy, and 
suggest that these roles remained consistent despite the effects of political transformation 
in the empire, especially due to the American Revolution. First, documents acted as the 
conduits through which administrative government was executed. Second, they were used 
to solicit the particular kind of knowledge privileged by imperial government–that of the 
correct execution of official procedure.  
Yet, in one key respect, the role of paper ‘instruments’ in imperial government 
changed in the late eighteenth century. The seventh and final chapter of the dissertation 
explores the nature of this development: the rise of the bureaucratic archive as a resource 
of imperial policy-making. This was indeed a change in imperial paperwork, but not an 
innovation. As earlier chapters in the dissertation show, bureaucratic archives served 
imperial administrators for many decades in the early eighteenth century as sources for 
generating precedents for policy. Furthermore, the final chapter shows, the use of 
bureaucratic archives had been a significant component of early modern English 




bringing traditions of domestic administration to bear on imperial governance. The 
written records of imperial administration that had been accumulating in the repositories 
and offices of government now began to be used not only to draw precedents for extant 
governing practices, but also as sources of knowledge to plan future imperial policy. 
Furthermore, the institutional design of the archives of state and empire were deliberately 
and consciously reorganized in order to better facilitate the use of records in the work of 
administrative planning.  
The mastermind behind these developments was named John Bruce. Although 
little known to both contemporaries and historians, Bruce played a central role in defining 
the forward-looking character of the bureaucratic archive in the era of the French wars. 
Turning to official archives for documentary precedents, Bruce drew upon the content of 
paperwork as evidence in composing memos, histories, and military plans aimed at 
defending and expanding the empire, and suppressing radicalism at home. He then 
circulated these texts privately among government officials, who used them as sources of 
information. In the process of research and writing, Bruce also reorganized the 
epistemological and physical composition of the archives themselves, with the intention 
of creating a permanent set of institutional repositories of paperwork primed for 
administrative consultation. Bruce’s occupation of two bureaucratic offices from the late 
1780s onward enabled his work, because they provided him with access to official 
archives otherwise restricted to select bureaucrats: Historiographer to the East India 
Company; and Keeper of State Papers. The last chapter of the dissertation reconstructs 
Bruce’s processes of research and writing; the modes by which he used archives and 




archive in government that he sought to institutionalize. It thus offers a substantial 
argument for Bruce’s centrality to the histories of both imperial administration and state 
paperwork. The dissertation concludes by suggesting the significance of the history of 
paperwork to understanding the experience of the British imperial state during an era of 
global political transformation.  
 
III 
With the exception of the familial and private papers of John Bruce, which have 
never been subject to extended scholarly analysis, the archival sources upon which this 
dissertation relies will be familiar to historians of the British empire, early America, and 
the East India Company. These documents constitute the basic materials from which 
these historians have worked since the late eighteenth century (beginning, in fact, with 
figures such as Bruce) through to the present day. These documents and manuscripts are 
largely housed in major and easily accessible repositories; and, in a few cases, the 
materials analyzed have even been transcribed and published in scholarly editions. But 
this dissertation reads these sources in an unusual and innovative manner: it attends not 
simply to their contents, but equally to the circumstances and reasons for their creation; 
the modes by which they circulated; the ends to which they were used; and the ways in 
which they were archived–issues that have not received serious and sustained attention in 
British imperial historiography. Reading the archive in this manner and attending to these 
questions may not radically revise dominant understandings of the political history of the 
eighteenth century British empire. Instead, by centering these problems, this dissertation 




question of how the imperial state used the technology of paper to govern in an era of 
significant political change.  
 
IV 
 This dissertation makes a set of significant empirical and argumentative 
contributions to existing scholarship. The most fundamental are to the historiography on 
the modes and cultures of governance in the British empire from its early modern origins 
in the seventeenth century, through its robust development in the eighteenth. To this 
historiography, the dissertation makes both specific and more general contributions. It 
may be an obvious fact that by the period in which the British empire established itself in 
the Americas, paper was the default technology through which European states governed 
both at home and abroad. But the ways in which any particular state used paper to govern 
can only be understood by examining the role of administrative documentation as it was 
iterated in specific imperial contexts. While there has been significant work on 
communications and document flows–especially that of private letters–in the British 
empire in this period, government paper, its circulation, and its archival history have yet 
to receive similar levels of attention.25 This dissertation is the first work of scholarship to 
examine how those practices developed in the administrative apparatus of the British 
imperial state in the long eighteenth century, and the meanings that inhered in the use of 
documents by the empire’s bureaucrats.  
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Each chapter of the dissertation constitutes a major empirical contribution in 
itself. By excavating the histories of particular kinds of documents and bureaucratic 
technologies used by the different administrative institutions of the British imperial state, 
each chapter expands the empirical contours of an imperial historiography that has rarely 
or in some cases never examined the significance of any of these material forms (and 
perhaps never even been aware of their existence). Furthermore, each of these chapters 
augments historiographies concerned with the functioning of particular bureaucratic 
institutions (such as the historiography on the Board of Trade in Chapter 2, and on the 
Admiralty in Chapter 3), but which have not attended to the role of documents as 
‘instruments’ within these contexts. By treating the histories of these different imperial 
administrative institutions together, the dissertation reveals something obscured by these 
more limited historical literatures: that a common, shared set of expectations of proper 
administrative conduct governed how documents were used by bureaucrats, independent 
of the particular site of their deployment. In emphasizing the commonalities of 
administrative expectations across different sites of imperial bureaucracy, and the role of 
paper in enforcing those expectations, the dissertation highlights a facet of imperial 
bureaucracy that is often obscured by scholarship focusing on the differential patterns by 
which specific bureaucratic sites in the British empire developed: that all remained 
governed by a common, shared imperial ‘constitution.’ While that insight has also been 
recognized by scholarship on the administrative and ideological contours of the ‘imperial 
constitution,’ even that work has missed the central role of documents as the technology 




Finally, the dissertation attends to the role of a specific institution which British 
historians has never considered as an apparatus of imperial governance: the archive. The 
reliance of early modern European states on archives as sources of political authority and 
their record contents as tools of administrative knowledge is an active subject of research, 
with recent attention the efforts of Spanish administrators to reorganize imperial archives 
in the 1780s to render documents useful in processes of governance; and similar efforts 
by Napoleonic administrators in the early nineteenth century, demonstrating that this 
work is taking an increasingly imperial turn.26 But while the role of archive in the 
administration of the early modern English state has begun to be examined, research has 
yet to extend its focus to the imperial archive. This dissertation marks the first 
examination of when, why, and how British imperial administrators turned to the imperial 
archive as a site of governance.27 
 If the crucial role of writing and documentation in European state-formation from 
the medieval period onward is now well-established, much remains to be known about 
how paperwork functioned in particular national and imperial political and administrative 
                                                
26 On archives as technologies of early modern statecraft in Europe, see Head, “Knowing Like a State”; 
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contexts, and how its role shifted over time within those contexts.28 By examining the 
role of documents and their repositories in the governance of the British empire during 
the age of revolutions, this dissertation excavates a crucial facet of this history that has 
yet to be treated on its own terms. Of course, nothing in the following pages is meant to 
suggest that the study of imperial documentation and its custodial history provides the 
sole key to understanding how the British governed their eighteenth century empire. 
Rather, Paperwork, Governance, and Archive in the British Empire During the Age of 
Revolutions aims to supplement existing scholarship by attending to the history of what it 














                                                





THE MATERIAL ARCHITECTURE OF IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT 
 
Introduction 
 In February 1780, Edmund Burke stood before Parliament to announce a plan of 
economical reform designed to reduce spending and corruption in government. In the 
middle of his speech, Burke cast his gaze on the structure of the administrative order over 
the American colonies. Long a critic of what he perceived as a bloated system of British 
imperial bureaucracy, Burke enumerated a detailed appraisal of the relative utility of 
specific official “establishments.” Casting his gaze upon royal offices, Burke singled out 
two which he denounced as having “no purpose of utility or of splendor”: the Southern 
Secretary of State for the American colonies, and the Board of Trade over which the 
secretary presided. The ground of Burke’s critique was paperwork: these offices did not 
do enough of it to justify their continued existence. “I will say nothing of [the Board’s] 
auspicious foundation; of the quality of its correspondence; or of the effects that have 
ensued from it. I speak merely of its quantity; which we know would have been little or 
no addition to the trouble of whatever office had its hands the fullest.” Burke continued 
by posing a rhetorical question about the volume of paperwork confronted by the London 
administrators: “Have their velvet bags, and their red boxes, been so full, that nothing 
more could possibly be crammed into them?”1  
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Examined on its merits, Burke’s claim was incorrect: imperial bureaucracy had 
plenty of “correspondence” to justify its existence. Indeed, at the moment of Burke’s 
writing, the administrative apparatus was awash in floods of paper as it sought to 
coordinate the complex work of waging war in North America. Nevertheless, Burke’s 
attack on the “utility” of imperial bureaucracy raises a set of fundamental questions about 
the mechanics of empire: how, exactly, was the paperwork of imperial bureaucracy – and 
bureaucracy itself, organized? How did administrators supply themselves with the paper 
necessary to transact the business of government? How did state institutions coordinate 
the dispatch and archivization of the ‘instruments’ of imperial government? How did that 
paper flow back and forth across the Atlantic Ocean? Who wrote and handled the 
massive amount of paperwork required for the administration of imperial government, 
and what can we know about the world of these bureaucrats? This chapter offers an 
overview of the bureaucratic, communicative, and material organization of the British 
empire during the long eighteenth century.  
 
Paper Supply  
Historians have extensively mapped the shifting dynamics in the supply of paper 
and the volume of printing within the British colonies in the Americas and in England 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a result, the fluctuating fortunes of 
the availability of paper in the colonies (much of it produced from cloth rags), and the 
struggles faced by the colonists to supply themselves from local sources, are well known. 




America was imported from the imperial center.2 From the first evidence of paper 
manufacture in England at the end of the fifteenth century, England’s papermaking 
industry had struggled to meet demand, resulting in a long-standing and heavy reliance 
upon imported paper from France and England. From the late seventeenth century, 
however, government endeavored to promote the domestic paper industry as its source of 
supply, especially through the formation of the Company of White Paper Makers in 1686 
and its receipt of a fourteen-year Crown monopoly on producing writing and printing 
paper.3 Government offices in Britain supplied themselves with the requisite stationary, 
books, and binding services against the pressures of both their increasing demand for 
these items and their rising prices. The default mode by which administrators procured 
office supplies, as the Treasury learned when it enquired into the question in 1762, 
involved individual government offices making a contract with a private commercial 
firm. The office would issue the firm a patent to provision it with “Stationary Wares.”4 In 
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4 H. M. Stationery Office: Brief Guide to Government Publications (London, 1925), 4-5; TNA, T 27/28, J 
Dyson to “Commissioners of to Commissioners Victualling, Commissioners Salt, Commissioners Taxes, 
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the case of the Board of Trade, a typical account included entries for accouterments such 
as blank “Almanacks” and sheets of paper for writing on; instruments like “black Lead 
Pencills [sic]” and “Dutch Penns [sic]” for making inscriptions; and wax, tape, 
pasteboard, and blotting paper, and funds for “binding . . . written papers in Vellum as 
usual.”5 The Board also budgeted funds for sending “packets to & from the Plantations,” 
for the “postage of Letters,”6 as well as for the cost of “binding” “vollums [sic] [of] 
writing Papers at the Office . . .”7 Perusing these accounts over time reveals other less 
frequent but related expenses: a charge for a “Travelling Writing-Case of fine Spanish 
Leather, with a fine brass Lock & Key,” from the firm of William Castle & Co. on July 
14, 1756;8 expenses for “7 Pair of Scissors,” “6 Letter Presses, and “1 Dozen of Red 
Tape” on June 12, 1765; as well as a charge on April 2, 1766 of 5 shillings for “Binding 
one years Bills of Entry.”9 Through patents, officials paid a private firm or bookseller 
“for furnishing” a given office “with Books, Stationary, Wares, binding of Books, and all 
other things belonging and appertaining to the several Trades of the Bookseller, 
                                                                                                                                            
December 29, 1762; and T 1/426/430-431, J. Clevland, Admiralty Office, to J. Dyson, December 25, 1762. 
Government offices supplied themselves with stationary in this way throughout the eighteenth century: for 
similar statements from officials in later years, see NMM, CAD/D/7, “The Examination of William 
Pollock,” November 1785, in Report upon the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State, 1786, 
11; and CAD/D/9, “The Examination of Sir Harry Parker, Baronet,” August 10, 1786, in Report upon the 
Office of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1786. 
 
5 For the phrase “binding . . . written papers in vellum as usual,” see TNA, CO 388/84, “An Account of 
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Bookbinder, and Stationer.”10 The most famous of these firms was the Stationer’s 
Company.11 The accounts of these offices–full of entries for the expense of supplies 
ranging from “1000 best office pens,” “1 Quart Ink and Bottle, “2 Packs Message Cards,” 
“2 Small paper books in Marble Covers,” and “2 Demy folios 6 Quires each, bound in 
Vellum”–testify to both the range of material artifacts used by bureaucrats in executing 
their offices, as well as the central, unceasing demand by government for paper and 
writing instruments.12 This system of contracting with private suppliers for stationary 
began to shift from 1786, when the Treasury established an official Stationary Office that 




 Communication across the Atlantic Ocean between metropolitan administration 
and their delegated authorities in the America was enabled by a postal system whose 
development has been extensively examined, and whose function can be briefly 
summarized here. At its heart lay the technology of the packet boat, which carried mail, 
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people, and goods between the metropole and the colonies as such vessels had done 
between England and Ireland from 1635. Despite the efforts of Edmund Dummer to 
establish a West Indies packet service in the opening decade of the 1700s, the postal 
communications in the British Atlantic was not regularized until 1755, when Benjamin 
Franklin (as a post-master general) spearheaded the implementation of a regular mail ship 
between Falmouth, on the coast of Cornwall, England; New York; and Charleston, South 
Carolina. From Falmouth, mail from the American colonies could be forwarded through 
the domestic postal service to offices in London.14 In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ 
War, the British state significantly expanded the infrastructure of communications in the 
Americas through the 1765 Post Office Act. The legislation lowered postal rates and 
divided the postal administration into two geographic sectors: a Northern Department 
encompassing British territory from Virginia northward, and a Southern one covering the 
empire from the Carolinas southward through the West Indies.15 Through this 
infrastructure, the dispatch and circulation of paperwork between the colonial and 
metropolitan administrators proceeded, binding empire across the Atlantic world and 
within British America. 
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Clerical Organization and Paper Management: An Overview 
 In 1765, one year after Britain’s military victory in the Seven Years’ War, the 
Earl of Hillsborough, president of the Board of Trade, wrote to the Prime Minister Lord 
Grenville, to explain that his office was struggling to manage the volume of documents 
flowing back from the now-enlarged empire in the Americas, and hence required more 
resources to meet the new infrastructural challenge. On May 29, he wrote to Grenville 
with “an account of the Addition which I am absolutely of Opinion” was “absolutely 
necessary to the carrying on [of] the Business of our Board with tolerable facility & 
expedition.” Acknowledging “the necessity of Frugality in every part of” administration, 
Hillsborough also emphasized that “the prodigious encrease [sic] of business” at the 
Board had convinced him that the prevailing salaries of the office’s clerks and their 
number ought to be augmented. Hillsborough requested more money to conduct Board’s 
work, and the hiring of “an additional Clerk without whom the Business cannot be well 
done.” The expenditure was “well worth” Grenville’s approval, Hillsborough 
emphasized, for it would “enable” the successful administration of the enlarged empire.16  
 Grenville approved the request, allotting £715 for remedying what Hillsborough 
described (in reporting the successful outcome at the Board’s July 4, 1764 meeting) as 
“the defective state” of the office of the Board with respect to inadequate salaries, “the 
want of more assistance in the Clerks office,” and “the Insufficiency of some of the 
present clerks.” At that same meeting, the Board also proposed new rules and procedures 
for clerical paperwork, and over turned its staff. The Board approved the retirements of 
four clerks and the Deputy Secretary (“in consideration of his advanced age”), distributed 
                                                





the extra funds granted by Grenville to the remaining staff, and specified a process of 
hiring new clerks (involving an interview of the applicant, consideration of “a specimen 
of his writing,” and the examination of references).17 
 Later that month, the Board approved these rules, and established new procedures 
for the proper conduct of clerical work and for the correct handling of bureaucratic 
documents. All clerks were now required “attend their duty in the Office” between 10 am 
and 3 pm “or as long as the Board sits or the Secretary remains in the Office, or requires 
their attendance,” as well as during any evening when ordered by the Secretary. The 
clerks were to take particular care to properly manage the office’s archive. Upon his 
arrival in the morning and before his departure in the evening, the Junior Clerk was to 
ensure “that all Books & papers be locked up in their respective Presses and places,” and 
to return the “Keys” to the cabinets containing the official documents to the Secretary or 
his Deputy. Security was paramount: no clerk was to “presume to deliver any Book or 
paper; or the Copy of any paper to any Stranger, or to suffer any Stranger to inspect or 
peruse any Book or paper without an order from the Secretary, or, in his absence, from 
the Deputy Secretary.” The Doorkeeper to the Board was, in turn, “on no account” to 
“suffer any Strangers to go into the Clerks room.”18 The rules established at this meeting 
continued to regulate clerical behavior at the Board of Trade for many years: a March 4, 
1777 meeting minute recounts, for example, the petition of one “Mr Davies, a Clerk in 
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their Lordships Office,” to be “restored to his place” upon being suspended “for neglect 
of Duty, pursuant to a minute of the Board of the 23d of July 1764.”19 
 1764 also saw the imperial bureaucrat Thomas Pownall articulate the importance 
of the proper administrative management of imperial paperwork in The Administration of 
the Colonies. The relationship between Pownall’s text–the most significant analysis of 
imperial government to appear in the late eighteenth century–and the broader ideological 
attitudes toward managing empire that took shape in the middle of the eighteenth century 
has often been noted. Imperial administration in these years sought to balance the 
preservation of political liberty in the colonies against the desire to render the American 
empire profitable to the metropole, which in turn led to policies restricting colonists’ 
economic activity. Pownall advanced a case for this position, arguing that colonial 
legislatures were properly subordinate to royal governors and London administrators, and 
that colonial administration ought to be centralized into one government department, 
rather than have its functions distributed between the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, the 
Secretary of State, the Treasury, and other bureaucratic offices.20 
 However, the vast scholarship on Pownall’s Administration of the Colonies has 
yet to recognize the author’s brief comments in the opening of the work on the 
relationship between imperial governance and what he termed “information.” This 
section of the book remained unchanged through all the revisions that Pownall made in 
the several editions of the text published during the remainder of the 1760s and in the 
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early 1770s.21 As a former clerk at the Board of Trade, lieutenant-governor of New 
Jersey, and governor of Massachusetts and South Carolina, Pownall possessed intimate 
and varied experiences of imperial bureaucracy; and here he advocated a way of 
organizing its documentary output. According to Pownall, the new “grand maritime 
dominion, consisting of our possessions in the Atlantic and in America” now under 
British control required “some general system of administration” to ensure that the 
mother country would “profit” from its empire. The proper organization of the material 
instruments of empire was important to this vision. “That part of government, which 
should administer” the colonies, Pownall contended, “ought, in the first place, to be the 
center of all information . . .” “All communication, all information should center 
immediately and solely in this department,” he wrote, such that “the department . . . has 
the means of knowledge of its business” to effectively execute the tasks of governance. 
Pownall criticized what he found to be the disorganized state of ‘correspondence’ in 
imperial administration:  
While the military correspond with the Secretary of State, the civil in one part of 
their office with the Secretary of State, in another with the Board of Trade; while 
the navy correspond in matters not merely naval with the Admiralty, while the 
engineers correspond with the Board of Ordnance, officers of the revenue with the 
several boards do that branch, and have no communication with the department 
which has, or ought to have, the general direction and administration of this great 
Atlantic and American, this great commercial interest, who is to collect?  
 
“Who does, or ever did collect, into one view,” Pownall lamented, “all these matters of 
information and knowledge?” The absence of “any one department form’d for this 
purpose” meant that it was difficult to put such “information and knowledge” “to any 
official real use.” For Pownall, the solution was to make the Secretary of State’s office 
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the information locus of colonial governance since “information” and “administration” 
were inextricably bound: by “centering” “information and knowledge” “in a one office,” 
the “power of executing” acts of governance based on them would “spring from one 
undivided department.” 22 Effective administration could not proceed in the absence of 
the organized “knowledge.” Notably, Pownall conceptualized ‘information and 
knowledge’ in concrete terms: as ‘correspondence’ between different administrative 
departments.  
 Pownall’s argument for concentrating “information and knowledge” centrally in 
the Secretary of State’s office, and the centrality of “communication” to how he 
understood the meaning of those concepts, was consonant with his broader intention in 
Administration to re-imagine a system of imperial government in the British empire in 
the Atlantic that consolidated metropolitan authority. He articulated the centrality of 
“information and knowledge” to colonial administration, and argued for the improved 
management of intra-administrative ‘correspondence.’ The Board’s own reform of 
clerical and documentary management that year differed from Pownall’s proposal; but 
both the institutional reform and Pownall’s theorization serve to highlight the central 
importance imperial government assigned to circulating and managing paper. How was 
this system of communication organized? Thanks to several generations of scholarship, a 
portrait of the growth and change within the British administrative bureaucracy in the 
post-Restoration period can be drawn.23  
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From the establishment of the Council of Trade and Foreign Plantations in 1696 
as the central administrative authority over English America until the dissolution of the 
Board of Trade in 1782, that structure of personnel consisted in principle of eight salaried 
commissioners (helmed by the First Lord) who conducted the Board’s regular business 
and regularly appeared at its meetings, and a number of unsalaried ex officio 
Commissioners who were not regular attendees. In the 1696 establishment, the Privy 
Council designated the appointment of an eleven-person clerical staff to assist the 
commissioners, including a Secretary, nominated by the Crown (held singularly except 
from 1753-1758 when two Secretaries occupied the position); a Deputy Secretary or 
Chief Clerk; four clerks; two office or chamber keepers; two messengers; and a female 
cleaner known as the “necessary woman.” Over the course of the eighteenth century, the 
size of this establishment remained largely intact: between 1696 and 1708, the number of 
clerks fluctuated between four and six, before being fixed at seven (salaried according to 
seniority) in 1708, with the only subsequent change before the Board’s termination 
coming with the expansion to nine in 1764.24  
 From the Restoration, the office of the Secretary of State was divided between 
two Secretaries, both concerned with domestic governance, but who from at least 1674 
divided responsibility for foreign affairs between a Northern Department and a Southern 
Department. In 1674, Sir Joseph Williamson, the Northern Secretary, organized a system 
of storing documents into sets of cupboards in a room in the Secretary’s office at 
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Whitehall.25 Two significant developments in this arrangement came in 1768, at which 
point a third Secretary was established who dealt with colonial matters; and in 1782, 
when the office was reorganized and divided between a Home Office and a Foreign 
Office. The Secretary was assisted by two Under Secretaries (with some alterations in the 
establishment between 1759 and 1768, when there was often one Under Secretary, and 
two or three Assistant Under Secretaries); and a series of clerks, including a Chief Clerk 
and a hierarchy of junior clerks whose numbers averaged between five and six in the first 
half of the eighteenth century, and between seven and nine from 1750 and 1782. The 
office staff included office keepers; “necessary women”; decipherers; writers of the 
official newsletter, the Gazette; and translators and embellishers of letters. The Secretary 
of State’s staff also included an archivist, the Keeper of State Papers. That office was 
held singularly alongside a staff of fluctuating numbers from its establishment in 1578. 
From 1764-1800, a separate office of three “Methodisers of State Papers” presided as part 
of a Parliamentary commission aimed at organizing the state archives.26  
The organization of other offices directly concerned with imperial affairs modeled 
that of the Secretary of State’s establishment: a structure of a high authority supervising a 
body of under-secretaries and clerks. The system of Admiralty administration that 
presided in the British empire during the eighteenth century was forged during the reign 
of Henry VIII. Under Henry, the Privy Council created the core offices of the Admiralty, 
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including the 1546 establishment of the offices of the Lord High Admiral and a 
subordinate Navy Board and High Court of Admiralty. In 1560, the Crown established 
further offices, including that of vice-admirals of the fleet, ordnance positions, treasurers, 
naval surveyors, and victualing officers, and directed the Navy Board to regularly report 
on its proceedings to the Lord High Admiral. Between 1673 and 1685, an Admiralty 
Commission existed, only to be abolished by James II. In the aftermath of the Revolution 
of 1688, an Admiralty Board was reestablished, made up of six commissioners under the 
direction of a First Lord, an arrangement that fluctuated until 1709, when the bureaucratic 
organization was fixed into a tripartite division reminiscent of the earlier period: an 
Admiralty Board, under the authority of the Privy Council, exercising the powers 
formerly accorded to the Lord High Admiral; a series of subordinate boards, usually 
sixteen administrators in size, tasked with the performance of specific administrative 
functions (including the Board for Sick and Wounded Seamen, the Treasurer’s Office, 
and the Victualling Board); and a High Court of Admiralty that governed the 
administration of justice within the service. Most important among these boards was the 
Navy Board, which was responsible for maintaining the physical infrastructure of royal 
ships and docks.27 
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Like the Board of Trade, the Lords of the Admiralty issued instructions and other 
paper ‘instruments’ to admirals, emanating from the delegated authority of the Privy 
Council, which specified expectations and requirements for bureaucratic behavior on 
virtually every conceivable act of sea-based bureaucracy: from authorizing the movement 
of ships to specific locales, to managing impressment, to the issuance of warrants for 
seamen and other ship staff.28 The first “Instructions” issued by the Lords, in fact, 
concerned the proper methods of drawing up and completing bills of exchange for 
supplying ships with goods; and required that all records of voyages were to be kept 
exclusively in official books.29 From the origins of Admiralty governance in the post-
Restoration period, admirals were instructed by the Lords to “keep a true and Exact 
Journall [sic] of your proceedings during your Voyage,” and to “give a Copy to” the 
Admiralty’s “Secretary at your return”; and during their voyages, admirals were required 
to “keep a correspondence with” the Secretary “by Letters as often as you have 
opportunity with by Sea or over Land.”30 These “Instructions” would soon become 
standardized, and included instructions for the completion and return of paperwork: for 
example, in 1674, the Lords issued a set of instructions concerning the “Method for 
Payments in ye Navy,” in which they detailed the specific bookkeeping responsibilities of 
the Naval comptroller, and the methods of writing out correct accounts.31 This 
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expectation gradually encompassed more kinds of forms as the size and complexity of the 
bureaucracy grew.32 
The Admiralty’s clerks processed documents received back in London. The 
Admiralty Secretary would then present the Lords of the Admiralty with all papers 
requiring their review and action. At their meetings, the Lords would (in the same manner 
as the Board of Trade) deliberate upon the business presented in the reviewed documents. 
If the matter warranted a reply, the Lords would issue an order to the secretary to draft a 
letter of response. Once the secretary prepared the reply, he returned it to the Lords for 
their approval; once approved, a clerk would then be directed to prepare a final form of 
the letter for the Lords to countersign before it was dispatched. As Admiralty Secretary 
from 1751, John Clevland inaugurated the practice of summarizing the Lords’ actions on 
the verso side of the document in question, which the Admiralty clerks would then use in 
the preparation of any replies.33 Outgoing paperwork from the Lords, such as orders and 
instructions to ship captains, were (as in other departments) transcribed by clerks into 
volumes as a means of record-keeping. The system of archiving and managing Admiralty 
paperwork was largely established in the mid-1690s in the context of war with France, 
the same period in which administrative procedure in the Admiralty office as a whole was 
regularized. In late 1693, the Admiralty specified procedures for the review of 
documents: one of the chief clerks was to read through all the papers which required the 
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eds. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Online ed., Lawrence 
Goldman, January 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/64851]; more generally, see Franklin B. 






Board’s signature; documents concerning matters that required consideration by the 
entire Admiralty Board were to be copied and placed aside; and letters from the 
Secretaries of State to the Lords of the Admiralty were to be kept separately from all 
other papers and given priority. In 1694, the Board established that it would conclude 
each meeting by deciding whether to refer any matters to its next adjournment, and 
organize corresponding documents for review. That same year, William Bridgeman, 
secretary to the Admiralty, established a system of archiving and organizing the 
department’s records. Bridgeman developed the first indexes to the Admiralty Board’s 
letters, and began collecting and rebinding the minutes into volumes. He also initiated 
distinct archival series for different kinds of documents, classifying forms such as 
petitions; commissions and warrants; and correspondence with the Secretaries of State, 
into separate classes. Bridgeman’s practices would become the normal mode of business 
in the office throughout the eighteenth century.34   
In processing the incoming paperwork, each of the clerks of the Admiralty was 
assigned to read particular kinds of documents, and to prepare appropriate responses as 
dictated by the Lords through the notation made by the Secretary on the paper. This 
division of clerical labor was explicitly specified at various times, including in October 
1759, when Clevland retired and Phillip Stephens, the next clerk in line of seniority, was 
promoted to position of Secretary. Clevland and Stephens together drew up a memo 
entitled “A Partition of the Business of the Clerks of the Office.” Each of the sixteen 
clerks was tasked with performing specific tasks: one, for example, to specifically write 
                                                
34 For a discussion of these administrative developments, see John Ehrman, The Navy in the War of William 
III (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1953), 557-565. See also Ehrman, “The Official Papers 





all memorials to the King and Secretaries of State; another to ensure that all paperwork 
sent to the Admiralty Board was properly prepared; a different clerk to collect and enter 
the minutes of the Lords’ meetings; and others to deal with archival tasks such as “to sort 
& keep all Letters & Papers in Proper Order, & to see to the Binding up of such as have 
been usually bound up."35 The assignment of duties could shift as the structure and 
necessities of administration altered, but in general, clerks specialized in handling 
different kinds of documents: when a Parliamentary commission interviewed Admiralty 
clerks in 1786 in the course of inquiring into official salaries, it found that the Lords 
assigned each clerk a different task, ranging from handling the correspondence between 
the Admiralty and ship captains; taking, transcribing, and preparing the office’s minute 
books; and being “employed to translate and Copy all French and Spanish Papers and to 
extract and arrange the Foreign Intelligence.”36 Unlike the Treasury and the Secretary of 
State’s office, the Admiralty lacked a dedicated archivist until the establishment of the 
Admiralty Record Office in 1809 and a specially appointed Keeper (John Finlaison) to 
undertake the organization of its papers.37 In the interim, clerks organized documents by 
drawing up tables of contents to the books of transcriptions of Admiralty orders and 
letters, cross-referencing titular descriptions of the contents of specific paperwork to the 
                                                
35 The document is printed and discussed in G. F. James, “Select Documents. XXXV. The admiralty 
establishment,” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 16 (1938), 26-27. 
 
36 See NMM, CAD/D/9, Report Upon the Office of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1786. For 
the broader context of the commission that investigated these offices, see J. E. D. Binney, British Public 
Finance and Administration, 1774-92 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), esp. chapter 2; John Torrance, 
“Social Class and Bureaucratic Innovation: The Commissioners for Examining the Public Accounts, 1780-
1787,” Past & Present, 78 (1978), 56-81; and John R. Breihan, “William Pitt and the Commission on Fees, 
1785-1801,” Historical Journal, 27 (1984), 58-81. 
 
37 See TNA, ADM 12/17 and ADM 12/86 for the first examples of this. For the organization and use of the 
Admiralty records within this specific office, see R. B. Pugh, “The Early History of the Admiralty Record 
Office,” in J. Conway Davies (ed.), Studies Presented to Sir Hilary Jenkinson (London: Oxford University 





page numbers upon which they were transcribed.38 The 1786 report on the Admiralty 
establishment specified that, in the absence of an archivist, “the fourth Clerk” received an 
annual allowance of £80 “for taking care of the office Papers, and Indexing the 
Correspondence with the Public Boards.”39 
 Considerably more vast in its official staff was the fiscal bureaucracy, which 
expanded at a considerably higher pace than any other government department during the 
course of the eighteenth century and employed more people than any other set of offices 
of state, with the most important and largest office being that which was directly 
responsible for collecting revenue: the Excise.40 As John Brewer showed many years ago, 
the very bureaucratic practices of tax collection and expenditure through which the 
British state financed the cost of governing this empire were themselves constituted by 
the “prodigies of penmanship performed” by the tax collectors and government clerks. 
Using “books,” “instruments,” “pen and special inkpot,” these bureaucrats created, 
deployed, and accounted for the forms of paperwork through which state finance came to 
be raised.41 The Treasury possessed a well-organized and sizeable number of clerks. As 
in other offices, each of these clerks engaged in particular kinds of duties within the 
office, much of which can be gleaned from the reports made by the Parliamentary 
commission in 1786 while inquiring into official salaries. The four Chief Clerks each 
                                                
38 See, for example, in TNA, ADM 2/3. 
 
39 NMM, CAD/D/9, Report Upon the Office of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 1786. 
 
40 Brewer, 55-56. 
 
41 Brewer, xvi, 105. For a discussion of Brewer’s work in relation to the nascent historiography on 
paperwork, see Ben Kafka, “Paperwork: The State of the Discipline,” Book History, 12 (2009), 342-344. 
For a detailed examination of the constellation of practices and institutions that structured the operation of 
the customs within Britain domestic, see William J. Ashworth, Customs and Excise: Trade, Production, 




supervised a “Department,” and distributed documents for review and response among 
the more junior clerks within their “Department.” The Chief Clerks reviewed all outgoing 
documents prepared by these clerks and coordinated the presentation of paperwork 
requiring the Lords’ signature as the meetings of the Treasury Board. These 
“Departments” were assigned specific tasks, involving the handling of particular 
documents: for example, one department involved the conduct of payments of 
government salaries, while another involved handling “all Business relative to the 
Foreign Ministers, Secret & Special Service, Tax Office, the Judges, the Attorney and 
Solicitor General” and several other offices. In turn, the Treasury was also assisted in 
managing its paperwork through by a “Keeper of the Papers,” a position first established 
in 1726, and held by a clerk from 1727 till 1783, at which point a separate person was 
appointed. As the occupant of the office, John Morin, described his duties in response to 
the 1786 Parliamentary inquiry, the Keeper was charged with rendering the office’s 
papers usable for reference–“to schedule and digest all Papers transmitted to his 
Repository that are of Import, so that they may easily [be] resorted to” and to “be ready to 
inform the Secretaries and Clerks of the precedents when necessary.”42    
The bureaucratic organization of the American colonies generally modeled the 
structure of English government in its division between an executive body with an 
advisory council, and a legislative body. Colonies were either proprietary (meaning 
founded by private investors or interests); chartered (in which case a specific group was 
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53 and passim. For the subsequent history of organizing Treasury paperwork, see Barbara L. Craig, 
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granted a charter from the Crown to establish a colony); or royal (meaning that the 
colony was under the direct sovereignty of the Crown); but in all cases, as the next 
chapter demonstrates, administrators in these various colonies operated under the same 
expectations for proper bureaucratic behavior, ones dictated from the central institutions 
of the Privy Council and the Board of Trade. Modeling the role of the Privy Council as an 
advisory body to the sovereign, governors were advised in the administration of the 
colony by a local council, usually composed of local influential and wealthy citizens 
nominated by the governor and approved of by the Board of Trade. The colonial council 
was invested with the power to review and debate legislation, and in this respect acted as 
a check on the governor’s executive power. The council also operated as the upper house 
of the colonial legislature. However, the governor retained ultimate responsibility for 
administering the central functions of government. The Privy Council invested him with 
the power to appoint lower bureaucrats–customs officials, judicial officers, and clerks, for 
example–, and it was with and through the governor that London administrators 
corresponded. Below the gubernatorial and consular level in each colony lay a pastiche of 
administrative institutions and positions–town councils, sheriffs, local justices, for 
example–which were highly varied depending on locale, but often modeled off of English 
counterparts. While not directly appointed by London government and in most cases 
having limited interaction with metropolitan administrative institutions, these local 
administrators (like all colonial officials) were subject to the ultimate sovereignty of the 
Crown and its delegated authorities for imperial administration.43  
                                                
43 On the organization of government in British America at both the federal and local levels, see Labaree, 
Royal Government in America; Jack P. Greene, The Quest for Power: The Lower Houses of Assembly in the 
Southern Royal Colonies, 1689-1776 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963); Greene, 





 The preceding discussion of the organization of British imperial bureaucracy and 
communication suggests two key conclusions about the evolution of the administrative 
structure of government. The first is that its lineaments were mostly established in the 
post-Restoration period, and (with the exception of the fiscal bureaucracy) underwent 
little significant alteration over the course of the eighteenth century. Key moments of 
transformation in the territorial expanse of the British empire in the eighteenth century–
the expansion of the size of empire in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, and its 
contraction with the loss of the North American colonies, for example–resulted in 
changes in the size of the staff of bureaucratic institutions, rather than fundamental 
innovation in the divisions of administrative responsibility within them or across 
institutional lines. The second is that bureaucratic organization was basically consistent 
across government: administrative offices were generally organized in terms of a high 
supervisory authority, under royal sovereignty, overseeing a staff of undersecretaries and 
clerks who managed specific aspects of governance. The dissertation now turns to 
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examining some of the specific ways in which paperwork facilitated the execution of the 


























THE BOARD OF TRADE, THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
AND THE CASE OF THE QUERY 
 
Introduction 
Just one year into his tenure as governor of New York, William Tryon needed a 
vacation. By mid-October, 1772, Tryon complained of the tiring nature of the work, and 
informed the new head of the Board of Trade and Plantations, the Earl of Dartmouth, of 
his plans to “set out . . . for Philadelphia,” in the hopes “that by changing the air & Scene 
for a short Time I may reestablish, if possible, my Health.” But before he departed, Tryon 
wanted to congratulate Dartmouth upon the latter’s ascension to the combined position of 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department and head of the Board of Trade. Having 
replaced the Earl of Hillsborough in the combined office of Secretary of State for the 
Southern Department and head of the Board of Trade, Dartmouth now stood at the helm 
of authority over British America. Tryon noted that he would henceforth be “directing my 
future Correspondence to be addressed to” Dartmouth.1 He numbered this letter “N.o1.” 
Tryon followed up the next day with letter numbered “N.o2,” sending Dartmouth 
“Duplicates of my last Dispatches to the Earl of Hillsborough.” Tryon noted that he 
believed the Board was “already possessed of the Originals” but sought to ensure that the 
paperwork had indeed reached London.2  
                                                
1 TNA, CO 5/1076, William Tryon to Dartmouth, October 19, 1772, f. 228. 
 





Several months later, after crossing the Atlantic Ocean in a packet boat, both of 
Tryon’s letters were received by the Board of Trade. When the letters arrived at the 
Board’s offices in Whitehall, a clerk read them and then recorded a summary of their 
contents on the back of each letter.3 To Tryon’s first letter of October 19, the clerk made 
the following short annotation:  
Duplicate of a Letter No. 1. from Gov. Tryon to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated Oct.  
19. 1772 congratulating His Lordship on his appointment to the Office of one of 
the principal Secretaries of State. 
 
The clerk then renumbered the letter in terms of the entire series of letters that Tryon had 
sent to the Board during his tenure in office, assigning it as number 62 and recording that 
number below the summary. The clerk then noted at the bottom of the page that the letter 
had been “Read April 29, 1773.”4 The clerk did something similar with the second letter, 
describing it in his summary as “transmitting publick [sic] papers” from New York to 
London.5 
 Neither Tryon’s nor the clerk’s behavior was remarkable in the context of 
imperial bureaucracy. Indeed, these transmissions of paperwork from America to the 
metropole, and the work of the clerks who processed them when the documents reached 
imperial administrators in London were entirely mundane, quotidian affairs. When Tryon 
wrote his letter in 1772, those institutions were the Board of Trade and the Secretary of 
State for the Southern Department. The leadership of both of these institutions had come 
                                                
3 The Board’s offices had always been in Whitehall, but within the palace complex, they moved several 
times over the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries before being fixed within the Treasury 
building constructed by William Kent between 1733 and 1736. The Board remained situated here until it 
was disbanded. See Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Period in American History: England’s 
Commercial and Colonial Policy, Volume 4 (1938; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), 297-298. 
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to be consolidated in a single figure, Dartmouth. Like every governor in the American 
colonies, Tryon would repeat these transmissions continuously over his tenure, sending a 
morass of documents, including affidavits, letters, tables, receipts, and extracts of minutes 
of the New York assembly–back to London, precisely numbering each dispatch and 
keeping a copy himself.6 In their aggregate, such acts were profoundly significant. The 
minute transactions embedded in the constant circulations of such documents from the 
Americas to London constituted the material embodiment of imperial authority. 
Paperwork, as the small example of Tryon demonstrates, was the material form these 
practices assumed: the sinew by which the British Atlantic came to be produced as a 
governed space.  
This chapter recovers the contextual meaning of a specific form of paperwork: the 
query. From the late seventeenth century, the administrators at the Board of Trade 
regularly circulated such queries to governors, requesting information about the trading, 
geographical, and political conditions of different colonies. Similar practices persisted in 
the office of the Secretary of State after American independence. What was the purpose 
of circulating these queries? What kind of knowledge did the Board seek to generate from 
them? What significance lay in a governor’s response? In answering these questions, the 
chapter examines queries circulated to governors in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ 
War and after the American Revolution. Such an examination, this chapter argues, 
demonstrates that imperial governance in this period was predicated upon an 
epistemological culture in which the knowledge and embodied transaction of process 
                                                
6 TNA, CO 5/1076, Tryon to Dartmouth, October 20, 1772, f. 232 (affidavit); Tryon to Dartmouth, 
December 1, 1772, f. 234 (forwarding letters); Tryon to Dartmouth, December 2, 1772, f. 238 (extract). For 




constituted an essential complement to the generation of factual information about the 
state of the British empire.  
Superficially, in fact, the Board’s queries would appear to have been intended to 
generate such factual information about the colonies, and there is little doubt that this was 
part of their intention. However, the most important kind of information sought by 
imperial administrators through the queries did not lie in the propositions contained in the 
governors’ responses. Rather, the most significant function of querying lay in the way in 
which these administrators could ensure that colonial governors were following a 
prescribed code of conduct in their official capacity. London government had dictated 
this code of conduct to the governors through the circulation of another kind of 
bureaucratic document: the “Orders and Instructions.” Through querying, metropolitan 
administrators at the Board of Trade ensured that governors were following the precise 
and specific “Instructions” that had been issued to them. In turn, governors demonstrated 
obedience to these directions and deference to the hierarchy of imperial authority when 
they completed “Queries.” This form of paperwork served as a site where governors 
expressed their own knowledge of the correct processes and procedures that adhered in 
the ‘imperial constitution.’ Through this mode of paperwork, the hierarchy of authority at 
the heart of the imperial constitution found its mediated, practiced expression, rendering 
bureaucrats accountable. 
Thanks to a long tradition of scholarship, the Board of Trade’s origins, history, 
and functions are well understood.7 Situated under the control of the royal Privy Council, 
                                                
7 Key works include Charles McLean Andrews, British Committees, Commissions, and Councils of Trade 
and Plantations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1908); Oliver Morton Dickerson, American 
Colonial Government, 1696-1765: A study of the British Board of Trade in its relation to the American 




to which it was technically merely an advisory body, the Board of Trade served as the 
central conduit through which paperwork to and from the colonies flowed, and through 
which Crown governance of the colonies was enacted. The Board acted as a kind of 
“forwarding agent” for paperwork sent by other branches of government–such as the 
Admiralty, Customs, and Treasury-to the colonies, and a site for reviewing colonial 
paperwork before referring its recommendations (contained in documents called 
“representations”) for actions on issues of colonial policy and politics to the Privy 
Council that required royal approval (especially in the cases of official appointments).8 
The Board also prepared paperwork and met with Parliament in moments when bills 
proposing alterations to the charter and proprietary colonies came before Parliament. The 
Board’s activities thus actualized a hierarchy of authority that placed all levels of 
imperial government–London bureaucracy and colonial administration–under Crown. 
Crucial to its effective function, therefore, lay in the ability to hold colonial government 
across the Atlantic Ocean accountable–something it could not do without the technology 
of paper. 
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The document through which metropolitan government specified these 
expectations to its colonial bureaucrats were called “Instructions,” issued to governors by 
the Board under the authority of the Privy Council. The “Instructions” operated as 
constitutional documents in which metropolitan administrators its expectations for 
colonial governance. Although instructions to American governors began to be issued in 
the 1660s, the system and language of instructions came to be standardized from the 
1670s, from which point they were generally changed in only minor ways.9 The manifold 
developments in the colonies themselves over the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries did not produce any significant change in the language, character, and 
expectations of bureaucratic performance which these “Instructions” expressed: as 
Leonard Woods Labaree, the most distinguished analyst of these documents, observed in 
1930, “the officials in Whitehall who drafted these documents were as unmoved by the 
changes in America as they would have been if those changes had taken place on another 
planet.”10 The debate which unfolded during the eighteenth century over the binding 
nature of these “Instructions” upon colonial assemblies–strongly asserted by metropolitan 
officials, and denied by the colonists themselves–never obfuscated the fact that the 
                                                
9 These “Instructions” were published and edited by Leonard Labaree in Royal Instructions to British 
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constitutional significance of these documents for the bureaucrats who were indisputably 
subject to Crown authority–the governors underwent no change in this period.11 
 While the constitutional significance of the “Instructions” to governors is well 
understood, considerably less attention has been accorded to the document by which the 
Board sought to monitor gubernatorial compliance: the query.12 This chapter elucidates 
the constitutional significance of both of these forms, and examines the type of 
bureaucratic knowledge that inhered in their circulation. It focuses in particular upon the 
set of queries issued by the Board of Trade in mid-1773, the first to be issued under the 
tenure of Dartmouth (the man whom Tyron congratulated upon his appointment). The 
chapter begins with an examination of the “Instructions” themselves, and then continues 
by exploring how five governors–of St. John in Canada, Pennsylvania, West Florida, 
                                                
11 The historiography on colonial protest against the “Instructions” is well-developed: see John F. Burns, 
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Virginia, and Bermuda–replied to the set of queries issued by the Board in 1773. As the 
chapter argues, the queries served as a site for indexing governors’ adherence to the 
Board’s explicit “Instructions” for proper administrative conduct. Through their acts of 
reply to the queries, governors not only provided information for the imperial state, but 
also (and, indeed, more importantly) demonstrated their understanding of these 
expectations. The chapter concludes by suggesting that the significance of these 
documents remained the same for imperial government in British America even after the 
American Revolution and the institutional dissolution of the Board of Trade in 1782.  
 
Constituting “Instructions”  
Upon the appointment of a new governor to office, the Board of Trade and the 
Privy Council issued him “Instructions” on how to execute his authority. Sometimes 
accompanied by a separate set of instructions specifically focused upon trade, such 
“Instructions” functioned as the textual constitutions empowering the designated 
governor as the executive authority over a given colony as an extension of the royal 
sovereignty. These documents invested the governor with the ability to act as a servant of 
royal power. Through these texts, the British state constituted the governor as a political 
subject, delineating both the precise nature of his authority, and the processes and tasks 
he was to execute as an imperial servant. The “Instructions” were always given to 
governors with a separate “Commission,” “constituting” the appointee as governor over a 
specific geographic area. Despite small modifications in their language, these 
“Instructions” took a basic form and had shared content that transcended the particular 




began its “Instructions” by ordering the governor to travel to the colony in question; and 
once there, to maintain “Peace and Tranquility” and to obey the treaties and agreements 
with foreign powers in force at the time. The “Instructions” specified that the governor 
was to always consult with the legislature or Council of the colony in making decisions;  
        
TNA, PC 5/12, Detail from Instructions to Governor William Young, Dominica, 1770 
to maintain the proper administration of justice; and to efficiently raise revenue–in short, 
to ensure that the colonies were well governed and ordered spaces. At the same time, the 
Board augmented these standard instructions by including directions to a governor to 
address a local issue: for example, in the 1769 “Instructions” Governor John Byron of 
Newfoundland, the Board issued specific dictates on the proper maintenance of the 
province’s fishery.13 In some instances, but without regularity, the Board appended sets 
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of queries to their “Instructions,” as well as further paperwork for the governors to 
complete and return to them.14  
 These “Instructions” regularly included specifications for governors to regularly 
return paperwork demonstrating that the colonies were properly administered. Governors 
were to “transmit authentic copies of all Laws, Statutes and ordinances, which are now 
made and in force” to the Secretaries of State “within three Months” of their enactment, 
“together with Duplicates.” A failure to properly execute this paperwork that defined this 
process would result in metropolitan government’s “highest Displeasure,” and 
punishment of “forfeiture of that years salary . . .” Similarly, the Board instructed that 
“Copies and duplicates of all Acts” passed by the colony’s assembly and council had to 
be “transmitted,” with each act “fairly abstracted in the margents [sic]” and with a 
notation of “the several Dates, or respective times” of its passage. ‘Abstract’ in this 
context referred to brief summaries of the content of the Act, usually no longer than a few 
words. The governor was also tasked with sending “Transcripts of all Journals and other 
proceedings of the” colonial assembly, again “fairly abstracted in the Margents [sic].”15 It 
was necessary, the Board’s “Instructions” made clear, for the governors “to send unto us, 
by One of Our Principal Secretaries of State only, a particular account of all your 
proceedings, and of the Condition of Affairs within your Government.”16 
The masses of documents that the governors then dispatched to the Board of 
Trade and Secretary of State in London unfolded in response to these “Instructions” for 
                                                
14 TNA, PC 5/12, Instructions to Byron, 209-225. 
 
15 TNA, PC 5/12, “Instructions to Our Trusty and well beloved Josiah Martin Esquire, Our Captain General 
and Governor in Chief in and over Our Province of North Carolina,” 1771, 571-2. 
 





their provision.17 Prior to the 1770s, the Board’s clerks would record the titles of the 
paperwork transmitted by the governors back to London in the Board’s meeting minutes. 
At the June 18, 1764 meeting of the Board, the clerk recorded the titles of paperwork 
considered lately received within the last year from Quebec: 
Letter from Mr John Gray to the Board, dated 21 Janry 1764, 
relating to the Posts of the King’s Domains in Canada, and inclosing 
Copy of a Memorial of Richard Murray, John Gray and Thomas 
Dunn to the Lords of the Treasury 
Letter from James Murray, Esqr, Governor of Quebec, to the 
Board, dated Janry 26, 1764, relative to the means of preventing 
smuggling; and inclosing 
Copy of a Letter from Govr. Murray to Lord Egremont, Secry of 
State, Sept.r 27 1763, containing his sentiments on the measures to be 
taken for preventing illicit Trade.18 
 
Upon receipt, the Board might take a variety of actions in reply to the paperwork received 
from the colonies, but always followed the same process: the paper was read and 
considered before the Committee, and then the Board would task the Secretary with 
drawing up a letter of response where necessary. The secretary would then return the 
draft reply to the Board, which (if they approved it) would instruct a clerk to transcribe 
the letter into a final form, and then return it to the Board for final approval. If the 
response was approved, the Board would sign the letter before its dispatch. Some papers 
did not fall into this system of reply: less important letters could be signed by the 
secretary after Board consideration, without the need for the paper to go before the Board 
again after the drafting of the reply; and commissions and instructions to governors, once 
approved by the Board, were sent to the Privy Council for royal approval before being 
                                                
17 The most comprehensive discussion of the practices of receipt and material organization at the Board 
remains Mary Patterson Clarke, “The Board of Trade at Work,” American Historical Review, 17 (1911), 
17-43. 
 






dispatched to governors.19 Much of the incoming correspondence was not responded to 
by the Board itself, but rather either simply recorded as being “read and received,” or 
forwarded to another department of administration for consideration. Murray’s letter to 
Egremont, for example, was forwarded by John Pownall, secretary to the Board, to his 
counterpart at the Treasury, Charles Jenkinson, with a cover letter from Pownall stating 
that he had been “directed to send” “the inclosed [sic] Copy of this paper, and to desire 
you will communicate it to the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury.”  
Complementing this recording of the receipt of such paperwork at the Board of 
Trade were a variety of practices of archivization. The most basic of these was the 
transcription and recording of documents related to a given colony, or group of colonies, 
for a set period time, in what were called “entry books.” Documents sent to the colonies, 
including letters and instructions to governors, were copied in full into these books, each 
under headings indicating the date of their transaction.20 Thus, in the relevant “entry 
book,” the Board transcribed the complete cover letter from Pownall to Jenkinson, and 
recorded (in the margins) a brief summary description of the action taken (in this case, 
the forwarding of the material to the Treasury).21 The original letter (and the enclosure 
from Murray that Pownall forwarded to Jenkinson) can be found among the Treasury’s 
own files.22 The Board used a variety of other methods of recording such paperwork, 
                                                
19 Clarke, “Board of Trade at Work,” 36-37. 
 
20 See, for example, the transcription of correspondence, instructions, and laws received from Pennsylvania 
between 1761 to 1773 in TNA, CO 5/1296. 
 
21 The transcription of Pownall’s letter to Jenkinson in the Board’s entry book is at TNA, CO 43/1, “Letter 
to Charles Jenkinson Esq.r Secy to the Treasury, inclosing [sic] Copy of a Letter from the Governor of 
Quebec to Lord Egremont,” 172. 
 
22 For the original letter, see TNA, T 1/434/137, Murray to Egremont, September 27, 1763. The cover letter 




including the creation of books in which letters sent (and in some cases also letters 
received) and paperwork generated for a specific colony was transcribed.23 These 
paginated books regularly contained “Indexes” at their end in which summary titles for 
each transcribed piece of paperwork were recorded, corresponding to the page number in 
the volume where the full transcription could be found.24  
It was through these practices, beginning with the Board’s specification of proper 
paperwork as essential to the governance of the colonies in their “Instructions” to 
governors; second, the process of receiving, following, and transacting such paperwork 
by the governors as a matter of obedience to these commands; and third, the circulation 
and forwarding, where deemed necessary, of such material ‘instruments’ within the 
apparatus of imperial administration in London, that administrators at the Board of Trade 
used documents to govern the American empire. Executive power in the colonies was 
itself crafted through textual forms; and these forms in turn constituted the mediative 
lifeblood through with the colonies were then governed. The organization, receipt, and 
review of these papers–transmitted in the regular packets sent by governors such as 
William Tryon; received and annotated by clerks at the Board of Trade; and in some 
cases reviewed and responded to–formed the work of administering British America.  
The Board’s practices of archiving and using its paperwork served these 
facilitative functions of government. At various points in its history, the Board’s clerical 
staff created abstracts and catalogues of its archival holdings, which reveal something of 
                                                
23 See, for example, TNA, CO 5/1300, a volume without title in which clerks transcribed letters from 
governors of Rhode Island and Connecticut that temporally range from 1760 to 1775. 
 
24 See, for example, TNA, CO 5/1296, “Index” for Pennsylvania correspondence, 1761-1773, ff. 241-243. 
The Board also at times indexed papers by Subject and Name; see, for example, CO 326/1 and CO 326/2 




their organization. The Board organized paperwork circulated and returned between the 
Americas chronologically and geographically by colony or region, which enabled the 
possibility of referral to this archive when necessary. Papers were organized into bundles 
marked for each colony, as well as four more general categories: one for paperwork 
dealing with proprietary colonies, another called “Plantations General” housing all 
general colonial paperwork, another bundle on Trade, and a miscellaneous file that 
contained papers concerning the Board’s own administration. The Board’s clerks would 
then traditionally mark each paper with a word or abbreviation indicating the bundle in 
which it had been placed–in some cases copying documents in order to place them in 
multiple bundles.25   
What kind of reference did the Board make to its own archive? One major usage 
concerned the Board’s solicitation of resolutions on questions of imperial jurisprudence 
from the Attorney and Solicitor Generals. When an issue related to the constitutionality 
of an act or policy arose, the Board sent the relevant document to these judicial officers 
for their opinion. On March 18, 1729, Alured Popple, secretary to the Board of Trade, 
wrote to the judicial officers concerning “several Papers under” the Board’s 
“Consideration relating to the Settlement of Carolina” – specifically the question of 
whether grants of “large Tracts of Land, without any Limitation therein” as had been 
made by the Board in the 1680s, were “legal & of force.” Popple understood that the 
labor of appraising the legitimacy of these grants would require the judicial officers to 
                                                
25 See, for example, BL, Add MS 30372, “Abstract of the Commissions and Instructions formerly and at 
this time given to the Governors of His Majesty’s Plantations in America with References to the Books and 
Papers shewing [sic] the Alterations that have been made therein, as also, Observations on the most 
remarkable Occurrences in each Government especially before the Establishment of this Office in 1696.” 





interpret the original grant from the Crown to the proprietors of Carolina, which in turn 
would required the use of paperwork, which he sent them: “And as the Validity of these 
Grants will naturally depend upon the Powers, Clauses and Design of the Original Grant 
form the Crown to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, I have likewise sent you that Grant 
for your further Information upon this Subject.” “The Governors of North, and of South 
Carolina, being to receive Instructions upon this Head, I am commanded to desire your 
Opinion, as soon as conveniently you can.” Popple closed his note by expressing his 
desire that the law officers would “please to return ye inclosed [sic] Papers with your 
Report.”26 With his letter, Popple sent a copy of the charters of Carolina to facilitate the 
resolution of the question.27   
That circuit of paperwork represented the material embodiment of both the 
constitutional relationships between colony and metropole, which placed British America 
under the sovereignty of the Crown and its delegated authority in the Board of Trade; and 
the very particular kind of knowledge upon which administration of the British empire in 
the Atlantic world rested, one centered on the bureaucratic demonstration of correct 
administrative practice in accordance with the specifications given by the Board in the 
“Instructions.” The next section of this chapter examines how the Board solicited this 




                                                
26 BL, Add MS 35908, “From the Board of Trade about Sir Nathaniel Johnson’s Settlement in Carolina,” 
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 On July 5, 1773, Lord Dartmouth drafted a circular letter (a common genre by 
which metropolitan administrators addressed a message to multiple imperial bureaucrats 
simultaneously) to the governors of British America to complain about the inadequacy of 
the information they had been returning to London. The “Accounts received from His 
Majesty’s Governors in America, of the Condition of their respective Governments,” 
Dartmouth wrote, “have not been so full and explicit with respect to the State and 
progress of the Commerce, Cultivation and Inhabitancy thereof as they might and ought 
to have been . . .” The governors had, by contrast, “contented themselves with barely 
exporting in their Correspondence the ordinary Events of their Administration . . .” 
Hence, Dartmouth informed the governors that he was “transmit[ting]” “the inclosed [sic] 
Heads of Enquiry relative to the Province under your Government,” and ordered them to 
“as speedily as may be, transmit to me” “a very full and particular answer thereto . . .” 
The Governors were also instructed to enclose “such Papers as shall be necessary to 
illustrate and explain every Circumstance that may appear to require it.” Dartmouth 
concluded his letter by making explicit the political role of the colonies within the 
imperial framework of the British empire in the Atlantic world; the centrality of 
information and paperwork to empire; and the relationship between the queries to the 
priorities of empire. “The rapid Progress that is making in Commerce, Cultivation and 
Inhabitancy, is an Object that deserves the utmost Attention,” he wrote, “and it will be 
necessary that you do not content yourself with barely transmitting to me answers to the 
present Heads of Enquiry, but that you do continue to report, in the fullest manner, such 




which those Heads of Enquiry do apply . . .” He concluded with one last request: that the 
governors inform him of any alterations in the composition of colonial government as a 
result of “Death or Removals, in any of the Civil and Military Officers.”28  
 In circulating this form of paperwork, Dartmouth was continuing a practice that 
had been in place at the Board for several decades. The Board’s tradition of sending 
queries to governors at regular intervals evolved directly out of its appropriation of 
analogous practices originally developed by the Royal Society. As Matthew Underwood 
has shown in his analysis of the Board’s queries in the late seventeenth century, the 
imperial-administrative use of this practice fundamentally consistent with that of the 
Royal Society: the Board, Underwood writes, “used questionnaires much as the Society 
had done: to build up a network of distant empirical observers and to discipline those 
observers' participation in that network to achieve the specific ends of those orchestrating 
it from the center.”29 The Board’s use of “Instructions” and “queries” in this regard 
corresponds to a longer tradition of administrative epistemology that Noah Millstone has 
identified as “politique reasoning”: a method of thinking about politics less in terms of 
legitimation, and instead with the aim of discovering the intentions behind political 
actions, especially of one’s enemies. Bureaucratic “Instructions” worked in a 
                                                
28 TNA, CO 5/74, Lord Dartmouth, circular to American governors, July 5, 1773, f. 114. A copy of the 
letter also appears in TNA, CO 5/241, 475-483. 
 
29 Matthew Carl Underwood, “Ordering Knowledge, Re-Ordering Empire: Science and State-Formation in 
the English Atlantic World,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2010, 219; see also Robert M. Bliss, 
Revolution and empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 178-180. On the broader role of the Board of Trade as an 
acquirer of mercantile knowledge to be rendered useful for the state, see Thomas Leng, “Epistemology: 
Expertise and Knowledge in the World of Commerce,” in Philip J. Stern and Carl Wennerlind (eds.), 
Mercantilism Reimagined: Political Economy in Early Modern Britain and Its Empire (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), esp. 111-113. On the connections between the Royal Society and the Board of 
Trade, see Peter Laslett, “John Locke, the Great Recoinage, and the Origins of the Board of Trade: 1695-





complementary sense, with a clear relation to the Renaissance genre of “instructions for 
travelers” that was appropriated with particular force within bureaucratic and scientific 
circles in late sixteenth and early seventeenth century England.30 In order to ensure that 
the actions, methods, and official behavior of one’s allies and underlings would be clear 
and free of dissimulation, it was necessary to guide officeholders–in explicit terms–upon 
the proper conduct of their duties, and in doing so, induce in them a form of reasoning 
about politics that stigmatized deception.31 It was also essential to have a method of 
checking whether bureaucrats had understood these “Instructions” correctly, and acted 
accordingly. Administrative training thus centered upon literally ‘instructing’ bureaucrats 
in deferential, honest behavior.  
 The Board thus used queries in two ways that corresponded with these 
imperatives. One way, as Underwood shows, was to solicit information that it did not 
already possess as empirical knowledge that it could then render useful for planning 
policy and government, a use that overlapped with practices of early modern and 
Enlightenment querying by knowledge societies, historians, and similar figures who 
deployed questionnaires as a tool of information collection in the contexts of scholarly 
                                                
30 Sarah Warneke, Images of the Educational Traveller in Early Modern England (Leiden: Brill, 1995); 
Joan-Pau Rubiès, “Instructions for Travellers: Teaching the Eye to See,” History and Anthropology, 9 
(1996), 56-59; Daniel Carey, “Compiling Nature’s History: Travellers and Travel Narratives in the Early 
Royal Society,” Annals of Science, 54 (1997), 269-292; Barbara J. Shapiro, Political Communication and 
Political Culture in England, 1558-1688 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), esp. chapter 3. On the 
overlap between bureaucratic and travel instruction, see Wolf Feurhahn, “A Theologian’s List and an 
Anthropologist’s Prose: Michaelis, Niebuhr, and the Expedition to Felix Arabia,” in Peter Becker and 
William Clark (eds.), Little Tools of Knowledge: Historical Essays on Academic and Bureaucratic 
Practices (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), esp. 144-145. 
 
31 Noah Millstone, “Plot’s Commonwealth: The Circulation of Manuscripts and the Practice of Politics in 
Early Stuart England,” PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2011, chapter 1; and Millstone, “Seeing Like 
a Statesman in Early Stuart England,” Past and Present, 223 (2014), 101-102. See also W. H. Greenleaf, 
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projects.32 As a matter of imperial administration in the British context, the origins of the 
practice have been described by Underwood, who shows the way in which the Board 
adopted the practice of querying not from the example of Spanish imperial 
administration, where questionnaires had been used from the late sixteenth century, but 
instead from Royal Society circles.33 The Board implemented queries within the context 
of colonial government in America as a method of both gathering information that could 
be useful for crafting economic policy in the developing late seventeenth century English 
Atlantic, and as a tool of disciplining governors as observers who could provide the 
particular information demanded by the center.34 The circular queries to governors, as the 
following discussion shows, fulfilled the second function: facilitating the enforcement of 
expectations for bureaucratic behavior.  
            From 1720, the Board systematically circulated queries to multiple colonial 
representatives at the same time through the use of circular letters. The immediate context 
for the Board’s institution of this practice was a demand from the Privy Council at a July 
                                                
32 On such practices, see Mark Duckworth, “An Eighteenth-Century Questionnaire: William Robertson on 
the Indians,” Eighteenth-Century Life, 6 (1987), 36-49; Carey, “Compiling Nature’s History”; Adam Fox, 
“Printed Questionnaires, Research Networks, and the Discovery of the British Isles, 1650-1800” Historical 
Journal, 53 (2010), 593-621; and Ida Federica Pugliese, “Le métier d’historien during the Enlightenment: 
William Robertson and the writing of the History of America,” PhD dissertation, European University 
Institute, 2010. 
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19 meeting with the Board of Trade for a report on the state of the British “Plantations.”35 
In the course of preparing the report, the Board developed and circulated a set of twenty-
one “Queries relating to His Majesty’s Plantations” to a set of London-based figures 
seeking geographic, demographic, economic, and political information several of the 
colonies. They included, Samuel Vetch, who had left the governorship of Nova Scotia in 
1717; Jeremiah Dummer, colonial agent for Massachusetts and Connecticut; Robert 
Hunter, in his last year as governor of New York and New Jersey; the merchant and 
writer Joshua Gee, who was closely associated with William Penn, proprietor of 
Pennsylvania; John Hart, who had been governor of Maryland until 1719; Nathaniel 
Blakiston, former governor of Maryland and in 1720 the agent for Virginia; and Joseph 
Boone, agent for Carolina. Each of these figures thus possessed local knowledge of the 
colonies through prior connection to them as former governors, agents, and merchants. 
The twenty-one queries focused heavily on the themes of finance, with many questions 
on trade (“6. What Trade has the Colony under your Government”; “7. What methods are 
there used to prevent illegal trade, and are the same Effectual?”), revenue and budget 
(“19. What is the Revenue arising within Your Government; and how is it 
appropriated?”; “20. What are the Ordinary & Extraordinary Expences [sic] of your 
Government?”), as well as the constitutional structure of government (“1. What is the 
                                                
35 For the request, see TNA, CO 323/8, Mr Delafaye to Council of Trade and Plantations, July 15, 1720, 35; 
for the contents of the meeting, see TNA, CO 391/29, “TNA, CO 391/29, “Journal of Board of Trade and 
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speed before their Excellencies”; and, TNA, CO 323/8, Mr Delafaye to Council of Trades and Plantations, 
August 2, 1720, 77: “The Lords Justices remind you of the state of H.M. Plantations, which, when you 





Situation of ye Colony under your Government?”; “3. What is the Constitution of the 
Government?”).36 Beginning with the receipt of Hunter’s reply on August 11, 1720, the 
Board began to receive a steady stream of responses to these queries over the remainder 
of 1720 through the first half of 1721.37  
             Over the course of the remainder of 1720 and early 1721, the Board prepared the 
report, documenting its “further progress” in “preparing” its “representation” in its 
meeting minutes, often in response to receiving governors’ responses, with a flurry of 
activity in late August and early September 1721. The Board dispatched the completed 
report to the Privy Council on September 8, 1721.38 In an accompanying letter, the Board 
emphasized that the report, containing information on the “respective situations, 
Governments, strengths and trade” of each colony, had been produced in response to the 
Council’s demand (“in obedience to your Majesty’s command”), and contained several 
suggestions for “methods” that “may contribute to the improving and enlarging your 
                                                
36 TNA, CO 324/10, William Popple, “Queries to ye Agents &c for the Several Governments on the 
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Majesty's dominions in America.” In this report, the Board transcribed and reproduced 
the contents of the governors’ replies under headings for each of the colonies.39 The 
report than concluded with a set of recommendations “for securing, improving & 
enlarging your Majesty’s Dominions in America”–in short, for better fulfilling extant 
objectives of imperial policy. The Board in particular bemoaned the fact that while “the 
Laws & constitutions of your Majesty’s Colonies are copied from those of Great Britain,” 
they “fall short of them in many particulars,” and have only been “corrected & amended 
by your Majesty’s Instructions to the respective Governors of the different Colonies 
under your Majesty’s immediate government.” The report continued by noting that 
obedience to these Instructions “might be rendered still more perfect, if your Majesty’s 
Commands met with due obedience in the proprietary & Charter Governments.” The 
trouble, indeed, was that the proprietary governments had often failed to recognize that 
their status did not exempt them from obedience to Crown sovereignty. They evinced 
“too great an inclination to be independent of their Mother kingdom.” “If [the proprietary 
colonies] were all of them under your Majesty’s immediate government, & were by 
proper laws compelled to follow the commands sent them by your Majesty,” “the entire, 
absolute, & immediate dependency” of the colonies would be secured.40  
In this way, the Board used the knowledge from the queries in a manner similar to 
the only explicit published proposal for their deployment as a tool of governance in 
published writing on the administration of the British empire in the Americas. That 
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statement was made twenty years earlier by the author of the anonymously published An 
Essay Upon the Government of the English Plantations on the Continent of America 
(1701). In this work, the author proposed that government use queries to generate 
knowledge that would improve colonial administration, on the grounds that making “the 
King and Court of England . . . thoroughly sensible of the true State of Affairs in this 
remote Part of the World” would be “the first and greatest Step towards remedying any 
former Mismanagements.”41 There is little evidence, however, that the Board’s report 
was used by the Privy Council. There was no attendant alteration in the “Instructions” to 
the governors, and the report’s suggestion for a reform of imperial bureaucracy–that the 
“business of Plantations” be handled exclusively by “one office,” rather than allowing the 
Treasury and the Admiralty to handle aspects of imperial governance–was never 
implemented.42 How then can these circular queries be understood? 
 The use of the replies to the queries in the 1721 report by the Board emphasized 
their role as soliciting information about compliance and obedience from the governors to 
the “Instructions.” The crux of the Board’s use of the knowledge from the queries in its 
report was to emphasize that although the administrative and legal constitution of 
colonial governments were clearly supposed to follow the direct proscriptions of the 
Privy Council–through its delegated authorities in the Lords of Trade–as contained in the 
material instrument of the “Instructions,” the practice often diverged from the direction. 
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This was particularly a problem, the Board emphasized, in the case of the proprietary 
colonies, which had not sufficiently recognized what the Board emphasized was their 
absolute subordination to Crown government, irrespective of the particular method 
through which they had been established.43 The queries and the report reinforced the 
extant administrative relationship that inhered in the British imperial ‘Constitution.’  
When the Board queried again in 1773, it sought knowledge of a similar nature: 
the compliance of colonial government with the expectations developed in the center. In 
stating in the circular letter to the colonies that the paperwork received from governors 
had “not been so full and explicit with respect to the State and progress of the Commerce, 
Cultivation and Inhabitancy” of the Americas, and then including the queries, Dartmouth 
requested information about the transaction of administrative process while reinforcing 
the constitutional obligations of the colonies. The Board circulated the queries to ensure 
that colonial administrators were properly executing the commands encoded in the 
“Instructions” to governors.  
The Lords of Trade drew up four different versions of the queries in 1773, and 
they differed little in the kinds of questions the Board had asked American governors 
since at least the 1730s.44 In July 1773, the Board sent two general versions of the queries  
                                                
43 On the Board of Trade’s struggles to assert control over proprietary colonial governments, see Alison 
Gilbert Olson, “William Penn, Parliament, and Proprietary Government,” William and Mary Quarterly, 18 
(1961), 176-195; and Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy, 48-49. Notably, proprietary and charter colonies 
corresponded much less with the Board than royal colonies: see Steele, The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: 
An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 238. 
 
44 Compare BL, King’s MS 205, “Copy of Answers of the Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania and 
Counties of Newcastle, Kent and Sussex on Delaware, to the Queries from the Right Honorable the Lords 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations,” 1730-1731, ff. 235-247; and “Copy of the Answers of Charles 






TNA, CO 5/74 Detail of Queries to Governors, 1773 
 
to the governors. These were distributed through a circular letter sent to each governor. 
To the North American colonies, Dartmouth sent nineteen “Heads of Enquiry” (first 
version), with altered lists to Maryland (second version) and then West Florida (third 
version). The first five questions focused upon geography: 
1. What is the Situation of the Province under your Government, the Nature of 
the Country, Soil & Climate, the Latitudes & Longitudes of the most 
considerable Places in it? Have those Latitudes been settled by good 
Observations, or only by common Computations, and from whence are the 
Longitudes computed? 
2. What are the reputed Boundaries and are any Parts thereof disputed, what 




3. What is the Size & Extent of the Province, the number of Acres supposed to 
be contained therein, what part thereof is cultivated & improved, & under 
what Titles do the Inhabitants hold their possession? 
4. What Rivers are there, & of what Extent & Convenience in point of 
Commerce?  
5. What are the principal Harbours [sic], how situated, of what Extent & is the 
Depth of Water & nature of Anchorage in each?45 
 
The following seven of Dartmouth’s queries concerned government, trade, and the 
colony’s natural resources: 
6. What is the Constitution of the Government? 
7. What is the Trade of the Province / Colony, the Number of Shipping 
belonging thereto, their Tonnage, & the Number of Seafaring Men, with the 
respective Increase or Diminution within ten Years past? 
8. What Quantity & Sorts of British Manufactures do the Inhabitants annually 
take from hence; what Goods & Commodities are exported from there to 
Great Britain, & what is the annual Amount at an Average? 
9. What Trade has the Province / Colony under Your Government, with any 
Foreign Plantations; or any part of Europe besides Great Britain; How is the 
Trade carried on; What Commodities do the People under your Government 
send to or receive from foreign Plantations, and what is the annual Amount 
thereof at an Average? 
10. What Methods are there used to prevent illegal Trade, and are the same 
effectual? 
11. What is then natural produce of the Country, Staple Commodities & 
Manufactures; and what Value thereof in Sterling Money, may you annually 
export? 
12. What Mines are there? 
 
On question 11, a small note was appended: for the circulation to Maryland, the words 
“besides tobacco” were to be added after “Commodities & Manufactures.” The queries 
continued with two questions on population: 
 13. What is the Number of Inhabitants, Whites & Blacks? 
 14. Are the Inhabitants increased or decreased within the last ten Years; how  
much & for what reasons? 
 
Dartmouth’s circular ended with questions that concerned defense and native peoples. 
The first four of these were: 
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 15. What is the Number of the Militia; & under what Regulations is it constituted? 
 16. What Forts and Places of Defence [sic] are there within your Government, &  
in what Condition? 
 17. What Number of Indians have you, & how are they inclined? 
 18. What is the Strength of the Neighbouring [sic] Indians? 
 
The circular then included a question for “West Florida only”: 
 19. What Effect have the French or Spanish Settlements on the Mississippi upon  
His Majesty’s Plantations especially in your Province? 
 
The final three questions returned to the problems of finance and defense: 
  
 20. What is the Revenue arising within your Government, and how is it  
appropriated & applied? 
 21. What are the ordinary & extraordinary Expences [sic] of your Government? 
 22. What are the Establishments, Civil & Military, within your Government & by  
what Authority do the officers hold their places; What is the annual Value of each  
Office, Civil or Military, how are they respectively appointed, & who are the  
present Possessors?46 
 
 The fourth version of the Board’s queries was for the governors of the British 
Caribbean. Like the heads of inquiry sent to the North American colonies, these “Queries 
relating to His Majesty’s Islands in America” contained nineteen questions, and covered 
many of the same themes. However, these questions registered the specific geographical 
and political concerns of the West Indies. Thus, the West Indies circular began (like the 
North American) with questions of geography and trade, but attended to the 
particularities of the geographic, economic, and political conditions pertaining in the 
region: 
1st. What is the size & extent of the several Islands under your Government, the  
number of Acres contained therein & the nature of the Soil & Climate. 
2nd. What are the principal Rivers and Harbours [sic], and how situated in respect  
to Commerce or for the Reception of Ships of War 
3rd. What is the Trade of the Islands under your Gov:t the number of Shipping  
belonging thereto, their Tonnage and the number of Seafaring men with their  
respective increase or Diminution?  
4th. What Quantity & Sorts of British Manufactures do the Inhabitants Annually  
                                                




take from, and what is the annual Amount of the Exports to Great Britain? 
Queries on the West Indies circular that overlapped with those on the North American 
circular appeared in a different order. For example, the ninth and tenth queries on the 
North American circular, which focused on trade, appeared here as the fifth and sixth: 
5th. What Trade has the Islands with your Gov:t with any Foreign Plantations or 
any part of Europe besides Great Britain? How is that Trade carried on, what 
Commodities do the people under your Gov.t send to or receive from Foreign 
Plantations?  
6th. What Methods are there used to prevent illegal Trade, and are the same 
effectual?  
 
The topics of Questions 11 and 12 on the North American circular found themselves 
divided into three questions on the West Indies queries: 
 7th. What is the natural Produce of the Islands under your Govt. are there any, and  
what Manufactures? 
 8th. What Mines are there? 
 9th. What may be the annual Produce of the Commodities of the Islands? 
 
The questions on population then followed, slightly altered from those on the North 
American circular: 
10th. What is the number of the Inhabitants Whites and Blacks?  
11th. Are the Inhabitants increased or decreased of late, and for what Reasons?47  
 
Questions about defense and fortifications appeared in the middle of the queries, rather 
than at the end (as in the North American), and reflected the specificities of the Caribbean 
context, inquiring about “French and Spanish Settlements,” rather than “Indians”: 
12th. What is the number of Militia and how constituted? 
13th. What Forts and Places of Defence [sic] are there within your Gov:t and in 
what condition? 
14th. What is the strength of your Neighbours [sic]? 
15th. What effect have the French and Spanish Settlements upon His Majesty’s 
Islands under Your Gov.t?48 
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The most significant way in which the queries to Caribbean governors differed from 
those sent to their North American counterparts lay in requests for information on 
revenue and land. At the end of the Caribbean circular, the Board wrote: 
 16th. What is the Revenue arising within your Gov.t and how is it appropriated? 
 17th. What number of Acres of Land are there already granted from the Crown,  
and cultivated in each Parish or District within your Government? What [is] the  
Quit-Rent reserved thereupon and what number of Acres may there by  
computation remain untaken up or uncultivated? 
 18th. What are the ordinary and extraordinary Expences [sic] of your Gov.t? 
 19th. What are the Establishments Civil and Military, within your Gov.t and by  
what Authority do the Officers hold their places? What is the annual value of each 
Office Civil or Military, how are they respectively appointed & who are the 
present Possessors?49  
 
Although questions about revenue were central in both circulars, the West Indies queries 
asked about the distribution of Crown land grants and the administration of “quit-rents,” a 
vestige tax emanating out of modifications in the feudal system of land tenure by which 
land owners paid the Crown (the only legitimate granter of vacant land in the colonies) a 
tax in lieu of personal service. The collection of quit rents in the North American colonies 
had fallen into disuse by the 1770s, but persisted in the West Indies, which explains the 
difference between the forms.50   
 The differences between these four versions of the queries reflected the complex 
intentions of the Board, and the precise epistemological and material conditions under 
which these particular forms of paperwork were circulated in 1773. The contents of the 
queries demonstrate that Board did not send them in the absence of knowledge about the 
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colonies: flooded with regular transmissions of paperwork from the governors containing 
information that already provided answers to all of the questions, the Board possessed 
ample knowledge of conditions in the Americas. This circumstance was recognized by 
one of the respondents to Dartmouth’s 1773 circular, Lord Dunmore, governor of 
Virginia, in the letter he sent enclosing his answers to the queries. “I did conceive that the 
Series of reports, made to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for America, of the ordinary 
Events of this Government, contain the best illustration of the progress of the Commerce, 
Cultivation, and Inhabitancy of the Colony,” Dunmore observed, “and I do imagine that 
the fullest Answers which can be procured (and which are herewith inclosed [sic]) to the 
Several Articles in the inquiry transmitted to me, will only be a recapitulation of reports 
which at different times and on different occasions have been transmitted to the Office of 
the Department over which your Lordship presides.” There was nothing new that 
Dunmore would report in his answers to the queries that the Board could not already have 
known from the archive of documents it had received from Virginia for decades. Of 
course, Dunmore submitted responses to the heads of inquiry anyway: doing so was 
essential properly executing his office.51 Perhaps unwittingly, Dunmore’s observation 
that there could be no new information in his answers to the queries revealed the function 
of the Board’s ‘heads of inquiry’: their purpose was not to generate more propositional 
“facts” about the colonies (since, as Dunmore recognized, those facts were amply 
available to administrators from the bureaucratic archive), but rather as a method of 
checking that the practice of governance detailed to governors in the “Instructions” was 
being followed. Indeed, the substantive differences between the Board’s queries to North 
America and the West Indies, respectively, show that metropolitan government was 
                                                




highly attuned to the geographical, political, and social differences within the Atlantic 
empire. Furthermore, in altering the queries by adding specific questions geared to 
particular colonies (such as the different versions of the North American circular sent to 
West Florida and Maryland, respectively), the Board also revealed its understanding of 
the internal differences within British America. Thus, more than the solicitation of 
unknown information, the Board sought the governors’ demonstration of compliance to 
its “Instructions” through the complementary document of the ‘queries.’ The remainder 
of the chapter explores how governors sought to meet this intention.   
 
Ensuring Understanding 
When governors replied to the Board of Trade’s queries, they demonstrated 
compliance and obedience to the governing instructions that they had been issued. 
Consider the case of Walter Patterson, appointed governor of the Island of St. John (now 
Prince Edward Island) in Canada, and who answered queries for that island in 1773. The 
story of the making of “St. John” as a British colony is itself illustrative of the centrality 
of paperwork to the operation of imperial governance. As an administrative entity, “St. 
John” did not exist until 1769, when it was severed from Nova Scotia, a region over 
which Britain had acquired control from France thanks to the 1763 Treaty of Paris. St. 
John’s formal constitution as a political space occurred through the Board of Trade’s 
consideration of documents–petitions from proprietors of the island, who lobbied for its 
creation as a separate colony. Upon receipt of these petitions, the Board commissioned a 
“report” on the claims; the Privy Council then considered and approved the creation of 




more paperwork: to “prepare Draughts of a Commission and Instructions for such person 
as his Majesty be pleased to Appoint Governor of the said Island . . .”52  
Following this order from the Privy Council, the Board of Trade on July 10, 1769 
prepared and dispatched to the Secretary of State a “draught of a commission for Walter 
Paterson, Esquire,” the form through which he was appointed governor of the island, and 
written following a standard rhetorical formula used for all the governors in America. 
Through the ‘instrument’ of the appointment letter, Patterson was directed to perform the 
duties of maintaining political stability (“the due & impartial Administration of Justice”), 
and the enforcement of “Laws relating to Trade and the Plantations” – the core tasks of 
administration.53 In these “Instructions,” the Board communicated its expectations to 
Patterson for the proper conduct of governmental procedure in the colony. Thus, in 
investing Patterson with the power to “constitute and ordain Laws, Statutes, and 
Ordinances of the public, peace, welfare, and good Government of Our said Island and of 
the People and Inhabitants thereof,” “with the advice and consent of Our said Council 
and Assembly,” London administrators made clear both the aims and the methods by 
which administration was to be conducted.54 These included specifications for how the 
colony’s bureaucracy ought to be designed structurally and conducted procedurally: in 
investing Patterson with the powers of appointing judges; establishing courts; prosecuting 
“all Enemies, Pirates and Rebels, both at Land and Sea”; building “so many Forts and 
Platforms, Castles, Cities, Borough, Towns and Fortifications, as you . . . shall judge 
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necessary,” the Board communicated its expectations for the kinds of institutions that 
Patterson was to establish.55 Paperwork enabled the Board to specify, from an ocean 
away, the meaning of the correct transaction of imperial governance: for example, “all 
public Money raised” was to be used “for the support of the Government and not 
otherwise.”56  
Such “Instructions” were highly formulaic; indeed, as the Board wrote of those 
issued to Patterson, “they are exactly conformable to the Instructions given to the 
Governors of Your Majesty’s other American Colonies and Plantations.”57 Once the 
“draught” was approved by the Secretary of State, the Board prepared two sets of far 
more voluminous and lengthy “Instructions” to be sent directly to the governors. In  
Patterson’s case, both of these were dated July 27, 1769. The first of these were general 
“Instructions” detailing the “Royal Intention with regard” to the “Form and Constitution” 
of the government. Here, metropolitan administrators enumerated directions for the 
establishment and conduct of the institutions of the colonies in a form consistent across 
the British Atlantic. For example, Patterson was directed to establish a Council that 
would “have an enjoy all the Powers, Privileges, and Authority usually exercised and 
enjoyed by the Members of Our Councils in Our other American Colonies.”58 He was 
also instructed to ensure that justice on the island was to be administered with respect for 
the “legal Rights & Properties” of all subjects, given detailed directions on the proper 
methods of collecting quit-rent payments upon land grants, and told to “conform as near 
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as may be to what has been approved and established for that purpose in Our other 
Colonies under like Circumstances.”59 The range of issues upon which the imperial 
administrators specified their intentions, from ensuring that no school on the island 
operated “without the Licence [sic] of the said Bishop of London,” to advising Patterson 
that he was obligated to execute any commission he received from the Admiralty during 
his tenure, testify both to the deep degree of metropolitan concern for the proper design 
and execution of imperial administration, and the enabling role played by documents in 
structuring and communicating these expectations.60 
When the Board dispatched such documents to new governors, they also as a 
matter of regular practice sent the appointee a set of separate “Orders and Instructions” 
that specified the procedures for conducting trade. The issuance of these separate 
instructions on trade reflected the importance accorded by the imperial state to the lawful 
and efficient administration of the imperial economy. In these “Instructions” on trade, the 
Board detailed metropolitan intentions on a variety of interrelated topics, including the 
proper sites of residence of customs officers (“at the same Ports or Towns” as naval 
officers), the importance of enforcing the Navigation Acts, and the imperative for the 
proper examination of ship certificates and bills of lading at colonial ports such that those 
who “counterfeit, raze or falsify” documents or engaged in other illegal trading activities 
were fined.61 Procedural obedience to the dictates of metropolitan officials was a central 
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and recurrent theme: any law or customary governing act related to trade passed by 
colonial legislatures that was “repugnant” to “Laws already made or hereafter to be made 
in this Kingdom” was to be declared “null & void to all intents & purposes 
whatsoever.”62 Particular emphasis was placed upon preventing both fraud and 
“clandestine trade.” In order to combat such activity, the Board specified in the 
instructions to Patterson that customs officers were to board and inspect the documents of 
all ships visiting the island, as well as keep a log book listing all ships that both entered 
and left the port of the island of St. John. Appended to the “Instructions” were copies of 
these forms of paperwork for replication and then usage by the customs officers–each 
form demanded the recording of information about the “time of entry” or “time of 
clearing” of each ship; the number “Tons,” “Guns,” and “Men” held on each; the site of 
the ship’s construction and registration, an account of the “General Cargoe [sic],” and its 
point of departure and ultimate terminus.63 The trade “Instructions” concluded with a 
threat: if governor or commander failed to follow the instructions, they ought “not only 
[to be] immediately removed” and made “liable” for a “Fine of One thousand Pounds,” 
but also to face prosecution “with the utmost Severity of Law” for breaching the supreme 
authority of the Privy Council and the power it delegated to the Board of Trade.64 
Five years later, when Patterson answered the Board’s queries, he communicated 
knowledge that corresponded to the “instructions.”65 Read apart from the context of the 
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“Instructions,” the queries and Patterson’s responses would appear to have sought new 
knowledge about a relatively unknown outpost of the British empire. But the kind of 
transaction involved was not primarily about requesting unknown information. In asking 
the first query, regarding “the size and extent” of the territory and the “nature of the Soil 
and Climate,” the Board generated a response from Patterson that provided a seemingly 
straightforward account of the size of the island and a description of the soil and crops. 
But another kind of ‘informing’ was also occurring. Describing the island’s “reddish” 
soil, Patterson emphasized that although it had an “unpromising appearance,” the soil 
with proper cultivation–“being opened to the Air,” and given “manure and proper labour 
[sic],” would “produce exceeding good crops” of “any kind of Grain or Roots . . . 
commonly cultivated in England.” Patterson cited the authority of his “own experience” 
of travel that “no kind of Grain degenerates” in contrast to “any other part of America 
wherever I have been, from New England to Virginia . . .”66 As an act of informing, 
Patterson’s response here coincided with the Board’s communicated expectations that its 
colonies would be sites of prosperity at which the Board’s desire for “the good of Our 
Plantations and the Improvement of the Trade” for “the benefit of this Kingdom” were 
being fulfilled.67 The information communicated by Patterson demonstrated his 
understanding of, and compliance with expectations of metropolitan government. 
Similarly, in asking about the “Quantity and sorts of British Manufactures” 
imported by the inhabitants and the amount of the island’s export to Great Britain, the 
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Board of Trade both requested information, and emphasized what it had extensively 
detailed in its “Instructions” on trade issued to Patterson in 1769: the need for governors 
to enforce the Navigation Acts. This emphasis on the proper conduct of trade was clear in 
the fifth and sixth query, the first of which asked about trade between the island and 
foreign governments, and the second about the nature and efficacy of “methods . . . used 
to prevent illegal Trade.” In the “Instructions” to Patterson, the Board emphasized its 
“Will and Pleasure” that the governor “duly observe and cause to be strictly observed” 
“Laws and Statues” on trade in order to prevent any “clandestine Trade” from being “to 
Our Plantations in America to the great Detriment of these Realms.” Patterson’s satisfied 
the center’s expectations. When Patterson wrote, in response to the query about trade 
from foreign plantations on the island, that there was (in his “Monosyllable”) “NONE,” 
and when he continued by responding to the query on methods of preventing illegal trade 
with the answer that “there is as yet no illegal trade carried on from, or by this Island,” he 
did more than inform the Board of the conditions pertaining in a particular imperial site.68 
Patterson also emphasized that he had followed (or at least sought to represent himself as 
having followed), the Board’s explicit instructions about the need to both prevent and 
prosecute “any unlawful Importations or Exportations” not in keeping with imperial law, 
and thus portrayed St. John as an ordered, well-governed outpost of the empire.69 
Reading Patterson’s replies to the queries in terms of the “Instructions” also 
places seemingly informational description back into the context of the constitutional 
hierarchy relating metropole and colony that the queries materialized. That context 
                                                
68 TNA, CO 318/2, Patterson to Dartmouth, May 1, 1774, f. 38. 
 





clarifies the significance of the seemingly mundane long list of official offices that 
Patterson (as well as many other governors) provided in response to the Board’s final 
query: “What are the Establishments Civil and Military within Your Government, and by 
what authority do the Officers hold their places? What is the annual value of each Office 
Civil or Military, how are they at present appointed, and who are the present Possessors?” 
In listing the offices and occupants of the local government (governor, lieutenant 
governor, chief justice, attorney general, collector of revenue, naval officer, Anglican 
minister, and so forth), Patterson would appear to have been merely providing factual 
information. But his answer also showed that the bureaucracy of St. John’s government 
was constituted exactly upon the lines prescribed in the “Instructions.” There, the Board 
had commanded Patterson to appoint a Council, “Courts of Judicature” and judges, 
admiralty officers, and other kinds of governing officials, all of whom he now listed in 
his reply to this query.70 Through providing information that accorded directly with what 
London government had prescribed, Patterson demonstrated to the Board that he 
correctly understood its mandates as to the composition of colonial administration.  
 The intersection between the intentions of these two forms of paperwork–the 
“Instructions” as a way by which London administrators could organize the proper 
governance of the colonies from a distance through explicit direction, and the “Queries” 
as a genre by which evidence of compliance to these dictated processes could be 
solicited–continually conditioned the way in which governors replied. This included 
contexts in which the colonies described were in states of political upheaval and turmoil. 
The queries sent to Pennsylvania by the circular in 1773, for example, appeared amidst a 
                                                





political storm. Thomas Penn, in his role as co-proprietor of the colony, had revoked 
Richard Penn’s governorship, and offered the position to John Penn, who arrived in 
Pennsylvania in late 1773.71 The Board’s preparation of John Penn’s commission had ony 
recently occurred. The Privy Council issued the John Penn’s appointment on April 22, 
and the matter came before the Board of Trade on May 10. However, as reported in the 
meeting minutes of the Board, “some doubts” had “occurred with respect to the mode of” 
John Penn’s appointment “and the form of the Instructions to be given in consequence 
thereof . . .” The Board resolved to consult with its counsel and with Pennsylvania’s 
colonial agent in London, Henry Wilmot.72 The issue was resolved by the May 27 
meeting of the Board, at which John Penn himself attended and pledged “the due 
observance of the Laws of Trade and such Instructions as he should receive from the 
King . . .”73 These Instructions were approved by the Board at its June 17 meeting.74 John 
Penn was then issued with the “Orders and Instructions” on July 2, 1773, only three days 
before the circulation of the queries on July 5, 1773. John Penn wrote to Dartmouth on 
November 15 to inform him that Richard Penn (the “late Governor of this Province”) had 
given him these queries upon his appointment, but asked for more time to prepare “full 
and particular Answers.” “As these Enquiries comprehend a variety of Subjects, many of 
which have been very little attended to by any Persons in this Country, and others will 
require Time to obtain the necessary Knowledge to enable me to give any satisfactory 
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Answers to,” Penn wrote, “I must beg leave to request Your Lordships Patience, ‘till I 
can procure such Information on these Subjects as will put it in my Power in some 
Measure to satisfy His Majesty’s Expectations.”75  
 Penn’s process of answering these queries and “satisfy[ing]” these “Expectations” 
was long drawn out. His next step appears to have been to write to Governor William 
Tryon of New York asking about how Tryon planned to complete the “Heads of Enquiry” 
in the “Circular letter” sent by Dartmouth.76 Tryon replied to him in October 1773 with a 
description of “the method I propose to take to comply” with the queries, one that placed 
primacy on the particular knowledge that could be provided from local colonial officials. 
“I have furnished the Officers of the several Public Offices of this Government, with such 
Articles of the enquiries, as I thought fell within their respective Departments”; Tryon 
reported that he sent the queries that did not seem to pertain “to any particular Office” to 
“the Secretary of the Province” for completion. Tryon then stated that he intended “to 
refer to some sensible friend here, to combine together” all of the answers “by way of a 
General Report,” for the governor had “neither genius, leisure, nor inclination” to do so 
himself.77 
Penn was not as averse as Tryon to placing personal effort into answering the 
queries. However, he also collaborated with other colonial bureaucrats as he prepared the 
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responses. In July 1774, a year after the queries had been issued, and several months after 
receiving Tryon’s advice, Penn appended an update on the status of his answers in a letter 
to Dartmouth. “I have not as yet been able to collect all the Information respecting the 
Heads of Enquiry transmitted by your Lordship last Year, which is necessary in giving 
them full and particular Answers,” he explained, referring to the precise demand for “full 
and particular answers” included in Dartmouth’s circular. Penn was well aware of the 
long delay and explained that he would seek to remedy it: “Yet as they are now in great 
forwardness,” he noted, “I am in hopes that in a short Time I shall have it in my Power to 
compleat [sic] them to your Lordship’s Satisfaction.”78  
Penn continued the regular process of dispatching paperwork concerning the 
colony’s administration back to Dartmouth, being “very sensible of the great necessity . . 
. that the King’s Ministers should at this Time be truly informed of the Proceedings of his 
Subjects in America” and promising to “chearfully [sic] attend to the strict Execution of 
His Majesty’s Commands, in transmitting every material Occurrence within my 
Department.”79 This “short Time” finally ended on January 30, 1775, when Penn wrote to 
Dartmouth with “particular Answers to the several Heads of Enquiry” sent in July 1773. 
Apologizing that “it has not been in my Power to transmit them sooner,” Penn 
emphasized, in a direct citation from the language of Dartmouth’s original circular, that 
he had “endeavoured [sic] to make them as full and explicit” as possible, and had “taken 
Pains to procure” “Informations [sic]” “on so many different Subjects” as “would enable 
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me.” Penn stated that he “hope[d]” that his responses “will be satisfactory to His 
Majesty.”80 
 
TNA, CO 5/1286, Detail from Governor John Penn's Reply to Queries, 1775 
 Like every other governor, Penn in his reply sought to describe the colony in a 
favorable light.81 The act of informing was, as with the replies of other governors, also a 
politics of description, a demonstration of conformity to the governing directives of the 
imperial state. In response to the first question on latitudinal and climate conditions of 
Pennsylvania, Penn was keen to both give precise latitudinal and longitudinal 
measurements, and to stress the fertility of the country. Even provisioning these 
measurements was a demonstration of obedience, for (as Penn emphasized) the 
geographical borders of Pennsylvania had been established “agreeable to the Royal 
Charter” for the colony. Like other governors, Penn stressed the mildness and 
productiveness of the climate, “differing little from European Climates in the same 
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Latitude . . .” If the “Winter Colds” in Pennsylvania were “something more intense” than 
other parts of the Americas, “the Purity of the Air . . . compensates for its keenness.”82 
But geographical informing was also an opportunity to place Pennsylvania in the best 
perspective possible with respect to imperial priorities, especially against the limitations 
imposed by nature itself and even against deficiencies in knowledge of the territory. 
Replying to the third query on the extent of the province and “what Part thereof is 
cultivated & improved,” Penn noted that “It is not easy to ascertain what Proportion of 
the Province is cultivated . . .” However, he expressed his confidence that “on the whole 
it is a much larger Proportion than in any other Colony of the Same Age, in North 
America . . .” Pennsylvania was “in general very fully settled as far as the Quality of the 
Lands and Purchase from the Indians will permit.”83 The governor’s description served to 
compensate for aspects of colonial administration that might fall below metropolitan 
expectations, a theme seen in Penn’s answer to the sixteenth query concerning forts and 
military defense in the colony. Although Penn reported that since the end of the Seven 
Years’ War, “no Forts of defence [sic] have been kept up within this Government,” there 
was “at present a Stone Fortification,” “began about three years ago” on an island in the 
River Delaware to protect against privateers who “might otherwise in Time of War, 
without any Difficulty or Interruption, pass up the River to the City, and plunder and 
destroy it in a few Days.” If the fort was currently “unfinished,” the blame did not lie 
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with the executive, but rather in the colonial assembly’s failure to earmark “sufficient 
Funds” for its completion.84  
 
TNA, CO 5/1286, Detail from Penn's Reply to Question 6 
In addition to portraying Pennsylvania as well governed through his replies, Penn 
was equally concerned to demonstrate that the constitution of the colony’s bureaucracy 
matched the expectations of the proper distribution of power and authority specified in 
the “Instructions.” In reply to question six of Dartmouth’s circular, on the “Constitution 
of the Government,” Penn noted that even though the duties of governance in the colony 
had been “generally acted by Deputy Governors,” rather than the governors themselves, 
these deputies were both “commissioned by [the governors] and approved of by the 
Crown,” following the hierarchy of imperial authority specified by the Board. According 
to Penn, the legislative process adhered to the proper methods of imperial governance: 
laws passed by the Governor and his Council were “subject to the Repeal of his Majesty 
in Council within six Months after they are presented them.” There was nothing unusual 
or particularly surprising about these descriptions, and this was exactly the point: there 
was a correct way of answering this query, and Penn understood this and sought to 
                                                




comply. Emphasizing that governing processes were occurring through legitimate 
authorities (“By the Proprietary Charter of Privileges,” or “By Act of Assembly”) Penn 
made clear that governance in the colony was proceeding in exactly the fashion 
envisioned by metropolitan administrators.85  
Penn’s emphasis that the processes of governance were being executed according 
to prescription resonated in his reply to the section of Dartmouth’s circular concerning 
trade. The seventh through tenth queries asked governors about the kinds of manufactures 
being exported from the colony to Britain, as well as consumed by the local inhabitants; 
trade with foreign powers; and the “natural produce” and “staple commodities” of the 
colony. The eleventh query asked, “What methods are there used to prevent illegal Trade, 
and are the same effectual”? In the “Orders and Instructions,” the Board had made clear 
how documents were to be used in order to ensure the integrity of trading practices in the 
colonies, and specifically in order to prevent illegal trade. The “Instructions” specified 
that the governor was to regularly (“every Three Months, or oftener”) “transmit” to the 
Treasury and the Customs in London “a List of all Ships and Vessels trading in the said 
Province of Pensylvania [sic],” following the structure of a standard form given to Penn 
with the “Instructions.” Penn was also to ensure that the master of every ship that docked 
in the colony’s ports completed and delivered “a true and perfect Inventory of her lading” 
in order to combat illegal trade. Through the “Instructions,” Penn (as the executive 
authority in Pennsylvania) bore ultimate responsibility for the actions of the customs 
officers whose proximate task was to ensure that captains correctly completed these 
                                                





forms.86 When Penn replied to the query, he emphasized that while it was impossible to 
effectively curb all illegal trade, Pennsylvania had instituted the prescribed preventative 
practices. At what Penn described as the colony’s single port–Philadelphia–“for the 
lading and unlading of Goods,” he noted that “there is a regular Custom House 
established, and a Number of Subordinate Officers, as Surveyors, Searchers and 
Tidesmen kept in pay, whose duty it is to prevent illicit trade.” Although he admitted that 
the practices of smuggling continued despite the presence of these officers, Penn also 
emphasized that “there can be no Doubt” that the measures in place “have a very 
considerable Effect in checking the Progress of that Kind of Trade.”87 Here, in 
completing the queries, Penn described the execution of a crucial task of imperial 
governance–the prevention of illegal trade–as proceeding in accordance with the 
expectations communicated to him in the “Instructions.” 
 In replying to Dartmouth, Penn enclosed several other documents alongside the 
answers, including a series of tables documenting imports and exports at the port of 
Philadelphia 1769 to 1773 from the Deputy Collector of the Customs House, John 
Patterson.88 Penn labeled the tables so that their relationship to his answers was clear: he 
described the form on its back overleaf as a “Copy of a Report of the Deputy Collector of 
His Majesty’s Customs for the Port of Philadelphia referred to in the Answers to The 
Heads of Enquiry herewith transmitted by the Governor of Pennsylvania to the Right 
Honorable The Earl of Dartmouth.” Below this annotation, the clerk at the Board of 
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Trade who processed Penn’s dispatch when it arrived in London noted that the report was 
enclosed in “Penn’s of the 30. Janry. 1775.”89 Penn submitted these documents in lieu of 
providing a descriptive answer to queries seven through ten of the circular, which 
requested both quantitative and qualitative descriptions of trade. Queries seven and eight, 
respectively, sought knowledge of “the Trade of the Province and “number of Shipping 
belonging thereto”; and the “Quantity and Sorts of British Manufactures” consumed in 
the colony and the amount of exports from Pennsylvania to Great Britain. In query nine, 
the Board asked for information on the trade of Pennsylvania to foreign provinces; while 
query ten asked about the “natural produce of the country” and “Staple Commodities.” 
Penn answered these queries by drawing on information contained in such material, but 
through the enclosure of such paperwork itself: “For a minute and precise Answer to 
these last four Heads of Enquiry,” he wrote, “I beg leave to refer to the Copy of a Report 
made by the Deputy Collector of his Majesties Customs for the Port of Philadelphia from 
the Custom House Books herewith transmitted.”90  
 In ‘begging leave to refer’ to the “Report from the Deputy Collector of the 
Customs” in his replies, and by submitting that report as an answer to four of the queries, 
Penn demonstrated not just the enclosure of official documents as a strategy of response 
to the Board’s heads of enquiry, but also the way in which answering the queries 
implicated a local circuit of administrative paperwork internal to the colony’s 
government. Even if Penn’s signature ultimately appeared as author of the replies, the 
actual documentation that he submitted to Dartmouth as a response was not exclusively 
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his own. The “Report” was signed and prepared by John Patterson, the Deputy Collector. 
In a note on the report, Patterson indicated his own processes of preparing the papers, as 
well as the challenge of providing the requested information. The accounts submitted 
were “taken from the Custom House Books,” but Patterson wrote that “I cannot 
ascertain” “the Prices of each Commodity,” leading him instead to “make an Estimate of 
it in the following mode, which I take from the best information I can obtain, as well as 
from the Custom House Books.” Patterson calculated these prices based on estimation: 
his description of these calculations are rendered in the language of supposition – “I 
believe the present number . . .”; “. . . I suppose import to the Amount . . .”; and “. . . it 
may be estimated . . . .”91 Patterson’s language of imprecision testified to the difficulty of 
generating accurate fiscal information demanded by the center from colonial accounting 
records. However, the difference between this language and Penn’s representation of the 
documents in his reply to the Board is notable: Penn had described the enclosed papers as 
a “minute and precise Answer” to four of the Board’s queries, even though (by its 
author’s own admission) they were anything but exact.  
 What explains the divergence between Penn’s confident representation of 
Patterson’s paperwork in the reply to the Board, and Patterson’s own uncertainty about 
the accounts? Here lies further evidence of the particular kind of knowledge transacted in 
the query and its reply. Factual information was of secondary importance to the 
demonstration by Penn that he understood the Board’s expectations of how colonial 
administration should function. Like his correspondent Governor Tryon of New York, 
Penn now outsourced the task of replying to parts of the queries to those bureaucrats 
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within the colony’s government who possessed the direct knowledge of the processes 
whose execution the queries sought to document. But even here, Penn represented the 
relevant documents as far more accurate and precise than their author (Patterson, the 
Deputy Customs Collector) indicated they were. In doing so, Penn produced an account 
of economic governance in Pennsylvania as compliant with the mandates of his 
“Instructions.”  
Demonstrating compliance with the commands of the imperial center could, 
however, be complicated for governors, particularly when their own account of the 
conditions attending in the colony proved more accurate than that held in the metropole. 
Still, governors’ in these contexts continued to endeavor to demonstrate their successful 
fulfillment of the constitutional obligations of imperial governance. The replies that the 
Board received from Governor Peter Chester of West Florida demonstrate this. Chester 
received the Board’s circular in early December 1773, which he promised to answer “so 
soon as I am able to collect the different Informations [sic], and necessary Papers, so as to 
enable me to give a full and particular Answer thereto . . .”92 But Chester’s replies were 
long delayed, and their transmission highly complicated. At the end of January 1774, 
Chester sent Dartmouth an “Extract from the Answers” he was “now preparing to be sent, 
to the heads of Enquiry which were transmitted by Your Lordship some time ago, and 
which I have not yet been able to compleat [sic] . . .” Chester explained that answering 
them was proving “much more difficult than I at first imagined, from a desire of having 
them as full and descriptive as possible, so as to enable Your Lordship at one view to 
know the situation” of the colony–meaning, in context, not simply information about 
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West Florida but more precisely information that Chester had fulfilled the Board’s 
expectations about the colony’s proper governance. In these replies, Chester made clear 
that his central goal was to demonstrate that he had correctly established the boundaries 
of the province itself, so that he had not acted “contrary” to either the geographic 
delineations of the territory established by diplomatic agreement in the Treaty of Paris, 
and included in the “Instructions” he had been issued.93  
In his enclosed answer, Chester addressed only the first of Dartmouth’s queries, 
which enquired about “the reputed Boundaries of the Province” and the extent of dispute 
over them. Chester began by emphasizing his compliance to the government’s mandates 
as to the proper boundaries of West Florida, simply quoting directly from the 
specification made in the Secretary of State’s “Commission” to him: 
The Province of West Florida, the only Frontier of the British Dominions in  
America, According to the Governors Commission, is bounded “to the Southward  
by the Gulph [sic] of Mexico, including all Islands within five leagues of the  
Coast, from the River Appalachicola [sic] to Lake Pontchartrain; the Westward  
by the said Lake, the Lake Maurepas* and the River Mississippi, to the Northward 
by a Line drawn due East from the Mouth of the River Yarous, where it unites 
with the Mississippi to the River Apalachicola or Chatahouchee; and to the 
Eastward by said River.” 
 
In the note keyed to the asterisk after “Lake Maurepas,” Chester contested the accuracy 
of the designation, revising the official geographical knowledge upon which the contours 
of West Florida had been established:   
Note This is evidently a Mistake in the Geography, for both these Lakes are 
situated upon the south side of the Province of West Florida, as well as the River 
Ibberville. 
 
He continued by correcting royal command:   
 
It is very remarkable that neither in the Royal Proclamation of the 7th October 
1763 (by which the Province of West Florida was to extend Northward only to the 
                                                




Latitude of thirty one Degrees) nor in any of the Governors Commissions, is there 
mention made of the River Ibberville as a Boundary of this Province, tho’ It must 
undoubtedly have been intended as such. But there is evidently a very 
considerable Chasm in this part of the Boundaries; for the Lake Maurepas is not 
Contiguous to the Mississippi, by a great many Leagues.94 
 
The geographical knowledge upon which the “Royal Proclamation” was based was 
inaccurate. But rather than use his local knowledge to question the imperial project, 
Chester mobilized it as a corrective to better establish the contours of imperial dominion. 
In revising the content of London paperwork (specifically the “Royal Proclamation” and 
the “Commissions” that had been circulated to him), Chester paradoxically complied with 
the imperial objective of accurately delineating the boundaries of British control. Local 
knowledge was thus crafted to the end of better establishing imperial power–and in this 
sense, coincided with the broader practice of compliance that governors executed in 
replying to queries. Chester continued his answer in the same vein, contesting Spanish 
interpretations of the 1763 Treaty of Paris as to the boundaries of West Florida; indeed, in 
his reply, he addressed none of the Board’s other queries, and it does not appear, from a 
perusal of the mass of paperwork that he did send back to London over the course of his 
administration, that Chester ever answered them before he left office in 1781.  
Chester’s example illustrates that the provision of local knowledge and the 
practice of gubernatorial obedience to the imperial center in the queries did not always 
operate in predictable ways. Answering queries could involve using local knowledge to 
correct metropolitan understandings of the territories it governed–not, however, as a 
critique of empire, but as a way of facilitating its more effective establishment. These 
complex uses of queries by the governors who responded to them extended to the way in 
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which they communicated administrative failures: ways in which the colony had not met 
imperial expectations. Asked, for example in the 1773 circular, about methods to prevent 
illegal trade in the colony, Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, noted simply that there 
were “None, except such as proceed from the Man of War stationed here, but those are 
not effectual.”95 This answer contrasted with the response of his predecessor in office, 
Francis Fauquier, a decade earlier. In reply to a similar question from the Board, Fauquier 
had been more deferential, noting that “the regulations now in force by Acts of 
Parliament, and by the Instructions and Directions from the Commissioners of His 
Majesty’s Customs, are pretty effectual to suppress illegal Trade,” even if “no restrictions 
can totally suppress it.”96 Perhaps the situation had deteriorated over the course of a 
decade; but it was also possible that Dunmore had been less inclined than Fauquier to 
admit the real situation–that it was impossible to completely prevent illegal trade–to his 
superiors.  
This tension between the governors’ desire to receive metropolitan approval, and 
the task of accurately describing their colony’s situation recurred in their answers. 
Indeed, sometimes governors used the replies as an opportunity to complain about 
administrative problems. Replying to the query in the 1773 circular on “the number of 
militia and how constituted,” Governor George Bruce of Bermuda noted that while a 
“company of militia” existed for each of the island’s parishes, it was “very irregular” in 
its service, “owing to the Officers taking commissions for Rank and then throwing them 
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up again.” Yet, Bruce directed responsibility for the disorganization away from himself. 
Although a “frequent practice” among the military officers at Bermuda, Bruce told the 
Board that this behavior was in place “more before I came, than since,” indicating that he 
did not bear culpability for its perpetuation, and leaving the reader to speculate that he 
had perhaps played a part in its diminishment.97 Bruce’s answer in this regard reflected a 
broader discourse in his replies of absolving his own administration of responsibility in 
the state of the colony. Enclosing “full and proper Answers, to the Nineteen queries 
Respecting the Government, Commerce, Cultivation and Inhabitancy of the Bermuda 
Islands,” Bruce expressed his “great Hopes” that the King would make a “Requisition. . . 
to the General Assembly” encouraging them “not to behave like wild People more than 
like a Branch of the Legislative Body.”98 By blaming legislatures for the inefficiencies 
and inadequacies of governance in their colonies, governors in their answers 
demonstrated that they correctly understood the mandates of proper administration 
emanating from the center, whether or not these had translated into corresponding 
practices on the ground. 
 
Advocacy and Obedience from the Periphery to the Center: Local Knowledge as Imperial 
Politics 
 As the previous section showed, the Board of Trade circulated queries in order to 
solicit a demonstration from governors of their understanding and compliance to the 
hierarchy of imperial command and the expectations for administrative process, as 
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codified in the material form of the “Orders and Instructions.” Governors replied to 
queries in a way that corresponded to these intentions, attempting in their answers to 
demonstrate that they understood and had executed these expectations. But even in the 
highly prescriptive context of imperial sovereignty, governors also answered queries in 
other ways: meeting the expectations of the Board in their answers did not prevent them 
from also appropriating the form to ends that extended beyond metropolitan intentions, 
especially when the end involved promoting their colony as not simply well-governed, 
but also a desirable location for emigration and settlement. Even here, however, these 
uses of queries were never acts of resistance to the center; rather, they incorporated local 
knowledge into a broader project of loyal facilitation of the processes of empire. 
 No set of replies to Dartmouth’s 1773 circular better illustrated such a process 
than those from William Young, lieutenant governor for several of the Caribbean islands 
controlled by Britain after the Seven Years’ War, including Dominica, Grenada, St. 
Vincent, and Tobago. Young came to the office with prior knowledge of imperial 
administration. At the end of the Seven Years’ War, Young served on a commission 
overseeing the division and sale of lands by the government to settlers in the islands of 
Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincent, and Dominica, under British control after the war. As the 
commission’s “receiver of monies,” Young handled the administration of payments for 
the land. Through such labor, Young gained experience of the expectations and material 
forms he would later encounter as governor. Along with the other commissioners, Young 
received “Instructions” from the Secretary of State specifying the methods for dividing 
the lands into allotments for sale, and for conducting the sales themselves. These 




certificates, and surveys) to be used in administering the sales. Each of these 
“Instructions” (devised, like those issued to governors, by London administrators) 
required Young and the other commissioners to engage in facilitating imperial settlement, 
partly through the use of documents.99 The commissioners were instructed to “cause as 
exact a Survey to be made . . . as [to] the nature of the Ground” in the islands by a Chief 
Surveyor; to “cause full reports to be made in writing of all [the Chief Surveyor’s] 
Proceedings”; and to “direct the Chief Surveyor to annex to such Reports Maps of the 
several Islands so surveyed” that “accurately described” each projected allotment of land. 
Once the preparation of “such Surveys and Maps” were “compleatly [sic] finished,” 
Young and the other commissioners were to “cause Copies . . . to be deposited in the 
Secretaries Office of each Island respectively,” accompanied by their “Observations” on 
the reports.100 The “Instructions” specified other kinds of mediative labor: “previous to 
any sale,” Young and the Commissioners were to “Publish an Advertisement” in every 
British possession in the Americas “giving notice of the time and place of Sale & setting 
forth in as full and particular a manner as you shall be able the number of lotts [sic] 
cleared & uncleared . . . to be sold . . .”101 In his capacity as receiver of monies, Young 
also was issued with specific instructions that explicitly detailed the correct processes he 
was to follow in executing this role: to receive payments from the sales; to make 
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payments from these sales as salaries to the commissioners and their clerks involved in 
surveying and selling the land, and to transmit the remainder back to the Treasury.102  
This appointment, however, did not exactly prompt Young to blind obedience of 
these administrative techniques. Rather, he came to be interested in devising better ways 
of meeting metropolitan intentions. On April 14, 1764, Young wrote a memo in which he 
outlined the extant processes of collecting payments on the lands; and the problems with 
this method.103 In an accompanying document, Young proposed a set of alternative 
methods that he stressed would better fulfill the end goal of “Receiving and Remitting the 
Money to the Treasury.” The precise details of Young’s critique and his alternative plan, 
which revolved around an argument for why the lands should be sold in terms of sterling 
money and paid for in gold specie rather than bills of exchange, are less relevant than the 
broader significance of Young’s action..104 His response to central “Instruction” was to 
use his local knowledge of the Caribbean to propose a better method for fulfilling the 
same end goal of imperial government. As land commissioner, Young exercised a very 
peculiar kind of obedience to central direction. Within the course of completing he duties 
prescribed to him by paperwork produced in the imperial center, Young also offered, 
through his own paperwork and local knowledge, arguments for how the processes of 
empire might be better executed. 
This was not the only kind of writing on the West Indies that Young appears to 
have produced in the 1760s. In 1764, coincident with his appointment as land 
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commissioner in the Ceded Islands, Young wrote and had anonymously published two 
pamphlets that sought to promote settlement in these new islands, respectively entitled 
Some Observations; Which May Contribute to Afford a Just Idea of the Nature, 
Importance, and Settlement, of Our West-India Islands, and Considerations Which May 
Tend to Promote The Settlement of Our New West-India Colonies, By Encouraging 
Individuals to Embark in the Undertaking. Both of these pamphlets advocated the 
incorporation of the West India colonies into “one vast Leviathan” of empire spanning 
the Atlantic, and portrayed them as sites of profitable settlement. Grenada’s 
“mountainous and rainy” “circumstances” “regularly” yielded “good crops” and “sugar of 
the most excellent quality,” both “well watered” and “with good provision grounds” for 
slaves, “which save considerable expence [sic] to the planters in their maintenance,” 
according to Considerations.105 Dominica, according to Some Observations, was “well 
seated for commerce” and possessed of “a most noble bay (Prince Rupert’s)” 
characterized by “goodness of the anchorage,” ready access to fresh water, and was well 
situated for defensive purposes such that a fort built there “might be rendered almost 
impregnable.”106 “The extraordinary advantages and profits to be derived” from 
settlement in these islands could not “fail to be extremely inviting to those that 
understand their real importance, and are desirous of improving their fortunes.”107 
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In November 1770, Young’s circumstances advanced. He was appointed 
Governor of Dominica, and issued with the Board’s “Instructions” for the position.108  
Young was also made “Lieutenant Governor” of the other Ceded Islands under William 
Leyborne, to whom Dartmouth directed his July 5 circular with the queries. Leyborne 
received these queries at Grenada in early September 1773, noting in his letter of 
acknowledgement to Dartmouth that he had “taken measures to procure the necessary 
information, upon the points required by your Lordship, in order that I may be able to 
fulfill His Majesty’s Commands . . . as early as possible.”109 Leyborne began completing 
the queries, but died in 1775, leaving the answers unfinished. After Leyborne died, 
Young completed the queries for all of the islands.  
There were, thus, two replies to the queries for the island of Grenada. The first 
was written by Leyborne, and answered only some of Dartmouth’s questions. These 
responses largely conveyed the mundane details of the geographic and economic 
situation of the province. Although Leyborne began with a geographical description of 
Grenada that lauded the harbor of St. George’s, which he described as situated in a bay 
“justly esteemed [as] one of the best in the West Indies” with “a depth sufficient to admit 
the largest ships in the Navy,” most of his replies were devoid of any particular 
enthusiasm. He simply reported the information that the queries requested: in reply to 
question six, on the means of preventing illegal trade, Leyborne informed that ship 
captains were “vested with the same powers as the Custom House Officers” to seize 
illegal goods “but, notwithstanding all their vigilance, a great deal of smuggling is carried 
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on.” The “principal trade” of the Island was with “Great Britain, Ireland, and North 
America,” with “a considerable contraband Trade” “also carried on” with Martinique and 
St. Lucia. The colony was still relatively under-established, with “no Militia,” and only 
two forts.110 In answering the queries, Leyborne executed the deference to metropolitan 
administration that lay at the heart of the imperial Constitution.  
The second set of replies to the Grenada queries were signed by Young. Young 
answered all the questions for Grenada, copying Leyborne’s responses and adding details 
to his predecessor’s descriptions. For example, in response to the question on illegal trade 
and its prevention, Leyborne had written: 
The means used for preventing Contraband trade are by the King’s Ships, the  
Captains of which are vested with the same powers as the Custom House Officers  
and by a Guarda Costa fitted out at the Expence [sic] of the Custom House; but,  
notwithstanding all their vigilance, a great deal of smuggling is carried on.111 
 
Young appropriated Leyborne’s words, and in the process gave them a different effect:  
The means used for preventing Contraband trade are by the King’s Ships, the 
Captains of which are vested with the same powers as the Custom house office 
and some time by a Guarda Costa fitted out at the expence [sic] of the Custom 
house, but not withstanding all their Vigilance a great deal of Smuggling is 
carried on there not being a Sufficient number of such Custom house Vessels. It is 
these French smuggling Vessels which carry off such Inhabitants as on account of 
debt Escape with their Negroes[;] the only method to prevent which is making a 
Cartel with the Court of France whose interest it likeways is in order to recover 
there deserters who are a burthen [sic] to the Conquered & Ceded Islands.112 
 
Leyborne explained that the resources of the customs officers at Grenada were 
insufficient to fulfill the task of preventing illegal trade. Young replicated this aspect of 
Leyborne’s response, but went a step further. He offered an explanation for why the 
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problem existed, and in the process suggested solutions: the supply of more resources 
(ships for customs officers), and making an agreement of cooperation with the French in 
the West Indies. In augmenting Leyborne’s response, Young offered a plan for fulfilling 
a central objective of imperial government, communicated by the Board of Trade and 
Secretary of State in the “Instructions”: the governors were responsible for “improving 
the Trade of these parts” and making the “utmost endeavours [sic] to discourage and 
restrain any attempts” at illegal mercantile activity that was “hurtful and Prejudicial” to 
the British empire.113 As in his capacity as land commissioner, Young as governor used 
the bureaucratic form to both provision evidence that he correctly understood the 
expectations of ‘good’ imperial governance, and to suggest ways in which its methods 
might be improved to meet them.  
 In answering the queries, Young responded in a manner that conjoined the work 
of bureaucratic informing to a strategy of advocacy. As with his paperwork as a land 
commissioner, Young used his knowledge of local imperial circumstance to answer the 
queries in a manner that conformed to the end goal of incorporating the ilsnads into what 
he had referred in Considerations as the “one vast Leviathan” of the British empire. This 
practice can be seen in Young’s replies for Tobago and Dominica. In both cases, Young 
stressed the advantages of both of these colonies as sites of settlement, imperial loyalty, 
and economic prosperity. Replying for Dominica to the Board’s second query on the 
island’s principal rivers and harbors, and their situation with respect to commerce and 
defense, Young emphasized that the island was “extremely well watered,” and that the 
principal bay of Prince Rupert’s was “acknowledged with Respect to its Extent and 
                                                





Anchorage for Shipping” to be “the best Bay in the West Indian Islands belonging to His 
Majesty.” He leveraged the authority of local knowledge, informing Dartmouth that he 
had conversed with two admirals stationed in the area “on the advantages of this Bay,” 
who in turn had “recommend[ed] it to the Right Honourable The Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty as a proper Rendezvous” and “place of Readiness from its Situation and 
Conveniences, for His Majesty’s Ships of War to annoy the Enemy.”114 Tobago’s Sandy 
Point Bay and Great Courland Bay were “excellent” places “where the Men of War 
usually lay for the conveniency [sic] of Wooding and Watering,” whereas the island’s 
Man of War Bay (though “not very easiely [sic] got into”) was advantageous such that 
“no Bay can well be safer in every Respect.”115   
 In his responses to both the Tobago and the Dominica queries, Young also 
emphasized the potential of these islands as sites of growth and future prosperity for the 
British empire. Tobago’s soil “ought to be turned up to a pretty good depth and left a 
considerable time to Moulder [sic] in the Sun before Planting”; “then great Crops may be 
expected from it.” Tobago’s settlers “give themselves little trouble” about the “Slight 
fevers” they experienced in “the Rainy season,” he informed, “well knowing that once 
the Island is tolerably clear of wood They will enjoy the healthiest Climate in the West 
Indies.”116 Dominica’s population “have increased and do increase daily” in size, Young 
stressed, “even to double their Numbers within these three years past owing to our 
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advantages of Situation for Trade and Commerce, the Extent of our Island, and the 
Quality of our Soil for all manner of Produce, which has induc’d [sic] many Families as 
well from Europe as the neighbouring [sic] Islands, to come amongst us and become 
Settlers.”117 The language of Young’s reply here was not clearly distinguishable from the 
promotional discourse of West Indian migration and settlement in his pamphlets, despite 
the bureaucratic, rather than ‘political’ nature of the medium of queries. In introducing 
this language, Young demonstrated that for him, these contexts were not necessarily 
distinct: indeed, as his example shows, bureaucratic paperwork could be a site where the 
bureaucratic demonstration of administrative deference, and the activity of promoting 
political interest overlapped.  
 To both of these ends, Young described the islands’ problems in a manner that 
highlighted their utility to empire. In response to the query asking about “the natural 
Produce of the Islands under your Government” for Tobago, Young described it as 
consisting of “several kinds of Hard durable wood, fitt [sic] for Buildings, such as 
Bullettree, Mastick [sic], Crabwood, Locust, Angline, Green hart, Cedar.”118 The interest 
that underlay this answer emerged in Young’s reply to a subsequent query on the island’s 
forts and defensive resources. The “Carriages” of every cannon on Tobago and the 
island’s military barracks were “rotten”; “this must always be the case,” Young wrote, 
because they were built of “European wood” which “very soon after . . . arrival here . . . 
lasts but a very short time.” “But were they made in this Country of West India 
Hardwood with Shades built over them,” he continued, “they’d last at least Six years for 
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one that those from Europe will do.”119 As in his promotional writings, Young leveraged 
the utility of local circumstance, and his own knowledge of them, as a boon to empire. 
 Young’s advocacy in the answers coincided with the same demonstration of 
competent administration that so strongly characterized the replies from all the governors. 
Just as the “Instructions” given by the Board had stressed the importance of combating 
illegal trade, Young emphasized in all his replies to the sixth query (“What methods are 
there used to prevent illegal Trade, and are the same effectual?”) that efforts were being 
taken to fulfill these commands. “All foreign and other Vessels, immediately on their 
arrival, are oblig’d to repair to His Majesty’s Custom House, where they either report or 
enter their Cargoes, and are, during their Stay, under the inspection of the Searchers and 
Waiters at the establish’d Ports, who do every thing they can to prevent illegal Trade,” he 
wrote in the Dominica replies.120 In Tobago, the situation was worse, but not because 
Young had failed to understand the issue’s importance; rather, the cause was poor 
resources (“. . . the Custom House has neither Boatt [sic] nor Sloop to look after 
Smugglers, which they have in Grenada, Barbadoes [sic] and most of the other 
Islands”).121  
 Young’s replies to Dartmouth’s queries are truly a set of exceptions that 
exemplify a broader pattern of bureaucratic practice. Unlike many of the other governors 
who replied to the 1773 circular, Young had articulated a political program for the 
territory under his immediate authority. But like all the governors, answering the queries 
for Young involved demonstrating compliance with the expectations for good governance 
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communicated in the “Instructions.” The answers to the queries thus provided 
metropolitan officials not only with new facts about the conditions of the empire, but 
most importantly, evidence that its local administrators understood what ‘good imperial 
governance’ meant. If the “Instructions” functioned as metropolitan government’s tool 
for articulating the contours of authority embodied in the ‘imperial Constitution,’ the 
“queries” served as the instrument through which those delegated the task of execution 
could be rendered compliant and accountable. 
 
Conclusion 
Toward the end of 1774, roughly around the same time that the governors were 
returning their replies to the queries of 1773, the Board of Trade confronted an 
organizational problem. Its meeting minutes of November 5 record that “by reason of the 
great addition made of late years to the Books and papers of this Office, the rooms 
assigned for the accommodation of their Lordships and their Officers were becoming 
insufficient to contain the same . . .” Struggling to control the overflow of “Books and 
papers,” the Board proposed that some of these “State papers” to be “removed” from the 
Board’s Whitehall rooms.122 Whether due to the problem of inadequate infrastructure to 
process paperwork or for another reason, the effectiveness of the Board’s organization of 
its paperwork does appear to have declined following 1774. By the time of its dissolution, 
its principal clerk lamented “the Confused State of the Books and Records of the late 
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Board of Trade” whose organization was “greatly behind hand.”123 The significance of 
the small gloss in the 1774 meeting minutes, therefore, lies less in how the problem of 
imperial paperwork’s proliferation might have been resolved, than the way the archival 
challenge of bureaucratic paperwork reprised the same struggle that had befallen the 
Board ten years earlier (one raised at the outset of this chapter): an insufficient capacity 
to effectively manage the overabundance of imperial paperwork. Not only was paperwork 
a problem in the British Atlantic; it was also a paradox: the production of the very 
material forms whose proliferation was complained about in 1764 and 1774 were, as this 
chapter has suggested, also integral in maintaining the British empire in the Atlantic 
world as an ordered and governed space. Yet, the longer that the colonies existed as part 
of this empire, the more paperwork their administration generated, in turn producing a 
recurring challenge of archivization and management. From the “Instructions” that 
invested imperial governors with political authority and crafted them as administrative 
subjects, to the queries in which the governors informed administrators of their 
understanding of these directions, documents formed the material through which the 
imperial ‘Constitution’ was enforced across oceanic distance. 
What, if any, use was the factual knowledge that the governors generated in the 
content of their replies to the 1773 queries put? In each of their answers to the queries, 
the governors generated kinds of facts and information that, in theory, could have been 
used by the Board of Trade for propositional ends: to write memos giving further 
instructions to governors based specifically upon the responses received, to draw up plans 
for military strategy, and to forge new approaches to economic governance. In contrast to 
the report generated by the Board in the context of the 1720 circular, there is no evidence 
                                                




that the answers to the queries that were received between 1773 and 1774 came to be 
used. Rather, as this chapter has suggested, the fundamental role of the Board’s queries 
was facilitative: to reinforce expectations for the proper constitution and conduct of 
imperial government.  
It is interesting to note that the role of the query in colonial administration appears 
to have remained largely intact despite the institutional transformations in imperial 
government at the end of the American Revolution. In 1782, the old Board of Trade was 
dissolved, and the functions it had performed in the administration of Britain’s remaining 
possessions in the Atlantic world came to be largely consolidated in the office of the 
Secretary of State. This administrative reshuffling coincided with the ascension of 
Thomas Townshend, first Viscount Sydney, to the position of Secretary of State. On 
November 11, 1784, Sydney in this capacity wrote a circular letter to the governors of the 
West Indian islands transmitting a set of “Heads of Inquiry,” and instructing the 
governors to transmit back “a very full and particular answer” to them “as speedily as 
may be,” “accompanied with such documents as shall be necessary to illustrate and 
explain every Circumstance that may appear to require” further explanation. It was highly 
necessary, Sydney wrote, that such information be transmitted in light of “the late 
Separation of the Colonies of North America, which are now the United States.”124 
As Sydney’s reference to the “United States” indicates, the political environment 
he circulated these “Heads of Inquiry” was radically different than those in which 
Dartmouth had operated a decade earlier. The form of Sydney’s “heads of inquiry” also 
diverged from that of Dartmouth’s earlier paperwork. Whereas Dartmouth’s circular had 
                                                





been written as a series of questions, Sydney’s comprised seven bullet points to which 
governors were expected to respond. Furthermore, whereas the form circulated under the 
old Board of Trade had combined questions on trade with those on a variety of other 
topics, Sydney’s queries were entirely focused on commerce and far more quantitative in 
the nature of the information demanded. Sydney directed the governors to inform him on 
seven points:  
1st – The Prices of Lumber, Horses, Horned Cattle, Live Stock, Rice and Indian  
Corn, compared with the Average Prices, before and during the War, also of Beef,  
Pork and other necessary Articles. 
 2nd – The Number of Ships belonging to Great Britain, or the British Possessions  
in America, and the West Indies, laden with the Produce of the United States, that  
have entered at [the colony in question] since the Proclamation, and their Cargoes. 
3rd The Imports from Canada, Nova Scotia, &c. 
4th The Amount, as far as it can be ascertained, of what is supposed to have been  
fraudulently imported from the United States. 
5th The Amount of the Quantity of Rum exported this Season, compared with the  
Average of former Years, and the Price at which it sells on the Island. 
6th The Difference of Price in any of the Articles above specified, if supplied from  
America, or from the Country, and the rest of The King’s Dominions. 
7th An Account of the Imports in to the Island [in question] for the last Ten  
Years.125 
When governors replied to these “heads of inquiry,” they provided the Secretary of State 
with a mass of quantitative information materially embodied in several different forms of 
paperwork. Many answered like Governor John Orde of Dominica by writing descriptive 
responses to some heads–such as a narrative of the changing prices of the specific goods 
enumerated in the first query; and copies of tabular paperwork generated from the local 
archives of customs officials as the method of responding to the other points.126 
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 But while the political environment in which these queries were circulated was 
clearly different as a result of the war, the bureaucratic expectations for imperial officials 
remained intact in what remained of the British empire in the Atlantic world. When Orde 
was appointed as governor in October 1783, after the Treaty of Paris had been signed, the 
“Instructions” with which he was issued emphasized, using exactly the same language as 
that given to his predecessor William Young, the importance of keeping London 
administrators regularly informed of his activities as governor through the circulation of 
paperwork (“to send to us . . . a particular Account of all your proceedings, and of the 
Condition of affairs within your Government”).127  
 As with Young’s responses to the queries, the significance of Orde’s answers to 
Sydney lay more in their form than in their content. Two clues demonstrate this. When 
the clerks in Sydney’s office processed the paperwork received from Dominica and other 
colonies, they always noted on the overleaf the date of the receipt of the material and the 
date of any response sent by Sydney back to the governor. Orde’s letter and the six 
enclosures of paperwork he submitted in response to them was noted as being received on 
March 25, 1785, but no response by the Secretary of State was recorded.128 When the 
question of illegal trade in Dominica with the American nation came to be addressed by 
Sydney in his correspondence to Orde after March 25, it was not in response to the 
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paperwork Orde submitted as part of his reply to the queries from the Secretary of State, 
but rather to an April 7 letter in which Orde reported on the problem of illegal trade in 
Dominica conducted by English traders between both the French islands and the new 
United States.129 It was this April 7 letter–not the responses to the queries containing 
similar information–that Sydney advised Orde he would “refer to the Consideration of the 
Privy Council for Plantation Affairs that I may be enabled to furnish you with 
Instructions for your guidance.”130 
 In replying to the “Heads of Inquiry” by provisioning these documents, Orde 
performed the same act of administrative obedience that his predecessors had 
demonstrated in completing the Board of Trade’s queries. Many in the new United States 
conceived of government founded on popular rather than royal sovereignty as a deliberate 
break with the imperial order.131 In the territories still controlled by Great Britain in the 
Atlantic after 1783, however, royal sovereignty–embodied in the ‘imperial Constitution,’ 
and formalized in the documents circulated and completed by administrators–remained 
intact. Hence, the bureaucratic significance of a governor providing “answers to the 
Heads of Inquiry . . . together with such Documents” “in obedience to His Majesty’s 
Commands,” as David Parry, governor of Barbados, wrote in his reply to Sydney’s 
queries, remained consistent despite the change in the political contours of the empire.132   
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THE REMARK BOOK AND THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF  
THE ADMIRALTY ARCHIVE 
 
Introduction 
On November 2, 1758, Edward Boscawen, one of the three Lords of the 
Admiralty, sent the Admiralty’s secretary, John Clevland, a copy of a document he had 
received from John Hughes, captain of a ship called the Somerset which had arrived at 
the port of Spithead earlier that day.1 Hughes’ form was entitled “Remarkable 
Observations Onboard his Majesty’s Ship Somerset.” In it, Hughes recorded the 
conditions of the wind and the weather made on the ship between October 29, 1758, and 
November 2, in a tabular arrangement. Although the form did not include information on 
the location of the ship, Hughes indicated that the vessel had been sailing off the western 
coast of England. For each day at sea, Hughes had also written a detailed description, 
under the heading “Remarkable Observations” of the weather conditions and events that 
had transpired on the ship. On October 31, for example, while sailing south east, 
Clevland included among his “Remarkable Observations” a note that the sea was beset 
with “Fresh Gales & hazy weather.” On November 1, the Scilly Islands, off the southwest 
of Britain, had been spotted.2  
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It is unclear what the Lords of the Admiralty made of Hughes’ form, for no direct 
response to it from Boscawen or his colleagues appears in the archive. But the Lords of 
the Admiralty may have found something of value in the table, because less than a year 
later, they mandated that every Admiralty captain submit a similar document after their 
voyages. At a meeting on October 27, 1759, amidst issuing a variety of orders from 
TNA, ADM 1/481, "Remarkable Observations Onboard his majesty's Ship 




specifying procedures for better regulating pilotage to requiring commanders to be “very 
punctual” in sending administrators records of all prizes taken at sea, the Lords 
prescribed the completion of a new form of paperwork. With the Seven Years’ War 
raging across the Atlantic World, the Lords issued an order to the Commanders of all 
British Admiralty ships and vessels that directed them to complete a new kind of form in 
order to remedy a problem of nautical knowledge and maritime grand strategy. “Whereas 
the King’s Service has suffered very much during this War, for want of due Information 
and Knowledge of Harbours [sic], Roads, and accessible places on the Coast of France,” 
they wrote, “the Journals of the Ships which have been employed in cruizing [sic] upon 
the Coast of that Kingdom” had been “found defective, and not to contain the necessary 
Lights which ought to have been transmitted therein.” The lack of helpful information 
recorded in one administrative document (the ships journals) now begot a “remedy” in 
the requirement that captains complete a new form, which organized into a single 
document the knowledge that had previously been inadequately transmitted. The new 
form was designed specifically so that the Admiralty could “be furnished with all useful 
Information of the State of Foreign Coasts, Ports, and Roads . . .” The captains of the 
Admiralty’s ships were now commanded to employ themselves “in making the most 
accurate Observations you possible can” with respect to a set of specified categories: the 
state and location of soundings and harbors; “directions for sailing to Ports or Roads,” 
“the best Anchoring Places and Watering Places”; and “what Provisions and 
Refreshments may be had.” The order also instructed captains describe the state of 
fortifications; and, if there were artists on board the ships, to “add Drafts or Plans” of the 




The 1759 order also specified how this document, called the ‘remark book,’ was 
to be prepared and transmitted to the Admiralty offices in London. The captains were told 
to extract the kind of observations of ports that they normally included in the genre of the 
“Journal” into this new form. The remark books were to be sent “in as expeditious a 
manner” as possible, recorded by the “Ship’s Master” in a “Book, for the said purposes 
only . . .” The Captain was to “very carefully” “supervise” the Master as he made those 
recordings, “and to cause him to add, at the end of the Book, an Index of the Names of 
Places mentioned therein, referring to the Page of the Book therein.” Upon completion of 
the voyage, the Captain was responsible for transmitting “the said Book, signed by 
yourself and the Master, to the Secretary of the Admiralty.” These observations were to 
be made, the order specified, in every port a ship visited, both foreign and British–when 
docking at the former, however, Captains were cautioned “not to do any thing to give 
Umbrage or Offence [sic] to the Governors or Inhabitants” of such places.3 
Accompanying the order was a list of the ships to which the order was to be sent–
covering those docked domestically (Portsmouth) as well as globally (in the 
Mediterranean, North America, East Indies, and the Caribbean).4 Once the order was 
transmitted, its injunction was immediately taken up by ship captains, who began to 
return remark books to the Admiralty that fulfilled the command for information 
according to the prescribed format.5  
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These remark books followed a standard format. The cover sheet of the books 
specified the names of the captain, master, the ship name, and the period of time during 
which the remarks were made. The pages of the remark books were then divided into a 
table, with six categories of description (following the Admiralty order) along the 
horizontal axis (Description for Sailing in and Out of Port, Marks for Anchoring and 
Landings, Descriptions of Wooding and Watering, Provisions and Refreshments, 
Fortifications and Landing, and Trade and Shipping). On the vertical axis, the captain 
recorded the date and place of harbor at which the remarks were being made, dividing the 
table so that the reader would be able to tell where and when the specific observations in 
each of the six categories had been made.  
 Similar information had been irregularly transmitted to the Admiralty in multiple 
ways, especially in the form of the ships’ journals. Earlier examples of ships’ journals, 
such as one sent to the Admiralty in 1738 by Charles Brown, naval commander in 
Jamaica, were filled with “remarkable observations” made at Port Royal.6 Governors 
such as Thomas Pownall transmitted navigational texts and journals back to London 
administrators that they believed corrected the existing “little” or “erroneous” 
“Information” about such subjects.7 Long before the 1759 order, the Admiralty had 
received paperwork from captains containing tables recording information such as 
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latitude and longitude and “Remarkable Observations & Accidents” made onboard and at 
port.8  
The mandated production of these texts in 1759–called ‘remark books’–as a mode 
of paperwork thus effectively regularized a practice of irregular receipt of such 
information by the Admiralty, both from captains, imperial administrators, and other 
branches of government, especially the Board of Trade.9 The order also served to isolate 
information of particular interest to British imperial fortunes that was contained in the 
existing form of the ‘journal,’ and directed captains to inscribe this knowledge into a new 
mode of paperwork. (The Board had sought to disseminate hydrographic knowledge 
itself; in 1760, for example, it circulated a chart of Nova Scotia, ordering the secretary to 
“send on the said Charts of the Master of the New England and Nova Scotia Coffeehouse, 
to be put up there for the Use and Information of Masters of Vessels using the Nova 
Scotia Trade.”10) Despite the fact that it merely mandated the continued production of 
something that had already been in practice, the 1759 order marks an important moment 
in the history of Admiralty paperwork. The requirement that such texts be produced and 
returned as a distinctive genre resulted in the creation of an archive of hydrographic 
knowledge specifically intended for use. But in that regard, the subsequent history of the 
remark book over the late eighteenth century is curious. Although the order mandating 
the return of remark books emphasized the utility of the information they would contain 
for administrators, the remark books returned to the Admiralty by captains over the 
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following decades were simply collected, not consulted.11 The archive of hydrographic 
knowledge that was built up in the offices of the Admiralty in London through the regular 
receipt of remark books from ship captains remained unused until the 1790s. In that 
decade, the Admiralty actively reorganized its archive in order to render hydrographic 
paperwork useful in administration. While the facilitative function of paperwork in 
imperial governance continued throughout this period, there was a lag between the 
invention of the form of the remark book, and its archival mobilization–despite the 
Admiralty’s creation of the remark book with the clear intention that it would generate 
usable data. This chapter begins by examining the role of the remark book as a form of 
maritime paperwork. It continues by detailing the history of how the archive of remark 
books came to rendered useful to the Admiralty through a bureaucratic innovation: the 
creation of the office of Admiralty hydrographer in 1795.   
The historiography of British maritime enterprise in the age of the revolutions has 
extensively probed the increasing expansion of the bureaucratic and logistical capacity of 
the British navy and admiralty in the late eighteenth century as central to the British 
empire’s expansion in these years, as well as the shifting attitudes toward naval 
administration within party politics.12 The cultural turn within British studies in the late 
1980s and 1990s saw the birth of scholarship that demonstrated the symbolic importance 
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of admirals in the Georgian period as rallying points for popular politics in defense of 
empire.13 Scholarship has also demonstrated the development of the Admiralty’s interest 
in cultivating knowledge of oceanic space in part to enhance its political fortunes.14 
However, sustained attention to the role of forms, documents, and material texts in 
Admiralty administration has been far more limited within each of these literatures.15 In 
exploring the intertwined histories of the remark book and the Admiralty archive, this 
chapter augments this historiography, and points to a curious aspect of the material 
practices of imperial government: the discrepancy between the facilitative circulation and 
completion of documents, which was long integral to administration; and the practice of 
using the archive of these documents as a tool of governance, one which (in the case of 
Admiralty bureaucracy) developed at a very late date.  
 
Circulating and Completing Remark Books  
What was the role of the remark book within the documentary ecology of 
Admiralty administration? Answering this question requires placing the production of 
                                                
13 For the cultural significance of admirals, see Kathleen Wilson, “Empire, Trade, and Popular Politics in 
Hanoverian England: The Case of Admiral Vernon,” Past and Present, 121 (1988), 74-109; and Gerald 
Jordan and Nicholas Rogers, “Admirals as Heroes: Patriotism and Liberty in Hanoverian England,” Journal 
of British Studies, 28 (1989), 201-224. 
 
14 For the involvement of the Admiralty in such projects, see David Mackay, In the Wake of Cook: 
Exploration, Science, & Empire, 1780-1801 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 1985); Glyn Williams, 
“‘To Make Discoveries of Countries Hitherto Unknown’: The Admiralty and Pacific Exploration in the 
Eighteenth Century,” The Mariner’s Mirror, 82 (1996), 14-27; John Gascoigne, Science in the Service of 
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UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Andrew S. Cook, “James Cook and the Royal Society,” in 
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2004), 37-55. See also, for a later period, Michael S. Reidy, Tides of History: Ocean Science and Her 
Majesty’s Navy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
 
15 There is, however, some research on lists as forms of Admiralty paperwork: see, for example, W. G. 
Perrin, “The Navy List,” The Mariner’s Mirror, 1 (1911), 257-264; and Margaret Robinson, “Loose and 






remark books in the context of the broader shipboard practices of completing paperwork, 
which can best be attended to be considering how documents were used aboard one 
Admiralty vessel. This approach helpfully concretizes the inquiry, grounding the 
examination of shipboard paperwork in a tangible context; but it raises the issue of 
whether the example chosen is representative of broader practice. Such concerns are 
offset by the fact that the form of the remark book was highly prescriptive: through it, the 
Admiralty orchestrated, organized, and standardized what would have otherwise been a 
more ad hoc manner of gaining the same information from multiple kinds of bureaucratic 
documents. What one ship captain did in completing the form was therefore to perform 
obedience to expectations iterated by all others. Hence, it is possible to examine the 
journey of one ship, the Nightingale, which in 1763 journeyed along the coast of North 
America and called at ports (including New York, Virginia, and Dominica) spanning the 
longitudinal breadth of British America. The Admiralty clerk who processed the ship’s 
remark book when it arrived in London recorded the names of the ports in an index 
affixed to the front of a volume in which he bound the Nightingale’s remark books with 
those of a number of other ships. Between February 13 and April 27, 1763, the 
Nightingale called at the port of Charleston, South Carolina. Two columns divide the 
page of the index, the “Ships Names” cross listed with the “Places Described,” and keyed 
to the number of the book in which the description appeared.16 Sailing entailed 
observation, and the production of documents in which to record them.  
 
 
                                                






TNA, ADM 52/1385/4, Detail of Nightingale "Journal" 
 
What were these documentary forms, and how did each function? The “Journal” 
served as a running diary in which captains could, as one popular navigational guide of 
the period wrote, “the most remarkable daily occurrences relating to the ship during her 
voyage outward and homeward.”17 In the Nightingale’s “Journal” for mid February to 
late April 1763, there were two different, hand-drawn tables for organizing and 
transcribing the information. The first consisted of a set of vertical columns for recording 
observations according to set categorical heads, including “Wind,” “Distance in Miles, 
“Latitude,” “Longitude,” and “Bearings and Distance at Noon,” indexed to the date on 
which the observations were made. In the period under examination, many of these 
columns were left blank, for, as the captain wrote, the Nightingale was now at port, 
“moord [sic] off Charles Town,” and at least some of these categories (such as latitude 
and longitude) therefore temporary constant. On the facing page of the journal lay a 
second table for recording “Remarks on Board His Majesty’s Ship Nightingale,” indexed 
to the same date of observations as the first table. These “Remarks” offered a 
documentary guide to the proceedings of life on the Nightingale as filtered through the 
authority of the Captain’s eye. While most of his observations seemed mundane and 
                                                





quotidian – on the cloudy weather, the acquisitions of provisions (“24 pounds of fresh 
beef”), and the repair of a mast–, the Captain also rendered more substantial events–the 
administration of “12 lashes for drunkenness and 12 lashes for Contempt to his Officer” 
to one John Walker, and similar punishments to another sailor for mutiny and another for 
theft–according to his own perspective.18 As a form of paperwork, the Captain’s Journal 
was thus hardly a neutral form of documentation; rather, it was one in which the 
observations of the captain were rendered into physical form, the chronicle of the journey 
recorded through the particular gaze of the authority figure at the helm of the shipboard 
hierarchy. 
The ship’s Log-Book had a different function: it served principally to record 
measurements (taken each day at noon) of the distance that the ship had travelled in the 
previous twenty four hours. This information assisted in determining the ship’s position 
using ‘dead reckoning.’ Before being inscribed in the Log-Book, these measurements 
were first written on the ship’s “Log-Board,” which (according to Robertson’s Elements 
of Navigation) was “a large square board, or panel [sic] of wainscot,” “on which is 
written in chalk whatever is thought worthy of notice from day to day.” Such 
observations, kept by the “officer of the watch,” were “divided into five columns,” and 
the kinds of information recorded on the board were to include knots, fathoms, winds, 
“the business doing aboard,” as well as “what other remarks the officer of the watch 
thinks proper to insert.” Because of the impermanence of the chalk writing, the Log-
Board possessed a particularly significant role in the archive of shipboard paperwork: as 
the document in which these observations were recorded represented, in Robertson’s 
                                                





words, “the only authentic record of the ship’s transactions.”19 Some of the information 
recorded in the Log-Board was also replicated in the “Journal.” On February 27, 1763, 
for example, the Journal of the Nightingale recorded that the weather at Charleston was 
“hazy” but “clearing”20; the log book offered that it had been “hazy this 24 hours” but 
had “cleared.”21  
Although the content of the observations in these documents would appear to be 
useful information, the logbook and the journal were not forms intended for generating 
factual knowledge, but rather to serve as tools for the execution of the tasks of 
navigation. Therefore, the regularized practice of completing such paperwork mattered as 
much, if not more than the content recorded in the form. The crew’s completion of these 
documents organized and furthered the routinization of shipboard procedures, and the 
structure of authority on board. Taken together, such forms attest to the way in which the 
eighteenth century ship and ocean functioned as something more than sites where 
propositional knowledge was generated.22 The crew also produced a mass of 
documentation simply in performing the work of navigation.  
The remark book differed from these other forms of nautical paperwork because it 
was an explicitly propositional technology. As a mode of organizing and collating 
knowledge of economic, political, environments, and material conditions at ports, the 
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remark book was less a form that enabled knowledge of geography, as was the focus of 
the captain’s logbook, but instead knowledge of human and natural conditions. If the 
logbook situated the ship mainly in terms of longitudinal and latitudinal space, the remark 
book oriented vessels primarily in relation to economic (with its category of remarks on 
trade), natural (with its categories in relation to provisioning), and indeed political space. 
But unlike the logbook and the journal, the remark did so with the intention of use 
beyond the facilitative. Specifically, the remark book served as the site for writing the 
information about geographic, political, and economic conditions at ports that were 
traditionally recorded in the ship’s “Journal” so as to organize this knowledge distinctly. 
The remark book did not abrogate the function of the “Journal,” but rather isolated that 
content judged to be particularly useful for administrators. The very reason for the 
invention of the remark book was to address a problem of politics that the Admiralty 
understood as a problem of knowledge: correct information about the geography and 
replenishing conditions of ports and coasts, the absence of which (as the order described) 
had resulted in adverse political consequences in the imperial warfare.  
Upon receipt in London by the Admiralty, the remark books kept aboard the 
Nightingale were bound together with several others from vessels which had made 
journeys in the same time period. The title pages of the Nightingale’s remark books 
demonstrate that they were completed by William Campbell, the captain of the ship, and 
Matthew Davis, the Nightingale’s master. Upon opening the remark book numbered “4,” 
which covers the period the Nightingale spent in Charleston in 1763, a largely blank table 
appears before the reader, containing on its vertical axis columns that reflect the 




December, 1762; and on its horizontal axis, running over the margin of the page, the 
particular categories of description–“Descriptions for Sailing in & out of Ports, with 
Soundings, Marks for Ports . . .,” “Marks for Anchoring,” “Trading and Watering,” 
“Provisions and Refreshments,” “Descriptions of Fortifications and Landing Places,” and 
“Further Descriptions in Regard to Trade and Shipping”–to be filled out with 
observations, with the design of the form reflecting categories prescribed by the 
Admiralty in its 1759 order. 23   
The first table in the Nightingale’s remark book described the period 
encompassing the ship’s departure from the harbor at Woolwich in October 1762, and its 
crossing of the Atlantic Ocean through December 1762. Unsurprisingly, the table is 
laconic and largely empty of elaborate text, the observations under the columns for 
“ports” being one of three kinds of entries: “pilot water” (meaning, simply, that the ship 
was cruising through water in which no astronomical observation was being made 
aboard); a note that the captain was “Busily Employed & had no Opportunity to make 
any new Observations”; or a reference directing the reader to “See Collins for the best 
Observations. No new Directions.” The latter reference points to the relationship between 
the eyewitness observations recorded in the remark books and the published 
hydrographical knowledge contained in Captain Grenville Collins’ The English Coasting 
Pilot (1693). Generated in response to monarchical demand by Charles II in 1681, 
Collins’ initial survey of the English coast provided maritime officials with geographical 
information that could be used to plot defensive strategy against the French navy in the 
English Channel. The charts and sailing directions in Collins’ Coasting Pilot had been 
                                                






continuously updated throughout the eighteenth century by its publisher, Mount & Page, 
augmented in successive editions with charts of other regions in which English ships 
traversed. Despite concerns about its inaccuracy, copies of the Coasting Pilot and similar 
books continued to be carried on ships and referred to in remark books, as in the case of 
the Nightingale. The presence of such ‘pilots’ within the archive of ships demonstrated 
the coexistence of printed and observed hydrographic knowledge aboard ships.24  
Once the Nightingale had crossed the Atlantic and began its cruise along the coast 
of the southern parts of the American colonies, the descriptions contained in its remark 
book became more full and elaborate. The second table of the ship’s remark book 
covered the period between February 13 and April 27, 1763, when the Nightingale was 
docked at Charlestown. Each of the categories contained a plethora of information 
potentially useful for guiding other ships in sailing, docking, and provisioning at the port. 
Both Campbell and Davis signed the Charleston section of the remark book, indicating 
that the description contained therein was either prepared jointly, or at the very least 
approved of by both. They filled the column under the heading of “Directions for 
Sailing” with a long and detailed set of instructions on the best way to enter the harbor, 
counseling other sailors to sail “no nearer . . . than 6 fm [fathoms]” to the “Shoal called 
Rattle Snake” that “lays 6 Miles from the Shoar [sic] . . .” They offered precise directions 
as to which landmarks in the harbor the ship ought to make turns at, including the sight of 
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Charlestown’s New Steeple, “a House Just open in the Swamp,” and “some shagling [sic] 
Trees, on the Southern part of the Southward wood.” The description contained in the 
Directions, which stretched over two pages of column space, entered into considerable 
specificity about such seemingly minute affairs.
  
TNA, ADM 346/20, Detail from Nightingale's Remark Book for Charleston, 1763 
 
Descriptions in the other categories were equally elaborate: the “Marks for Anchoring,” 
for example, directed readers toward the “good Anchor ground in Rebellion Road,” the 
northern part of the Charleston port, while under the category of “Provision and 
Refreshments,” the authors warned that “the Bread is very Coarse, the Beef & Pork is not 
so good as English or Irish, and Vegetables are very scarce.” In the same column, the 




remain on board and not expect to find treatment options at Charleston, “there being no 
Hospitals here or Sick Quarters Unless you pay Very dear for them.”  
Further information about the same subject – medicine and health – was also 
entered under the separate column containing “Description of Fortifications and Landing 
Places,” where the authors noted that despite the lack of an affordable hospital at the port, 
“there is a House and Family kept to Receive Such People that may come here with 
Contagions, Distempers.” That same column also contained information that seemingly 
ought to pertain to the heading of ‘provisioning’: namely, that Charleston “abounds with 
wood and you may Catch good fish round it.” Such an example suggests that the 
prescription of categories of knowledge that the Admiralty deemed worth knowing about, 
and that inhered in the design of the remark book (since it asked for information on the 
six categories – and only those categories) coexisted alongside the much less rigid 
practices by which crew members completed the forms in which information might be 
categorized differently. It is in such descriptions, moreover, the nature of the remark book 
as a snapshot of current conditions as perceived by the particular observers becomes 
clear. The continued production of remark books as mandated by the Admiralty implied a 
recognition that such conditions could also change.  
Although the collation of such knowledge appeared as disinterested geographical 
description, the intention of the remark book (as has been shown) was tied to the 
advancement of imperial advantage by remedying what the Admiralty perceived as an 
adverse knowledge deficit. If such an intention seemed sublimated under the quotidian 
columns for recording descriptions of wood provisioning and fish quality, it perhaps 




Shipping.” The term “Further” in the column heading is itself an indication that the 
entirety of the remark book’s categories of description, no matter how apolitical they may 
have seemed, were geared (as the earlier discussion of the Admiralty’s order creating the 
form suggested) toward strengthening imperial political economy: this particular column 
made that tacit intention of the genre explicit. Charleston, the Nightingale’s leaders 
observed, was “a place of large Trade for Rice, Indigo & Skins,” and in a real sense the 
entirety of the remark book can be seen as a way of organizing the collection of 
hydrographic, geographic, and economic knowledge needed to achieve those ends at 
different ports.   
Despite the Admiralty’s efforts to formally mandate the material structure of the 
remark books in its 1759 order by designating specific categories and detailing the way in 
which they ought to be laid out on the page, the actual completion of the paperwork by 
crews challenged these prescriptions. Post-1759 instantiations of remark books displayed 
a number of ways in which captains recorded such information. Consider, for example, 
the “Description of the different Ports, Harbours, Bay’s and Anchoring Places where his 
Majesty’s Ship Alborough has had Occasion to land at during her Voyage from Spithead 
to Cork and up the River St Laurence to Quebec & from then or Back to Spithead 
between the 26 March 1762 and ye 1st of Nov. 1762.” The first two pages of the 
Alborough’s account were a journal of the conditions encountered during the voyage, 
conveying similar information as required by the categories of the remark book (such as 
wind conditions and latitudinal observations) that covered both the ship’s Atlantic 
crossing and its voyage up Canadian waters and calling at ports, but in narrative form 




along the way. The next two pages, however, followed the exact form of the remark 
book, with the ship captain recording information about such ports in the table under the 
prescribed headings.25 At times, remark books could merge formal strategies on the very 
same page, as the commanders of the ship the Active did during its sail through the West 
Indies between 1772 and 1773. They combined lengthy narrative descriptions of the 
sights encountered as the ship journeyed from Grenada to Anguilla – the kind that would 
have been included in the first column of the Admiralty’s tabular form – with much 
smaller tables, drawn on the bottom of pages in which they included very brief 
observations under the remaining prescribed heads (Marks for Anchoring, Wood and 
Water, Provisions, Fortifications, and Trade).26 At times, moreover, ship captains 
completing remark books invented their own categories of description: remarking on 
conditions at Porto Bello harbor in Panama in 1765, the commanders of the HMS Essex 
offered information on all the prescribed headings, but added two of their own columns–
“Salutes & Compliments,” under which the procedures of military greetings between 
officers and commanders were detailed; and a dedicated space specifically describing the 
“Look Out” of the harbor.27 Here, it appears, the power of deciding what knowledge was 
in fact essential to record in the remark book lay beyond the intentions of the form’s 
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creators. It is significant as well that even after the 1759 order, captains sent these books 
back to the Admiralty under a variety of titles–‘remark books,’ ‘description books,’ sets 
of ‘remarkable observations,’ ‘remarks & descriptions’; and sometimes simply ‘remarks,’ 
‘observations,’ or ‘descriptions.’ This circumstance further illustrates the tension between 
the Admiralty’s prescription of a particular form for the remark book, and the looseness 
of practice on ships. Yet, it is equally important to highlight that, as in the case of the 
instances in answering queries where governors corrected the information about the 
Americas contained in the “Instructions,” the return of the remark book independent of 
what alterations captains made in the form, was itself a demonstration of their obedience 
to the hierarchy of imperial government. By regularly sending even modified remark 
books to the Admiralty, the captions were displaying compliance with metropolitan 
command, and thus to the administrative sovereignty embodied in the imperial 
Constitution.  
The regularized practice of returning remark books continued throughout the Age 
of Revolutions, although the number of remark books returned during the War of 
American Independence declined.28 However, for complex reasons, the Admiralty’s 
attitude toward remark books changed during the late eighteenth century. The Admiralty 
developed an attitude and capacity of using the archive of these documents as resources 
for government–a fulfillment, incidentally, of the original intention behind their creation. 
The next section explores how this bureaucratic practice came to be established.  
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The Remark Book and the Reform of the Hydrographic Archive 
 As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the eighteenth century Admiralty had established 
methods of reviewing, processing, and replying to incoming documents, as well as a 
system of archiving them. But the Admiralty did not respond to or use all of these 
documents–and, most curiously, in the decades following the 1759 order commissioning 
the remark books, the Admiralty had made little use of them and similar documents 
(especially maritime surveys) as they accrued in its archive. Instead, official maritime 
surveying and cartography was undertaken through a mixture of military engineering, and 
purchasing nautical charts produced by private publishers.29 Indeed, the default mode by 
which the Admiralty acquired charts was through purchasing them from private firms, to 
whom ship captains would sell copies of the charts they created during their voyages as a 
way of augmenting their income.30 The Admiralty’s failure to create an institutional 
capacity to employ its archive of remark books for making better charts is paradoxical 
given that the form was specifically created to improve the quality and organization of 
hydrographical data for use. It is also curious because the Admiralty reiterated the 
importance of keeping and returning remark books to captains in another order of 1786.31 
Yet, as the Lords of the Admiralty noted in an August 12, 1795 order in council, these 
documents had simply been collected within their office, but not rendered useful: 
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 On a cursory examination of the plans and charts which have from time to time  
been deposited in the office, we find a considerable mass of information, which, if  
judiciously arranged and digested, would be found to be of the greatest utility to  
Your Majesty’s Service; but from the want of a proper establishment for the  
execution of this duty, Your Majesty’s Officers are in a great measure deprived of  
the advantage of these valuable communications. 
The documents pertaining to geographic and hydrographic knowledge had yet to be 
rendered useful; and the reason, the Lords continued, was “the want of a proper 
establishment for the execution of this duty,” resulting in maritime officers being 
“deprived of the advantage of these valuable communications.”32  
 The idea of appointing a bureaucrat to undertake precisely this task had been 
floated earlier in the eighteenth century. In A General Treatise of the Dominion and Laws 
of the Sea (1705), Alexander Justice proposed appointing “professors of hydrography” 
who would instruct mariners in the science of navigation by “carefully examin[ing] the 
Journals of Navigation, deposited in the Office of the Admiralty” and “correct[ing] them 
in the presence of the Pilots who have err’d in their Computation.”33 England also had a 
tradition of a semi-official ‘hydrographer royal,’ most notably Grenville Collins, who 
published charts and navigational documents used by Admiralty captains.34 In 1776, 
James Rennell, Surveyor General of Bengal, proposed to engage in similar work with 
respect to the hydrographical materials of the East India Company contained in India 
House.35 But within the administrative structure of the Admiralty itself, and in contrast to 
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France, no formal establishment of a hydrographer occurred in 1795, when Alexander 
Dalrymple was appointed as the inaugural occupant to the position.36 Rising through the 
bureaucratic ranks of the East India Company from his appointment as a writer in Madras 
from 1752, Dalrymple had long provisioned the Company with hydrographical and 
geographical information on South Asia in the form of maps, charts, and plans, mainly as 
a means of maintaining an official position and salary; from 1779, the Company 
appointed him to use the ship’s journals contained in East India House to publish charts 
and maps for the use of the Company’s marine.37 Furthermore, Dalrymple was well-
connected within the political and intellectual establishment of London, having been 
elected a member of the Royal Society in 1771. From these social circles, Dalrymple had 
come to informally provide hydrographic information to several influential government 
figures, including some who rose to positions of leadership within the Admiralty after a 
March 1795 bureaucratic reorganization: Sir Philip Stephens, who went from being 
Secretary of the Admiralty to part of the Board; Even Nepean, former under-secretary for 
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War, who became Secretary; and William Marsden, who became Second Secretary. All 
three had prior links to Dalrymple, either through the Royal Society, or in the case of 
Nepean, through the Home Office. At a moment of internal discussion about the “proper 
Management of the Admiralty,” in which its leadership acknowledged that “there is no 
method whatever observed in amassing or collecting Information” in the office, 
Dalrymple’s appointment helped fulfill the need for better organized records.38 
For several years prior to his appointment, Dalrymple had been a critic of the state 
of hydrographic knowledge. In the introduction to his 1783 General Collection of 
Nautical Publications, Dalrymple lamented that “in the enlightened Ages of Modern 
Times there has scarcely been one Hydrographer, deserving the appellation but 
D’Aprés,” a reference to the French East India Company hydrographer whom Dalrymple 
had corresponded with and assisted beginning in the mid-1760s. “Not One Navigator in a 
THOUSAND, ever attempts to make, or thinks it a part of his Professional Duty to be 
able to make a Chart,” he contended, noting that “were the practice of Hydrography 
universal among Navigators, the Improvement of Charts would rapidly approach to 
perfection . . .”39 In addition to the need to organize the records of the Admiralty to 
publish better charts to ship captains, the purpose of establishing Dalrymple in this 
position was to make the work he had already been doing for several years–provisioning 
hydrographical information to government–official. The key advantage that his official 
appointment brought was access to the Admiralty’s bureaucratic archive. This aspect of 
Dalrymple’s position was heralded by his friends, one of whom, the surveyor Robert 
                                                
38 See BL, Add MS 75775, Sir Charles Middleton to Earl of Spencer, December 19, 1794, and the enclosed 
“Memorandum for Business at the Admiralty.” 
 





Moorsom, wrote to Henry Dundas in 1797 to express his happiness that the position 
would “enable” Dalrymple “to add to his valuable publications & make a selection” of 
the hydrographical paperwork in the office “for public use . . .”40  
Dalrymple’s tempestuous tenure as the Admiralty’s first hydrographer, and the 
subsequent development of the position after his death has been extensively examined.41 
Dalrymple spent his initial years organizing and arranging the contents of the Admiralty’s 
official archive. As part of the job, he supplied admirals with copies of official 
documents. For example, in preparing paperwork for Commodore John Blankett in 1798 
prior to a voyage, Dalrymple found himself drawing up lists of “Things supplied,” 
including remark books from three captains for the harbors Blankett would also enter, 
sending both charts from his private archive as well as the official one.42 Dalrymple also 
responded to specific requests from the Admiralty itself for information on navigational 
routes and other issues related to the sea.43 Similarly, Dalrymple actively supplied or 
summarized paperwork to Dundas that he acquired through his position as Hydrographer 
                                                
40 NAS, GD 51/3/638, Robert Moorsom to Henry Dundas, August 4, 1797. 
 
41 For an account of Dalrymple’s tenure at the Hydrographic Office, see Cook, “Alexander Dalrymple and 
the Hydrographic Office,” in Alan Frost and Jane Samson (eds.), Pacific Empires: Essays in Honour of 
Glyndwr Williams (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999), 53-68. For the history and development 
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Hydrographical Office, the Royal Navy and the charting of the Baltic Sea, 1795-1815,” Journal for 
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International Journal of Maritime History, 27 (2015), 208-226. 
 
42 TNA, ADM 1/3522, “A List of Journals, Memoirs, Charts &c furnished Commodore Blankett by Mr 
Dalrymple, the Admiralty Hydrographer, for his Information during his present intended Voyage,” July 4, 
1798, f. 67; “List of Things supplied Com Blankett kept at Admiralty,” f. 69. 
 
43 TNA, ADM 1/3522, Dalrymple on the “probable length of the Passage of a Frigate . . . from England to 





on subjects ranging from ranging from trade routes to China to “a Revolutionary Club at 
Buenos Ayres [sic]” seeking to overthrow Spanish control.44  
               
             TNA, ADM 1/3522, Detail from Alexander Dalrymple's Design for the Remark Book 
Of particular interest is the fate of the remark book during Dalrymple’s tenure. In 
1804, Dalrymple sent Nepean a printed proof of a new layout for the remark book.45 In 
his redesign of the form, Dalrymple prefaced the remark book with a letter to ship 
captains reiterating the importance of the knowledge solicited by the form to imperial 
                                                
44 NAS, GD 51/1/564/1, Dalrymple to Melville, February 21, 1805; GD 51/1/574/1, Dalrymple to Melville, 
April 25, 1808.  
 
45 TNA, ADM 1/3522, Dalrymple to Nepean, February 6, 1804. For a brief discussion, see also Luciana de 
Lima Martins, “Mapping Tropical Waters: British Views and Visions of Rio de Janeiro,” in Denis E. 





government, and a plan to make it actionable for administrators. The “Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty” had judged it “highly important to the advancement of 
Nautical Knowledge, and to the safety of His Majesty’s Ships,” that accurate “Reports on 
Coasts, Harbours [sic], &c.,” were regularly transmitted to the Admiralty; ship captains 
were thus instructed to complete the attached from by making “Remarks on the Coasts, 
Harbours [sic], &c. which you may visit from time to time in future, and to transmit 
Reports thereof to this Office, agreeably to the enclosed Form, by the first safe 
conveyance, retaining a Copy of such Reports in case of accident.” The “Hydrographer” 
would then “examine such Reports” and “state” to the Lords of the Admiralty “how far 
they appear to him to have been made with a due attention to the Objects of these 
Instructions.” Dalrymple ended the cover letter by emphasizing the importance of the 
captains’ regular return of nautical paperwork to his office precisely because of the utility 
of such information, commanding the captains that if they captured any enemy vessels 
they were to “secure all Journals, Nautical Descriptions, Charts, Plans, Maps and Views 
of Land which may be found on board her,” make an “exact Inventory” of them, and 
transmit that Inventory alongside “the said Journals, Nautical Descriptions, Charts, &c., 
for the use of the Hydrographical Office”–meaning, specifically, Dalrymple’s work of 
designing better charts and maps for the use of Admiralty vessels.46 
The original remark books, as the 1759 order explained, had been produced in 
response to the deficit of knowledge within the British Admiralty of hydrographical 
conditions. Dalrymple’s redesign of 1804 framed the purpose of the books in the same 
way. The information generated by the new remark book was intended for the 
                                                





“advancement of Nautical Knowledge” on behalf of securing “the safety of His Majesty’s 
Ships.” The original remark book had been organized as a table with headings for 
specific thematic that captains were then instructed to make observations thereupon. 
Dalrymple’s new 1804 “Form of Remark-Book” replicated the same categories of 
description in the original remark book, including “Directions for sailing into, or out of 
Ports, and for avoiding Dangers,” “Marks for anchoring,” “Wooding and Watering,” 
“Provisions and Refreshments,” and “Fortifications and Landing Places,” adding only 
one new category not included on the original remark book: “Inhabitants.” What changed 
from the 1759 order? The difference lay not in the invention of new categories of desired 
knowledge, but rather in two aspects, one formal and the other institutional. Dalrymple’s 
new remark book included detailed instructions specifying the precise kinds of 
observations to make under each category. For example, under the category of “Marks 
for anchoring,” Dalrymple instructed the captains to record the “Best anchorage in the 
Ports visited, or on the Coasts adjacent,” “Roads, Bays, or other convenient Places of 
anchorage adjacent to the Port visited,” as well as “whether or not” “a Fleet or Squadron 
may remain in safety in tempestuous weather, to watch the motions of, or block up, the 
Enemy’s Ships taking shelter in port.” Under the category of “Fortifications and Landing 
Places,” Dalrymple specifically asked for information on “the Form, Strength, and 
Position of Fortifications, their Elevation above the Sea; the number, condition and size 
of Guns; how they cover and command the Places where Troops may land; in what 
manner they defend watering Places or anchorage, whether they are, or are not attackable 
by Ships or Bomb Vessels: and how the annoyance they are calculated to give to the 




“better defence [sic]” of British interests, Dalrymple explained in these instructions to the 
captains. He also appended a table of “Symbols and Contractions” that the captains were 
instructed to use in making latitudinal and longitudinal observations. If the original 
remark book had served to standardize and organize hydrographic observation through 
the proscriptive form of paperwork, Dalrymple extended these prescriptions in his new 
form. His redesigned remark book was more detailed, explicit, and proscriptive than the 
original version of the Admiralty’s in instructing captains on exactly how to make the 
proper observations in each of the categories of inquiry. Through such specifications, 
Dalrymple thus sought to improve the quality of information submitted through the form 
of the remark book. 
The second innovation was institutional. In 1759, the Admiralty Lords created a 
form through which they sought to generate useful knowledge. But they did not institute 
the attendant institutional capacity necessary to fulfill that intention. For over three 
decades following the mandate for the completion and return of the form, the archival 
condition of the remark book remained the same. Why did this change–from an 
Admiralty bureaucracy disinterested in the use of its own hydrographic archive, to one 
that created a new office explicitly to mobilize the contents of this archive for 
administrative use–occur? The immediate explanation lies in the movement of 
bureaucratic personnel: the entrance during the 1790s of administrators into the 
leadership of the Admiralty who elevated a particular figure–Alexander Dalrymple–who 
had already worked to render paperwork useful for government. But that still leaves 
unanswered the related question: why did Admiralty administration for much of the late 




by the broader examination of paper ‘instruments’ in this dissertation, may be that the 
eighteenth century imperial state in the Atlantic world treated paperwork for the vast 
majority of its history as a facilitative tool, whose significance was largely confined to 
the immediate instance of its circulation, completion, and return. This attitude seems to 
have deemphasized the potential utility of information–such as that contained in the 
“remark book”–beyond the fact of its creation. The ‘exponential decay’ in the utility of 
official information was thus considered to be very high. By the 1790s, however, this 
attitude seems to have been changing–as seen in the founding of the office of 
hydrographer at the Admiralty, and in other realms of bureaucratic government, as the 
final chapter of the dissertation will show. 
 
Conclusion 
What does an examination of the history of the remark book between its 1759 
invention and Dalrymple’s 1804 redesign reveal about the history of paperwork in British 
imperial administration? As the continued return of remark books through and after 1783 
makes clear, there were long continuities in the Admiralty’s demand for hydrographic 
knowledge, and its bureaucratic provisioning by ship captains, including over the period 
of political rupture in the empire wrought by the years of 1776-1783. Indeed, the 
Admiralty continued to reiterate the importance of the remark book well into the 
nineteenth century, even as the rate of return of remark books with data deemed adequate 
by subsequent hydrographers after Dalrymple diminished between 1800 and 1830.47 The 
change in the Admiralty’s attitude toward the remark book in the late eighteenth century 
                                                





was thus an additive one: the development of a capacity to use its own hydrographic 


























AMBASSADORS AS INFORMATION NODES:  
IMPERIAL DOCUMENTS AT EUROPEAN COURTS 
 
Introduction 
 On February 10, 1763, diplomatic representatives of Britain, France, Spain, and 
Holland met in Paris and signed a treaty ending the Seven Years’ War. The result 
fundamentally reshaped the geography of imperial sovereignty in North America and the 
Caribbean by reallocating the control of territories in the Americas among these 
European powers. While the contest for territorial control had been fought with men, 
arms, and blood in the theatres of the Americas, the fact that the treaty ending the conflict 
was signed and negotiated in Paris highlighted the significance of European diplomacy to 
the political structure of the Atlantic world empires. The events of February 10–the 
signing of a document with the power to govern inter-state relations in the Americas–
demonstrated as well that paper technology was central to this diplomatic work.1 
The historiography on the role of diplomacy in the management and contest for 
imperial control within the Americas and the Atlantic world in the long eighteenth 
century; and the centrality of news, information, and knowledge to it, is extensive.2 
                                                
1 For overviews of the diplomatic history of Britain in the late eighteenth century, see Adolphus William 
Ward and George Peabody Gooch (eds.), The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919, i 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1922); E. Malcolm-Smith, British Diplomacy in the 
Eighteenth Century, 1700-1789 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1937); and Jeremy Black, British foreign 
policy in an age of revolutions, 1783-1793 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 
2 See, for example, John Phillip Reid, A Better Kind of Hatchet: Law, Trade, and Diplomacy in the 
Cherokee Nation During the Early Years of European Contact (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1976); William Slauter, “News and Diplomacy in the Age of the American Revolution,” 
PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 2007; Leonard J. Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, 




Recent scholarship on British diplomacy has also explored the ways in which diplomats 
acted as collectors and generators of information from foreign courts useful for 
metropolitan administrators; the centrality of writing technologies and practices to their 
execution of this role; and the importance of administrative direction and instruction, as 
well as deeper cultures of diplomatic training, to condition the process of conveying 
information through diplomatic channels and shaping its contents.3 The material 
infrastructure of British diplomacy provided many ways in which diplomats and the 
secretaries of state under whom they served could exchange information. These methods 
included circulating the official London Gazette, which included reports from diplomats; 
constant letter-writing; and meetings with the Secretary of State upon return to London.4 
In general, however, the writing of British diplomatic history in the long eighteenth 
                                                                                                                                            
Colin G. Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Paul Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-
1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); and Saliha Belmessous (ed.), Empire By 
Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion, 1600-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
 
3 For discussions of British diplomats in the eighteenth century as vehicles for information transmission, 
see Black, British Diplomats and Diplomacy, 1688-1800 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2001), ch. 7. 
For the education and training of diplomats, see Jennifer Mori, The culture of diplomacy: Britain in 
Europe, c. 1750-1830 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), chapter 2. For studies of 
diplomatic letter writing in a British context, see Rayne Allinson, A Monarchy of Letters: Royal 
Correspondence and English Diplomacy in the Reign of Elizabeth I (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012). Although published over a half century ago, one of the best discussions of the material culture of 
diplomatic service remains D. B. Horn, The British Diplomatic Service, 1689-1789 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1961); more recent treatments include Jocelyn G. Russell, Diplomats at Work: Three Renaissance 
Case Studies (Gloucestershire: A. Sutton, 1992); Paul Marcus Dover, “Deciphering the diplomatic archives 
of fifteenth-century Italy,” Archival Science, 7 (2007), 297-316; and Alan Stewart, “Francis Bacon’s Bi-
literal Cipher and the Materiality of Early Modern Diplomatic Writing,” in Robyn Adams and Rosanna 
Cox (eds.), Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 120-137; John-
Paul A. Ghobrial, The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of 
William Trumbull (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); and John C. Rule and Ben S. Trotter, A World 
of Paper: Louis XIV, Colbert de Torcy, and the Rise of the Information State (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
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century focuses on personalities and policy, leaving open the question of how diplomats 
acquired and used documents in negotiations over imperial affairs.  
‘Diplomats’ in this period are best understood not in the current sense of 
practitioners of ‘statecraft,’ but rather according to how contemporaries thought of these 
figures: as officials of the state whose labor was defined by the practices of writing and 
handling diplomas–state papers and official documents–through which they demonstrated 
obedience to the sovereign on whose behalf they executed inter-state negotiation and 
collected information.5 British ambassadors remained in constant correspondence with 
the Secretaries of State of the Northern and Southern Departments, which administered 
Crown authority over envoys in the field. These exchanges of documents encompassed a 
variety of epistolary styles and forms whose particular uses depended on the kind of 
information transmitted; and required the use of different writing instruments, including 
seals and cyphers. Diplomatic messages were transferred between London and the 
Continent through systems ranging from local postal routes and official British 
messengers (which required that the foreign government provide a pass to the courier), to 
British ship captains and personal acquaintances of the ambassador.6 A Whitehall staff of 
decipherers, undersecretaries, and other similar figures was responsible for writing 
outgoing dispatches; and reading and archiving the vast volume of diplomatic paperwork 
                                                
5 On the relationship between diplomacy, diplomas, and sovereignty in the early modern period, and the 
distinction between these practices and modern understandings of diplomacy as ‘statecraft,’ see Costas M. 
Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); and Mark 
Netzloff, “The Ambassador’s Household: Sir Henry Wotton, Domesticity, and Diplomatic Writing,” in 
Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture, 161. 
 
6 See V. Wheeler-Holohan, The History of the King’s Messengers (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1935), chapter 
5; Mark A. Thomson, The Secretaries of State, 1681-1782 (London: Frank Cass, 1968), chapter 3; and 





that flowed back to London from ambassadors and officials in the field.7 By the mid- 
eighteenth century, a set of expectations for the kind of knowledge and training necessary 
for diplomatic work had coalesced: knowledge of languages (especially French, the 
common tongue of European diplomacy) and literature, often acquired at universities or 
similar schooling; expertise in the arts of discerning secrets and dissimulating when 
necessary; and familiarity in the use of the technologies of administrative writing, usually 
gained through apprenticeships as writers and secretaries to extant diplomats.8 As Lord 
Chesterfield explained to his son, secretary to the British ambassador to France, Lord 
Albemarle, in 1751, such employment “will teach you, at least, the mechanical part of 
that business, such as folding, entering, and docketing letters . . . use yourself to secrecy 
as to the letters you either read or write, that in time you may be trusted with secret, very 
secret, separate, apart, etc.”9 Knowledge of how to do diplomatic paperwork could also 
be obtained by reading one of the several popular instruction manuals for ambassadors 
that circulated across Europe during the eighteenth century. These guidebooks stressed 
the need for ambassadors to write “letters which are filled with good Reasoning, founded 
                                                
7 On the organization of the Secretary of State’s office and its information culture, see chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, as well as Florence M. Greir Evans, The Principal Secretary of State: A Survey of the Office 
from 1558 to 1680 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923), chapters 8 and 12. 
 
8 For the development of these skills as correct training for diplomatic and secretarial service, see Douglas 
Blow, Doctors, Ambassadors, Secretaries: Humanism and Professions in Renaissance Italy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), esp. chapter 6; Heidrum R I Kugeler, “‘Le Parfait Ambassadeur’: The 
Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia,” DPhil dissertation, 
University of Oxford, 2006, esp. chapter 2 and part 4; Jon R. Snyder, Dissimulation and the Culture of 
Secrecy in Early Modern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Netzloff, 156-158; and 
Noah Millstone, “Seeing Like a Statesman in Early Stuart England,” Past & Present, 223 (2014), esp. 94-
112. For a contemporary discussion, see Sir William Keith, An Essay on the Education of a Young British 
Nobleman, after he leaves the Schools. To Which are added, Some Observations on the Office of an 
Ambassador (London, 1730), 49-56. 
 
9 “To His Son,” January 21, 1751, in David Roberts (ed.), Lord Chesterfield’s Letters (Oxford: Oxford 





upon Facts, clearly described with all their Circumstances”; to engage in precise formal 
practices in the process, such as “mention the Receipt and Date of those which he 
answers”; and to adopt sensible archival strategies and emphasize circumspection in 
circulating documents (“to make Duplicates of his own Letters, and to send them by 
different Ways, when they are to pass through suspected Countries”).10 The possession of 
these skills was also expected of diplomats across Europe in many other national contexts 
during the eighteenth century; by demonstrating them, British diplomats gained entrance 
into the wider pan-European diplomatic culture, and its shared social, linguistic, and 
cultural values and expectations.11 
As the British empire in the Atlantic world expanded during the eighteenth 
century, diplomats stationed at the courts of imperial rivals became particularly well-
positioned to provision useful information to London officials, and in turn to pursue 
British imperial interests under administrative instruction. How and what kind of imperial 
paperwork flowed between the sites of American empire, metropolitan office, and 
ambassadorial outpost? How did ambassadors use imperial information from other 
British bureaucrats, and what did they do when they received documents from foreign 
sources relevant to British interest? This chapter attempts to answer these questions. 
When conflicts between Atlantic world empires refracted back into European courtly 
politics, British ambassadors used the formal ‘instruments’ of paper to fulfill the 
intentions and expectations of negotiation. These expectations emanated from the office 
of the Secretary of State, who communicated them to diplomats through specific 
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11 On the pan-European culture of diplomacy in the eighteenth century, see Kugeler, 244-264; and Hamish 
Scott, “Diplomatic culture in old regime Europe,” in Scott and Brendan Simms (eds.), Cultures of Power in 




documentary forms. Like governors in America, these ambassadors continually sought to 
demonstrate their knowledge of, and adherence to, these highly formal and repetitive 
“Instructions,” and the expectations they detailed, for the correct execution of 
administrative process.12 But unlike these governors, diplomats were geographically 
distant from the Americas themselves, meaning that they learned about imperial affairs 
from different sources, and interacted with imperial paperwork in particular ways–not in 
generating it, but in using it as a tool. Within the system of imperial information, 
ambassadors functioned as information nodes: they linked together both American and 
European sites for acquiring information about imperial politics, acting on documents 
from the Americas received through Whitehall, and communicating back information not 
otherwise obtainable through the flow of paper between American administration and 
London.  
In exploring the communicative dimensions of diplomatic practice with specific 
respect to information about empire, this chapter focuses on the actions of William Henry 
van Nassau van Zuylestein, the fourth Earl of Rochford, Britain’s ambassador to Spain 
between 1763 and 1766, immediately following the Seven Years’ War; and Robert 
Liston, who occupied the same ambassadorship between 1783 and 1788, in the aftermath 
of the American Revolution. Because Spain remained a key imperial rival to Britain 
throughout this period, the British embassy here functioned as a significant site for inter-
imperial negotiation. This chapter examines how Rochford and Liston used documents, 
thus illustrating the roles of imperial documents in inter-state European diplomacy; and 
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the impact of diplomatic activity on imperial politics. The following section shows how 
imperial paperwork flowed from Whitehall to the Madrid embassy as the Secretary of 
State sought to direct its ambassador (Rochford) to resolve a conflict within the empire. 
The subsequent section demonstrates how ambassadors could act as information 
suppliers, provisioning London administrators with imperial paperwork they did not 
already possess. In both circumstances, diplomats, like governors in America, operated 
under highly specific directions from the Secretary of State on the use of information; 
and, like the governors, their ‘diplomas’ functioned in part as a way of demonstrating 
compliance with these expectations.  
 
Acting On Imperial Paperwork: The Earl of Rochford at the Spanish Court 
Several months after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Lord Halifax, Secretary of 
State, dispatched a new ambassador to the court of Spain: William Henry van Nassau van 
Zuylestein, the fourth Earl of Rochford. Rochford’s path to the office of ambassador 
followed a path typical of many other British diplomats, including elite education (Eton), 
language acquisition (he had learned French through an extended stay in Switzerland), 
and an initial posting as envoy-extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to the court of 
Turin through the patronage of the Duke of Cumberland (from 1749). Through these 
experiences, and especially his apprenticeship at Turin, Rochford acquired the skills 




for communication back to London, and negotiation with foreign officials according to 
the directions of the Secretary of State.13    
Upon appointment to the office of ambassador, therefore, Rochford possessed the 
training and knowledge to execute the duties associated with the position. The Secretary 
of State issued Rochford with the standard form of paperwork given to outgoing 
diplomatic representatives: two sets of “Instructions,” “Letters of Credence,” and 
“Cyphers” for his correspondence. Each of these forms was intended to perform a 
different function. The “Letters of Credence” confirmed Rochford’s identity as the 
legitimate representative of the British crown, and were to be presented directly to the 
King of Spain to establish the ambassador’s official status.14 Both sets of “Instructions” 
defined the expectations and duties that the Secretary of State intended for Rochford to 
fulfill in the office. In the aftermath of the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Halifax’s 
“Instructions” focused on issues arising from the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War. In 
the first set of “Instructions,” the Secretary of State precisely specified the terms of the 
ambassador’s authority and his tasks. Halifax was instructed to “support & maintain” the 
Treaty of Paris just signed and to “be particularly watchfull [sic]” that the interests of 
British subjects trading in “any of the Dominions of the Crown of Spain in Europe or 
America” were protected. Rochford was instructed to “diligently observe the Motions and 
Conduct” the Spanish Court and “use” his “best Skill to penetrate into their secret Views 
& Designs . . .” He was, furthermore, to “keep a Constant Correspondence” with both the 
                                                
13 On Rochford, see G. W. Rice, “An Aspect of European Diplomacy in the Mid-Eighteenth Century: The 
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University of Canterbury (New Zealand), 1973.  
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Secretaries of State in London as well as Britain’s other Ambassadors in Europe in order 
to best facilitate the execution of British interest.15  
 The second set of instructions were labeled “Particular and Private,” intended to 
“apprize [sic]” Rochford “more particularly hereby” of the “Royal Will and Pleasure with 
respect to several Points of great Importance” to the conduct of diplomacy with Spain at 
that moment. In these instructions, Halifax emphasized the importance and interest on the 
part of Britain in obtaining information about the status of Spanish maneuvers in the 
Americas in the aftermath of the conclusion of the war, and especially the extent of 
Spanish adherence to the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Rochford was therefore to “keep a 
watchful Eye upon every Step” taken by Spain “intended to exceed the usual Military 
Establishments” in its “American Settlements,” as well as to discern whether the 
unfavorable results of the war for Spain – namely, “the Diminution of their Naval Force, 
the great Loss of Reputation, as well as Treasure, & the dismembering of Their American 
Dominions by the Cession of Florida” had “created any general Prejudice, & Resentment 
in their Minds against Great Britain” that might lead them toward a stronger alliance with 
either France for Portugal.”16 “Obtaining the most authentick [sic] Information, for Our 
Knowledge” on such topics including the status of the rivalry in the Americas was thus a 
central responsibility of Rochford’s mission.17 
 In addition to these paper ‘instruments’ establishing his legitimacy and specifying 
the goals of his mission, Rochford received two items of state paperwork comprising two 
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intended to facilitate his work. The first was a “Memorial” addressed to the Secretary of 
State from London merchants trading in the Caribbean. In this appeal, the British 
merchants entreated the Secretary of State to use his diplomatic power to help them 
recover losses sustained in 1748 when Spanish vessels around Jamaica had captured and 
seized their cargo. They asked that “Instructions may be given to the Ambassador to be 
appointed by his Majesty to the Court of Spain, to make such effectual Remonstrances 
and Representations” to the Spanish Court to satisfy the compensation.18 The second item 
of paperwork was a specific account of the amount of the losses sustained by the 
merchants.19 These were accompanied, by the “Cyphers” transmitted to Rochford. If the 
documents of the “Instructions” and “Letters of Credence” established Rochford’s 
legitimacy as ambassador and delineated the precise nature of his duties, these other 
‘instruments’–the “Cyphers” and the two enclosures of state paperwork–served as tools 
for him to use in executing his office. The “Cyphers” enabled Rochford to confidentially 
transmit information back to the Secretary of State and communicate secretly with other 
British diplomats. The other two documents performed an educative function, providing 
knowledge to Rochford that the Secretary determined would be essential for him in the 
specific task, delineated in the “Instructions,” to advocate on behalf of British subjects in 
the Atlantic world empires.  
 Rochford’s official work unfolded in direct conformity to these “Instructions.” 
Upon arriving at the court at Madrid in early December 1763, Rochford informed Halifax 
                                                
18 TNA, SP 94/165, “The Memorial of Beeston Long of London, Merchant, on behalf of himself and many 
others His Majesty’s Subjects, who were Owners and Freightors [sic] of several British Vesells [sic] and 
their Cargoes, taken and seized by the Subjects of his Catholic Majesty, after the Cessation of Hostilities 
between the Crowns of Great Britain and Spain, which took place on the 9th of August 1748,” f. 70. 
 
19 TNA, SP 94/165, “State of the Accounts upon the Just Value of the English Vesells [sic] that were taken 





that he had delivered copies of his credential letters to his Spanish counterpart, the 
Monsieur de Grimaldi, and had followed the “Instructions” to emphasize Britain’s good 
intentions and desire for a cooperative relationship with Spain in the aftermath of the 
peace.20 In his early correspondence, drafted by his secretary Edward Ligonier, Rochford 
demonstrated that he had precisely fulfilled several of the articles of the “Instructions,” 
reporting information regarding the personalities of the Court and European affairs21 and 
negotiations within the Spanish Court on establishing new post-Seven Years’ War 
strategy in the West Indies.22 In compliance with his “Instructions,” Rochford also 
executed the task of assisting British subjects in Spanish territories in the Americas, 
obtaining passports for a fleet of English ships sailing to Havana.23 He was soon similarly 
engaged on behalf of a different group of Britons when, on June 15, 1764, Halifax wrote 
Rochford “transmitting” “a Matter of Complaint” arising across the Atlantic. The 
“inclosed Papers” had been “lately received” from the William Henry Lyttleton, governor 
of Jamaica, and provided evidence that “the Spanish Governor of Yucatan” and other 
Spanish officials in the region had “disturbed His Majesty’s Subjects employed in cutting 
Logwood in the Bay of Honduras,” and prevented them from continuing until they could 
produce appropriate paperwork, “either a cedula from His Catholick [sic] Majesty, or a 
Licence [sic] from the King.” Halifax, however, was not writing to request that Rochford 
obtain these documents, but instead to question their legitimacy. The Spanish actions 
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were “directly contrary to the express Stipulations” of the Treaty of Paris, Halifax wrote; 
therefore, the Secretary instructed Rochford to protest “these manifest contraventions of 
the Definitive Treaty,” and demand that Grimaldi send Spanish officials in the colonies 
“positive Orders” that they refrain from interfering with the British loggers.24  
 The papers Halifax enclosed had travelled across the Atlantic Ocean a month 
earlier, in May 1764. The packet commenced with a letter from Lyttleton from early 
April enclosing documents pertaining to the plight of “divers of His Majesty’s Subjects at 
the Bay of Honduras.”25 Lyttleton included a copy of a petition from the loggers asking 
for redress against the Spanish efforts for forcing them to stop harvesting wood; and a 
letter from Lyttleton to the Spanish military governor of Puerto Rico, Don Felipe 
Remerez de Estenoz, protesting on behalf of the loggers that the Spanish were violating 
“the Seventeenth Article” of the Paris treaty.26 Halifax followed up on this direction to 
Rochford by sending “Copies of several Papers” from the Commander of the British 
Admiralty at Jamaica, “containing more particular Information with respect to the 
Expulsion of the Logwood Cutters.” “By these papers,” Halifax wrote in his cover letter, 
Rochford would “see . . . that in consequence of that Officer’s unjustifiable Proceeding 
between five & six hundred” British subjects had been “reduced to a Condition of the 
most deplorable Distress,” threatening to render “the whole Logwood Trade” “totally 
ruined,” violating the terms of the Treaty of Paris. These documents thus functioned as 
tools that educated Rochford on the specifics of the dispute he was now instructed to act 
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on, and to provide him with authorities and useful evidence. Halifax tasked Rochford 
with communicating the official ministerial position. “Your Excellency,” he addressed 
Rochford, “will . . . represent to the Spanish Minister in the strongest but most friendly 
Terms, how essential it is to the Preservation of that Harmony & good Understanding 
which so happily subsists between the Two Crowns . . . that the Conduct of the Governor 
of Yucatan . . . be immediately disavow’d; That a suitable Punishment be inflicted on that 
Officer for a Proceeding so contrary to the Good Faith of Treaties, & destructive of the 
Publick [sic] Peace, and that no Time be lost in dispatching the most clear and positive 
Orders for restoring to His Majesty’s Subjects the full & free Liberty” of logwood cutting 
in the Bay of Honduras “according to the true Intent & Meaning” of the Treaty of Paris.27 
As Halifax explained, Rochford would “see by these Papers” that due to Spanish 
obstructionism, “between five & six hundred of His Majesty’s Subjects are reduced to a 
Condition of the most deplorable Distress,” and the entire Logwood trade was now 
threatened to be “totally ruined.”  
 If the “Instructions” to Rochford had established Whitehall’s broad expectations 
for the conduct of the ambassadorial office, the paperwork that Halifax now sent on the 
Honduras loggers sought to provide the diplomat with the knowledge deemed requisite to 
fulfill a particular official command: in this case, pursuing the claims of the Honduras 
loggers. The provisioning of the papers directly from the Secretary’s office to the 
ambassador establishes the way documents functioned as an educative trainer for 
diplomats to carry out their duty. Indeed, Halifax scripted the message that Rochford was 
to deliver on the logging dispute to the Spanish. Rochford was to “represent” “in the 
                                                





strongest but most friendly Terms, how essential it is to the Preservation of that Harmony 
& good Understanding which so happily subsist between” Britain and Spain “that the 
Conduct of the Governor of Yucatan . . . be immediately disavow’d; That a suitable 
Punishment be inflicted on that Officer for a Proceeding so contrary to the Good Faith of 
Treaties, & destructive of the Publick [sic] Peace,” and that the Spanish court 
immediately send “the most clear and positive Orders” to its imperial officials that the 
British were to be allowed to engage in logwood cultivation.28 
Rochford communicated the results of his negotiation back to Halifax in a letter 
of July 8, 1764. Rochford demonstrated that he had precisely understood and adhered to 
the commands of royal authority, represented in the office of the Secretary of State. “I 
have now to inform Your Lordship in what Manner I have obeyed the King’s Command 
relative to His Majesty’s Subjects being disturbed in their cutting Logwood in the Bay of 
Honduras,” Rochford wrote, emphasizing that he had followed the directions 
communicated to him in the instruments of the “Instructions” and Halifax’s letters. When 
he had explained to Grimaldi that the logwood cutters complained of having been 
disturbed “on Account of their not having produced a Cedula from His Catholick [sic] 
Majesty” – paperwork not required due to the terms of the Treaty of Paris, as had been 
emphasized in the petition of the logwood cutters – Rpchford reported that Grimaldi had 
“owned the Proceedings of the Spanish Governors were unjust, and that Orders should be 
immediately sent to have the King’s Subjects restored to the full and free Enjoyment of 
their Rights obtained” in the Treaty of Paris. Grimaldi then requested that he and Halifax 
                                                





confirm their understanding in paperwork (“He desired I would pass him an Office”).29 
Rochford included a copy of the official petition he made to Grimaldi asserting Britain’s 
position on the matter,30 and both a copy of Grimaldi’s response (in Spanish) and an 
English translation asserting the legitimacy of the logcutters’ right and stating that the 
Spanish crown would direct their governor to respect this right.31 
The reception of these papers by Halifax underscored both the extent to which 
Rochford’s role was as a conduit and representative of royal authority; and the facilitative 
and evidentiary role of documents in the transaction of the diplomatic mission. Halifax in 
a letter of July 24 emphasized that while pleased that the paperwork Rochford had 
transmitted on July 8 contained the Spanish assurance that they would observe the 
stipulation in the Treaty of Paris regarding the logwood cutters, the British court would 
have found it “much more satisfactory” “according to” royal “Expectations” “that orders 
were actually prepared, and on the point of being dispatched, for giving immediate 
Redress and Reparation” to the displaced settlers. It was not sufficient, Halifax asserted, 
for the Spanish to simply leave the logcutters alone; he demanded evidence that the 
Spanish “admit, that no Motive whatever can justify the Proceedings of the Governor of 
Yucatan . . .” Halifax thus communicated that the British “most impatiently expect to 
hear” that the complaint to the Spanish minister and demand for redress which Rochford 
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was “thereby instructed to insist on,” had resulted in orders actually being dispatched 
from the Spanish to the governor to respect the right. Halifax demanded documentary 
evidence of this point: “a copy of those Orders, which You will transmit to me, for His 
Majesty’s Information.”32 
Rochford endeavored to comply precisely with these further instructions. On July 
30, Rochford wrote to Halifax to report the “Degree of firmness” with which he had 
emphasized the British position, in conformity with Halifax’s command.33 As evidence of 
his obedience, Rochford included the letter he had sent to Grimaldi formally protesting 
and demanding that the Spanish acknowledge that their conduct was unjustified, and that 
they send orders instructing the governor to provide redress and restitution to the English 
logcutters. Rochford precisely executed Halifax’s instructions on the contents of the 
protest, emphasizing in his letter to Grimaldi that the Spanish issue orders in which they 
“disavow[ed]” the “most unjustifiable” conduct of the Yucatan officials and made them 
desist.34 The generation of those documents proved slow, due to the intricacies of Spanish 
bureaucracy. As Rochford informed Halifax on August 6, Grimaldi explained why he had 
been prevented from giving the Spanish Court’s formal response to the British protest. 
Following the established procedures of the Spanish Court, Grimaldi had had to consult 
with Julián de Ariaga, the Minister of the Indies, who had himself demanded copies of 
“Papers relative” to the affair before offering his input on the Spanish response; Grimaldi, 
Rochford reported, had had “his Patience . . . worn out with the tediousness” of Ariaga’s 
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“Proceeding.” Rochford furthermore warned Halifax that despite Grimaldi’s own 
position, he did not expect the Spanish to officially acknowledge the British position and 
instead would likely offer “no more than the Proposal of some temporary Expedient, 
untill [sic] it is absolutely agreed between the two Courts what is the true Meaning of the 
seventeenth Article” of the Treaty of Paris. Rochford reported to Halifax that, in 
conformity with the Secretary of State’s directions, he had continued to “insist that Our 
Logwood Cutters being molested was contrary to the Meaning of the seventeenth Article 
of the Treaty, and that his Majesty expected they should have Reparation made, and be 
restored to their Rights.” Entering cypher, Rochford communicated to Halifax his own 
belief that this was a prime opportunity to come to a solid agreement with Grimaldi over 
the meaning of Article 17.35 Whatever frustrations Rochford had experienced in securing 
these acknowledgements from the Spanish court, his negotiation had proceeded in precise 
accordance with the directions given by Halifax, which Halifax subsequently confirmed 
by giving his “Approbation” of “the firm and spirited . . . Language” “perfectly 
conformable to the King’s Intentions” which Rochford had “held upon” “in Negotiation 
with the Spanish Ministers.”36 
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However, Halifax was unsatisfied with Spain’s lack of recognition of Britain’s 
asserted right to cut logwood on the Bay of Honduras. As he wrote to Rochford on 
August 30, 1764, Spain had still not acknowledged “the manifest Contravention of Treaty 
on the Part of the Spanish Governor” and failed to provide the redress to the settlers. 
Halifax instructed Rochford to “demand” “immediate Reparation, Redress, and [the] 
Satisfaction which His Majesty has so much Right to insist on” from the Spanish, and 
stated that he would communicate these demands to the Spanish ambassador in London 
as well. Halifax praised Rochford’s “strict conformity to the steady Purpose and amicable 
Dispositions of His Majesty,” and further instructed Rochford that he should make clear 
that Britain would move to “take proper measures for reinstating & protecting” the 
settlers “in the Enjoyment of those Rights & Privileges to which they are justly entitled 
by Treaty.”37  
                                                




Despite Halifax’s insistence, the issue of the British logwood cutters was left 
unresolved by these negotiations (and, indeed, would remain so for several more 
decades). Yet, in a bureaucratic and constitutional sense, Rochford’s negotiations were a 
success. His actions encapsulated the way diplomats and their immediate authority in the 
Secretary of State used documents in negotiations–as sources of information, as 
metropolitan directives for the conduct and content of negotiation, and as evidence of 
their correct execution by diplomatic bureaucrats. In this way, British diplomats like 
Rochford performed the ‘Europe-based’ functions involved in maintaining the ‘imperial 
Constitution.’ As they executed diplomatic tasks essential to maintaining British interest 
in the inter-imperial rivalries of the Atlantic world, diplomats encountered paperwork as 
both a training device and an instrument of instruction from the metropole; and as a set of 
tools through which they could execute their “Instructions” and demonstrate compliance 
with their constitutional position.  
 
Acquiring Documents for Imperial Government: Robert Liston at the Spanish Court 
 As the previous section demonstrated, the Secretary of State provisioned imperial 
paperwork to ambassadors as a way of structuring the conduct of diplomatic negotiation. 
Ambassadors were communicators, not policy-makers: they sought to convey the precise 
intentions of metropolitan government to foreign courts; and, in executing this task, relied 
on paper as both a facilitative technology and a source of information and instruction. 
This section of the chapter explores a complementary way in which diplomats interacted 
with imperial paperwork: as acquirers of political information for London administrators. 




and transmitted useful knowledge about imperial rivals back to metropolitan government 
for administrators to use. Paper played an essential role in facilitating their execution of 
this responsibility. The chapter now explores this role by examining the official actions of 
Robert Liston, the British ambassador to Spain in the immediate aftermath of the 
American Revolution. Liston’s attentiveness to the proper transaction of bureaucratic 
paperwork comes through clearly in his private correspondence, where he often 
expressed feeling “perfectly ashamed” upon finding that he had “sent off” letters 
“without the enclosure” that he had intended to attach to it, and anger upon finding that 
he had been given incorrect documents.38 He described himself as an “enthusiast” for the 
“regular intercourse” of correspondence between British ministers at different European 
courts, and a believer in the “reciprocal advantages” to be gained from that constant flow 
of letters.39 He was highly impressed by the Spanish court’s bureaucratic organization 
under its leading minister, Count Floridablanca. “I have been struck with the footing on 
which C. Floridablanca’s office is carried on,” Liston wrote, describing the way in which 
Spanish diplomatic secretaries were each assigned a specific country file. “They read 
Memorials [from that country], make their reports to the Court, draw up answers for 
[Floridablanca’s] correction & approbation,” Liston wrote. He found the Spanish clerks 
to be “better paid” and “people of more character & consequence than our Clerks, few of 
whom could be made any use of in this way.”40 He was less impressed with the Spanish 
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mail system, complaining that “it happens disagrebly [sic] at this Royal Residence” “that 
the mail from England comes in a few hours after the mail for England goes out.”41 
Having served as private secretary to Hugh Eliot, ambassador in Munich, from 
1774, Liston in 1783 was initially appointed as secretary to the ambassador-designate to 
Madrid, Lord Mountstuart. But because Mountstuart did not take up the office, Liston 
became the ambassador. As with the Earl of Rochford, the Secretary of State provided 
Liston upon appointment with copies of paperwork concerning American affairs, such as 
a copy of a memo from John Dalling, governor of Jamaica, entitled ““Some Observations 
on the probability of Success in case an Attack should be made on the Island of 
Trinidada, S.ta Fé, Cumana, Carraccas [sic], Nicaragua, Honduras & Guatimala [sic].”42 
As with the papers given to Rochford upon his appointment, these documents performed 
an educative function, providing the newly appointment ambassador with background 
information on issues pertinent to Anglo-Spanish relations at the moment. The 
“Instructions” given to Liston detailing the bureaucratic expectations held by the 
Secretary of State mirrored those given to Rochford a decade earlier, mobilizing the 
ambassador as an acquirer of knowledge, and in commanding deference and obedience to 
the Secretary of State.43 Despite the different political circumstances of the post-1783 
period, bureaucratic expectations had not changed. Like Rochford, Liston was instructed 
to “diligently observe” the behavior of the Spanish court, “penetrate into their secret 
Views and Designs” especially “with Relation to the present State of Affairs in Europe” 
“which may be worthy of our Knowledge,” and to “give frequent and exact Account by 
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Our Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.” Moreover, like Rochford, Liston 
was expected to “constantly correspond” with the Secretary “for mutual Directions and 
Informations [sic].”44   
At the end of January 1784, Liston sent the new Secretary of State, the Marquis of 
Carmarthen, a packet of “Copies” of “Letters and Correspondence” “arrived here by the 
late Packets from the Havanna [sic].” The material had been addressed to Liston’s 
predecessor, Lord Mountstuart, by Captain George Stoney. Stoney had been sent to 
Havana to assist British merchants detained by Spanish imperial officials. The merchants 
had sought to collect debts they were owed by Spaniards as a result of the war. “The 
enclosed papers,” Liston summarized, “contains an account of the apparently unjust 
imprisonment of Mr. Allwood, a considerable merchant of Jamaica,” arrested at the end 
of August and had his papers seized, but still in custody as of mid October (“when the 
last letters came away”). In his letter, Liston summarized the actions that he had already 
taken to assist the merchant, Philip Allwood, the Havana representative of the Liverpool 
slave merchants Baker and Dawson, which had contracted with the Spanish Crown to 
supply slaves to Cuba and Caracas.45 Liston had made “an immediate application to the 
Spanish Minister in [Allwood’s] favour,” comprising a “Memorial” of complaint to his 
Spanish counterpart, Count Floridablanca. Entering cypher in the last paragraph of his 
letter, Liston informed Carmarthen of how he had written the Memorial. Liston had used 
a language of “Moderation,” on the grounds that if the “first and essential Object” was to 
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“obtain speedy Relief” for Allwood, it was necessary for to be careful in the use of 
language to avoid giving the Spanish the impression that the British treated Allwood’s 
capture as an act of war. “Had I spoken of Despotism and Injustice exercised toward an 
innocent Man,” and of Allwood’s “Right” to “Satisfaction and Damages,” Liston 
explained, his counterpart Count Floridablanca would have treated the matter as if Spain 
were a “Party” to the conflict, and escalated Spanish anger in a manner counterproductive 
to the end of freeing the prisoner.46  
In the series of papers that he enclosed in this letter (many of them originally 
addressed to Mountstuart), Liston engaged in a variety of bureaucratic activities. Part of 
his labor was the simple transfer of the letters and papers received from Stoney to the 
Secretary of State in London; Liston here was a kind of middleman in a chain of trans-
Atlantic communication that had begun on a ship docked at Havana, from where Stoney 
had written two letters: one of protest to the Spanish commander at Havana, Luis de 
Unzaga; and one to Allwood promising assistance. Liston’s agency comprised the 
organization and summarizing of the contents of these documents. On the back of each of 
the enclosures, Liston wrote a small summary of the contents of the letter. For example, 
the fourth enclosure in Liston’s packet was a “Copy” of the letter of August 24 from 
Stoney to the Governor of Havana protesting Allwood’s detention. On the final page of 
the letter, Liston wrote: 
                                                





Detail of Liston's Annotation 
 
Upon receipt at the Secretary of State’s office, the clerk who received Liston’s letters and 
the packet of documents numbered the enclosure (in this case, enclosure 4), and noted on 
the bottom of each of them that they had arrived in the ambassador’s letter.47 
 Through the transfer and organization of these imperial documents Liston 
facilitated the presentation of Allwood’s case to the Secretary of State. Liston also used 
documents to protest to and petition the Spanish administration, in accordance with his 
“Instructions” to “procure good and speedy Justice” to British subjects detained in the 
Spanish territories of the Atlantic world. In doing so, Liston put to work his own 
particular knowledge of Spanish court politics, a point he had alluded to in explaining to 
Carmarthen why he had avoided an outraged reaction. Liston sent the Secretary of State 
copies of the documents he had submitted to Count Floridablanca, the Spanish minister, 
on behalf of Allwood. The first (“No. 9”) these contained a short note, dated January 19, 
1784, in which Liston carefully summarized the circumstances of Allwood’s detention to 
                                                




Floridablanca without entering an explicit protest; indeed, he absolutely avoided blaming 
the Spanish. There was “no doubt” “the humanity of His Catholic Majesty” would 
compel Spain to speedily issue “orders to free the prisoner.” Indeed, Liston emphasized, 
thanks to “the services that Mr. Allwood renders to the subjects of His Majesty,” the 
Spanish crown and its officers “ought” to give him “particular protection.” Liston cited 
“the threat to commerce” and Allwood’s poor health as reasons why the prisoner ought to 
be given a speedy trial.48 In the second note (“No. 10”), also of January 19, Liston cited 
the “return of peace” between Britain and Spain, and the damage to Allwood’s health and 
commerce, as reasons why Spain ought to issue “orders commanding the release of this 
innocent man.”49 
 The tectonics of imperial bureaucracy moved slowly. After this dispatch, the 
Allwood case did not reemerge in Liston’s dispatches until mid March. In letter number 
17, dated March 15, 1784, Liston explained to Carmarthen that the delay in resolving 
Allwood’s case emanated from the sluggishness of Spanish bureaucracy. Based on “what 
the Minister for the Indies had said to me on the Subject” in January in Madrid, Liston 
reported that he had hoped “that orders would be sent out by the first opportunity” for 
Allwood’s “immediate enlargement.” But this had “been prevented by Letters received 
from the Judge by whose authority Mr. Allwood was confined . . .” The Judge in Havana 
had “promised to send without delay, a full account of the proceedings” in Allwood’s 
case, “by which the Minister for the Indies would be enabled to judge how far he was 
guilty of the crimes laid to his charge.” The Spanish court was “determined to wait for 
the arrival of the papers referred to before any orders should be sent on the subject to the 
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West-Indies.” Those “papers” had finally arrived from across the Atlantic. Liston could 
also now report to Carmarthen that, based on “several Letters” he had recently “received” 
from “Captain Stoney enclosing an account of the Judgment pronounced by the Regent at 
the Havanna [sic], together with Mr. Allwood’s defence [sic],” it was clear that Allwood 
“though perfectly innocent, has been sentenced to Eight years Banishment and 
imprisonment, and to pay a fine of Eighty Nine Thousand Five Hundred Dollars . . .” 
Allwood had, however, “appealed to the Supreme Council of the Indies at Madrid for 
redress.” Liston concluded his letter by “enclosing Copies of the principal Documents 
that have come to my hands,” and expressed his wish for “Instructions with regard to the 
Steps it may be proper to taken on the occasion.”50 Even as Liston supplied the Secretary 
of State with paperwork he himself had obtained, he deferred to Whitehall for instruction 
on how to proceed with the information.  
 The first document was the December 23, 1783 letter (marked “A”) from 
Allwood to Stoney (“the only representation of my Royal Sovereign” in Havana) 
protesting “the unprecedented and illegal Seizure of all my Papers, property, and the 
arrest of my person,” as well as the “cruel sentence” passed on him at trial. Allwood 
“enclosed” in this letter “a copy of the Sentence” against him (which followed as 
enclosure “B” in Liston’s packet), and appealed to Stoney to address his case to “the 
Representative of my most Gracious & Royal Master at the Court of Madrid”–formerly 
Mountstuart, and now, Robert Liston.51 Liston also transmitted the series of letters from 
Stoney to Mountstuart on the Allwood case (enclosures marked “C,” “D,” and “E”), sent 
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in January 1784, and an English translation of a 1782 statement by Galvez protesting 
illegal trading activities conducted surreptitiously by Spanish traders with the 
participation of Spanish military officials.52  Interestingly, Allwood’s intentions in 
venturing from Jamaica to Havana were presented as slightly different from those that 
had been initially broached–that he had simply gone to settle a debt. Liston’s enclosure 
“C” was a letter from Stoney (addressed to Mountstuart) from January 11, 1784, in which 
Stoney suggested that Allwood had been “sent down [to Havana] . . . by the Governor of 
Jamaica on a public Mission of such consequence as the adjusting [of] the Cartel between 
the two Islands and to demand some free people of Colour [sic] belonging to Jamaica 
who had been taken by some of their Pickeroons [sic] and sold here as slaves.” In 
addition, Allwood had also attempted to collect his “just debts.” Whatever the reason for 
Allwood’s trip, Stoney protested that the merchant’s detention “deprived” him “of all 
communication, and even the use of Pen and Ink . . .”53   
Although Liston had obtained these papers, it was the Secretary of State who 
instructed him on how they were to be used. In mid-May 1784, Carmarthen advised 
Liston that “as Mr Allwood still remains in the same cruel Situation, I am to desire you 
will draw up a Memorial, in the most temperate Terms, containing the Particulars of Mr. 
Allwood’s Case, which You will be enabled to do from the Documents in Your Hands, 
and present it to the Minister of the Department to which it may belong, to redress the 
Injuries of one of His Majestys’ Subjects . . .” I am persuaded,” Carmarthen continued, 
“that when the Circumstances of his Situation are fully known, [Allwood] will meet with 
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the Justice which a British Subject, from every Consideration, has reason to expect, from 
the known Justice of the Court of Spain.”54 Although the papers in question were the ones 
that Liston had obtained and then sent to Carmarthen, the directions for their use 
proceeded according to the hierarchy of bureaucratic authority. As a bureaucrat, the 
ambassador’s role was to obtain information and to act on it; but the terms upon which he 
was to act were those commanded by authority with the appropriate constitutional 
authority to dictate the conduct of imperial and diplomatic affairs: the Secretary of State. 
  By early June, Liston had executed Carmarthen’s command of May 14 to draw 
up a memorial petitioning for Allwood’s release, informing the Secretary of State on June 
7 that “in consequence of your Lordship’s direction,” he had “written a letter to Count 
Floridablanca, containing the substance of what I had urged in person.” Liston stressed 
his obedience and compliance to Carmarthen’s orders, hoping that “the stile [sic]” of the 
copies of these “Papers” which he now enclosed would “appear to Your Lordship” as 
appropriate to “the circumstances of the case required.”55 The “Papers” comprised three 
memorials summarizing of facts of the case, and imploring the Spanish for speedy justice 
for the prisoner.56  
In these memorials, Liston performed an act of facilitative translation, 
recapitulating and summarizing the contents of the case based on the documents he had 
been transferred from Jamaica. Just as enclosure “A” in the papers sent to him suggested, 
Liston cited Allwood’s deprivation of “the use of paper and ink.” Allwood’s intentions, 
Liston wrote (following Stoney’s enclosure “C”), was to settle the war debts: “avoit pour 
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object le recouvrement les avances faites aux prisonniers Espagnols pendant le cour de la 
guerre . . .”57 Yet, Liston’s own local knowledge of the particular contexts of the Spanish 
court also led him to exercise constraint in advancing Allwood’s case. Liston thus hoped 
that Carmarthen would not “disapprove” that the ambassador had “confined myself to the 
Request that Mr Allwood should be liberated upon Bail, and that the King should 
interpose his Authority only in Case the Affair shall not be determined in the Court of 
Law before the End of the Month.” As Liston explained, his reasoning emerged from his 
own knowledge “that a Demand of [Allwood’s] unconditional Enlargement and compleat 
[sic] Acquittal would have been rejected as unreasonable and might even have retarded 
his Release . . .”58 
At last, in July, a breakthrough in the case of Allwood seemed to emerge. Liston 
wrote on July 19 to Carmarthen to report that “orders have at last been sent to the 
Havanna [sic] to release Mr. Allwood from his present confinement, and to allow him the 
liberty of the City till the truth of the accusations brought against him shall have been 
examined into . . .” Liston also enclosed in the letter a copy of Floridablanca’s note 
informing him that Allwood had been “freed” from the Havana prison.59 Yet, despite all 
of the paperwork that Liston had transacted, the tectonics of bureaucratic transaction 
proved slow–in large part because of communication problems. Nearly half a year later, 
on January 17, 1785, Liston informed Carmarthen that he had learned that “the persons to 
whom those orders had been directed had explained them in such a way as in a great 
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measure to defeat that effect,” meaning that Allwood had been “detained a prisoner” for 
some period after the orders had been received. Now, however, it appeared “from 
subsequent accounts” that Allwood had indeed been freed; and Liston enclosed a “Letter” 
from which it was clear “he now has the liberty of the city and its environs” and “will 
wait with patience the issue of his Appeal.” The letter itself was addressed from Allwood 
to Liston, from Havana, and dated October 4, 1784, in which the former captive 
expressed to Liston “my most grateful acknowledgements of your generous and most 
effectual exertions and applications with the Court of Spain” “and particularly for the 
Liberty I now enjoy” of being able to move about Havana.60   
 The documents generated by the Allwood case, and the processes of their 
circulation across the Atlantic and between bureaucrats illustrate how British diplomats 
centered at the courts of imperial rivals could operate as conduits of information to 
London authorities. Paralleling the outward circulation of documents from the Secretary 
of State to their ambassadors (examined with respect to the Earl of Rochford), diplomats 
also acquired imperial paperwork for Whitehall, acting as collections of information. But 
in both roles, the ambassador’s use of documents was conditioned by the intentions of the 
Secretary of State. Whether acquiring or deploying information in diplomatic negotiation 
around empire, ambassadors sought to meet these expectations. As the examples of a pre-
American Revolution negotiation (Rochford) and a post-1783 instance (Liston) also 
suggest, these expectations regarding the role of ambassadors as both collectors and users 
of information appear to have remained consistent throughout this period, independent of 
changes in the issues that preoccupied British imperial diplomacy in these years. 
                                                






 1788 brought another change to the occupancy of the British ministry to Spain, as 
William Eden took over the ambassadorship from Robert Liston. In the transfer of office, 
the paperwork that Liston had produced while occupying it underwent a telling fate. In 
February 1788, Carmarthen as Secretary of State wrote to Eden to inform him that, “as 
the time is now approaching when it may be convenient to You to set out for the Court of 
Spain, Mr. Liston will be instructed to deliver to You the whole of the Official 
Correspondence in his Possession; and I am sure it is unnecessary for me to inform You 
of his Ability & Inclination to give you the best Information on the Situation of Affairs at 
that Court . . .”61 Liston received the command to “deliver up the official Parts of your 
Correspondence, together with the Cyphers, and such other public Documents as may be 
in your Possession” on March 1.62 Just has his own ambassadorship had began with 
receiving official papers from the Secretary of State, Liston’s tenure now concluded with 
an instruction to transfer of his archive to his successor, one with which Liston swiftly 
complied.63 
 The Secretary of State’s directive that Liston transfer “Official Correspondence in 
his Possession” to his successor highlights one of the central functions of diplomatic 
paperwork: as a source of information useful for executing aspects of imperial 
administration that required negotiating with other European powers. Ambassadors often 
sat at the beginnings and the ends of imperial information chains: in some instances as 
the providers of knowledge about imperial affairs to London administration, and in other 
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cases as the figures responsible for acting upon imperial information that initially entered 
administrative channels from other sources. As this chapter has also emphasized, 
ambassadors had a highly rule-bound relationship to this information: whether it involved 
the transmission of paperwork to London administrators, or acting on imperial 
information initially received in the metropole, ambassadors’ use of paperwork unfolded 
according to detailed prescriptions and expectations established by the Secretary of State, 
under the power of royal sovereignty. In this respect, imperial documents implicated 
British ambassadors in Europe in the broader ‘imperial Constitution’ through which the 



















PAPER AND POLICY: REFORMING CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION 
IN BRITISH AMERICA 
 
Introduction 
A year before the outbreak of the American Revolution, a pamphlet was 
published in London with the title The Address of the People of Great-Britain to the 
Inhabitants of America. The author sought to comprehensively refute all the arguments 
advanced by patriot commentators on behalf of revolution by demonstrating the 
benevolent intentions of the imperial policies critiqued by the colonists as tyrannical. The 
author noted that due to the ubiquity of smuggling in the colonies, a subject of significant 
concern to imperial administration, Parliament had established “a Board of Customs . . . 
settled at Boston” “to keep a strict eye over the conduct of their officers.” “But that 
establishment, which the fair Trader had long desired, and the Smuggler alone had reason 
to dread, has been converted, in the representations of your Congress, into a badge of 
your slavery. As long as we did not establish a Board of Customs in America, we were 
blamed for neglecting you. When we sent it, we are charged with insulting you. If Boards 
of Revenue be badges of slavery, no nation that has wealth is free.”1  
The writer’s contention that British imperial administrators had sought to ensure 
the proper conduct of its bureaucrats through a policy reform–the creation of a Board of 
Customs in America–points to the role of institutional innovation in the governance of 
the eighteenth century British empire. Adjustments to the structure of the Customs 
bureaucracy were particularly significant in the context of revenue management. As 
                                                




contemporaries like Edmund Burke (and, subsequently, historians and social scientists) 
recognized, “the revenue of the state is the state”–government could only perform its 
functions if it could pay for them, and effective taxation was the mechanism to do so.2 
What role did paperwork play in generating these shifts in policy? Previous chapters in 
this dissertation have explored how material ‘instruments’ inculcated and enforced 
expectations for bureaucratic conduct. This chapter explores a related role of documents: 
in generating ministerial and legislative efforts to reform imperial administration, 
specifically with respect to the collection of revenue.  
The British state’s effectiveness at revenue collection, both domestically and in 
the empire, has often been noted as key to its stability and growth during the eighteenth 
century. From the late seventeenth century, administrators and politicians developed and 
instituted practices that enabled the efficient process of revenue collection and 
expenditure, especially through the interrelated ventures of accumulating debt and 
generating tax revenue. From the 1690s, prospective customs officers underwent rigorous 
training and formal apprenticeship that inculcated knowledge of customs management 
and administrative procedure, and the use of correct, credible methods of recording and 
calculating tax. Supervisors regularly checked the paperwork of customs officers for 
fraud and errors; officers who failed to comply with expectations were dismissed.3 These 
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rule-governed practices of excise emanated from an administrative ethos of centered 
upon accountability and transparency.4 The British fiscal bureaucracy’s performance of 
these processes with greater efficiency and success than those of its European rivals has 
long been seen as crucial to its imperial ascension, especially because it allowed Britain 
to finance imperial warfare and the cost of governing a far-flung empire over multiple 
continents. 
As John Brewer has observed, the British methods of tax collection and 
expenditure involved “prodigies of penmanship performed” by bureaucrats. Using 
“books,” “instruments,” “pen and special inkpot,” these government officials created, 
deployed, and accounted for the instruments of paperwork through which taxes were 
raised and expenditure carried out.5 Paperwork served as the constitutive fabric of the 
processes of economic administration. This chapter builds upon this recognition of 
paperwork’s centrality to the eighteenth century British empire’s fiscal success by 
exploring an unexamined issue in the historiography on customs administration. One of 
the key attribute of the British “fiscal-military” state was its bureaucratic dynamism: the 
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ability of government to develop new institutions and practices of revenue collection in 
response to changing political circumstances. What role did paperwork play in providing 
government with the knowledge necessary to generate these adjustments? With specific 
respect to customs administration, this chapter explores how paperwork was used in 
making imperial policy, an aspect of the material culture of imperial governance yet to be 
examined in this dissertation. As previous chapters demonstrated, a crucial function of 
paper ‘instruments’ lay in their use as devices to communicate and then enforce 
metropolitan government’s expectations for the proper conduct of office to lesser 
bureaucrats; and it is clear that the British imperial apparatus was successful in instilling 
these expectations in its personnel. That success depended on the ability of imperial 
government to adjust its administrative organization when bureaucrats failed to perform 
according to expectations. Paperwork’s role in effecting these adjustments, this chapter 
argues, lay in government’s use of documents as sources of knowledge from which it 
could develop new policies. The imperial state used paperwork as a form of audit to 
generate knowledge useful for both reforming administrative practice, and then to enforce 
expectations for bureaucratic behavior. This chapter begins by exploring the role of 
documents in government efforts to reform the system of customs administration. The 
second example shows the centrality of paper to imperial administration’s effort to 







Documents and Administrative Improvement: The Origins of the American Duties Act of 
1764 
 In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, the British state confronted the 
challenge of raising sufficient revenue to both finance its war debt and administer a 
reshaped American empire. Over the remainder of the 1760s, imperial government 
imposed a series of taxes on the American colonies, including the American Duties Act 
(also known as the Sugar Act) of 1764, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Townshend Acts 
of 1767, all well-known because of the significant resentment and opposition they 
generated from the colonists. Through these initiatives, however, government did more 
than create new revenue streams: it also fundamentally reconstituted the structure of 
American customs administration in order to address inefficient and corrupt bureaucratic 
behavior. In particular, bureaucratic reform was one of the major goals of the 1764 
American Duties Act.6 The administrative reorganization instituted by the 1764 act raises 
a question about the role of knowledge in imperial reform: how did officials initially 
learn about the problems that they subsequently sought to address legislatively?  
On July 10, 1757, Charles Hardy, the outgoing governor of New York, wrote to 
the Board of Trade to inform its members about the state of trade in the colony. While 
emphasizing that he had “used all my endeavours [sic]” to ensure the trade was on “a 
proper footing,” Hardy informed the Board of Trade that “I have not been able to do it so 
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effectually as I could wish,” and encouraged the Board to make an “Interposition with the 
Treasury and Custom House Boards” to restrain the illegal trade between colonists in 
New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and the French West Indies. A similar 
complaint had been made a month earlier by the Lieutenant Governor, Charles 
DeLancey.7 The Board of Trade began investing the issue, sending the Customs 
Commissioners a report on the subject in February 1759.  In its report, the Board 
emphasized that “findings from various representations” “lately made to them” on the 
“illegal and improper Practices” “set up” to “elude” the laws prohibiting illicit had 
demonstrated a need for “remedies” to address “the Evils complained of.” Enclosing 
“Copies of the Letters and Representations which their Lordships have received 
respecting these matters,” the Board of Trade asked the Customs Commissioners develop 
new rules for the “Conduct” of the “Officers” who “Superintend the Execution of the 
Laws for regulating the Plantations Trade.”8  
 Upon receiving the Board of Trade’s report, the Customs Commissioners 
forwarded the papers to the Treasury, explaining that because it was “the Constitution 
and practice” for the Customs “only to receive Directions from, and to make Reports to” 
the Treasury or Privy Council, the commissioners needed advice before acting.9 Having 
received such direction, the Customs Commissioners produced a report for the Treasury, 
dated May 10, 1759, in which they digested and replied to the papers the Board had 
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transmitted. Having “considered all the said Letters, and Representations, and compared 
them with all the Papers in Our Office,” the officials offered some “general 
Observations” arising from them. Based on the facts contained in the “beforementioned 
Papers,” the Customs administrators emphasized that while “no endeavours [sic] have 
been wanting in this Board to oblige the Officers of the Customs to attend” their duties, 
the extant system was fundamentally inadequate to prevent bureaucratic abuse because of 
the difficulty of administrative oversight from an ocean away (“the distance from hence 
is so great, We despair, by the means of the officers of the Revenue, of putting any 
effectual stop thereto”). With the letter, the Customs Commissioners sent the Treasury 
relevant papers, including as a guide a “List of papers respecting illicit Trade”: the same 
papers initially submitted to them by the Board of Trade. These papers comprised twenty-
six copies and extracts from letters dating back as early as 1739 from governors, 
merchants, Admiralty judges, and other bureaucrats complaining of the inefficacy of 
extant measures to stop illegal trade in British America.10     
Imperial administration took no further action on this issue until the end of the 
Seven Years’ War and the ascension of the reform-minded George Grenville to the 
positions of Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.11 On May 21, 1763, Charles 
Jenkinson of the Treasury wrote to the Customs Commissioners to ask them to 
investigate why “the revenue arising . . . in America & the West Indies in no degree 
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amounts to the sum which might be expected from them.”12 In response, the Customs 
Commissioners restated the same points they had made in 1759. While emphasizing the 
“the utmost Care . . . used by the Board” in enforcing the collection of the duties, the 
“Smallness” of “the Net Amount thereof remitted to England” “plainly proved that many 
Frauds have been, and are, Committed.” But the Commissioners emphasized that 
combating these frauds was “beyond the reach, and Prevention of any Officers of the 
Custom” given their existing powers and capabilities, and would instead require “farther 
Checks and Restraints, to be imposed by Parliament.” As in 1759, the Commissioners in 
1763 blamed the “Distance” of American customs officials “from Inspection” by the 
Board as the reason why officers were “too easily led off from their Duty, to their 
Interest, in a Country, where the strict Observance of the former, is rendered highly 
difficult and obnoxious.” The Customs Commissioners emphasized as a solution the need 
to alter the ‘instructions’ given to officers in America to ensure that they were  “expressly 
enjoined” to avoid taking “fees” as remuneration and instead to be paid a salary indexed 
to the successful performance of their task, “in order that their Profits may keep Pace 
only with their Diligence, and their Interest and their Duty become the same.”13   
The Treasury now acted, both on the basis of the documents from the Customs 
Commissioners and from the earlier 1759 report. On July 25, the Treasury wrote to the 
Customs stating that “having taken into Consideration” the “Report of the 21st Instant & 
also had a Report of your Board dated May 10 1759,” it was ordering the Customs to 
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develop new “Instruction” to officers in America and the West Indies “enforcing in the 
Strongest manner the Strictest Attention to their Duty,” and “to prepare a Bill to hinder 
clandestine Trade in America.”14 In a letter to the Privy Council, the Treasury explained 
why they had thus acted. Investigation into “the present state of the Duties of Customs 
imposed on your Majesty’s Subjects in America and the West Indies” had shown that 
“the Revenue arising therefrom is very small and inconsiderable” due to “Neglect 
Connivance and Fraud.” There was thus a need to ensure that extant “regulations” “fully 
answer the end to which they are designed.”15  
The Board of Customs responded to the Treasury’s instruction by dispatching 
commands (reviewed and approved by the Treasury) to Customs officers in America 
compelling them to strictly observe their duties, and by preparing the draft of the 
legislation subsequently known as the Sugar Act, or American Duties Act, of 1764.16 In 
part, the legislation aimed to reform the conduct of customs paperwork itself. In order to 
affect “the better preventing [of] frauds in the importation” of foreign products “into any 
of his Majesty’s dominions, under the pretence [sic] that the same are the growth, 
produce, or manufacture, of the British colonies or plantations,” ship captains 
transporting such goods to British colonies were required to “produce and deliver to the 
collector or other principal officer of the customs at the loading port, an affidavit signed 
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and sworn to before some justice of the peace in the said British colonies or plantations,” 
stating the content and origin of the goods in question. Furthermore, the legislation 
specified that “any officer of his Majesty’s customs” found to “take or receive any bribe, 
recompence [sic], or reward, in any kind whatsoever” “or do any . . . deed whatsoever by 
which his Majesty” faced a £500 fine and dismissal.17 In response to information about 
bureaucratic corruption received from the Americas, imperial government pursued 
remedies intended to reinforce expectations of proper administrative conduct.  
These efforts at policing the bureaucracy of the Customs were subsequently 
reinforced by the bureaucratic reforms of the Townshend Acts, including the 1767 
Commissioners of Customs Act, which established a central bureaucratic office in the 
colonies (the American Customs Board) to directly oversee the revenue administration. 
But these efforts neither successfully curbed illicit trade, nor stamped out bureaucratic 
malfeasance, as imperial administrators recognized: an internal report, written around 
1770, observed that virtually every major port in British America remained “in a 
Remarkable manner . . . exposed to Illicit trade,” with customs officers generally showing 
“inattention & neglect” of their duties.18 For the purposes of the present discussion, the 
significance of the American Duties Act lies in the role of documents in its genesis. The 
manner in which the legislation arose–even, in this case, after a lengthy delay between 
the receipt of papers from the colonies complaining of the inefficient Customs 
administration; the 1759 report compiling these complaints and urging action; and the 
1763 response–illustrates in microcosm the responsiveness of the imperial state to 
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information generated from bureaucratic paperwork. Irrespective of the failures of the 
enacted reforms, the role of documents in their making demonstrates the responsiveness 
of administration to information in making reforms. Documentation from the 
administrative archive could be rendered useful as the basis upon which reform could 
proceed. 
 
Petitions and Expectations: West India Customs, Remuneration, and Government 
Responsiveness 
As the previous section demonstrated, customs paperwork was useful to the 
imperial government as a source of information upon which policy could be adjusted and 
reformed. But documents generated by and for bureaucrats were not the only kind of 
paper that metropolitan officials relied upon for information when adjusting 
administrative procedure. Recent scholarship has, for example, emphasized the 
importance of petitioning as a conduit of formal demands from those living under British 
imperial sovereignty on imperial government.19 The reason why government might or 
might not be responsive to a petition was highly contingent on factors ranging from the 
identity and importance of the petitioner, to the particular political context in which a 
petition entered. But imperial administrators were clearly more inclined to act when the 
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petitioner was politically powerful, and when the concerns of the petitioner matched the 
interests of government itself at the moment of the petition’s genesis.  
Imperial government remunerated its American customs officials through a highly 
ad hoc system, with salaries dependent on location rather than being set centrally. To 
augment their income, customs officers charged fees to merchants for performing certain 
kinds of services. These fees were originally set by Parliament in 1662 and periodically  
revised; a prospective customs officer was required to swear not to charge more than 
these upon taking office. In practice, and to the endless irritation of merchants, the actual 
fees charged by officials varied greatly between ports and over time, with virtually no 




enforcement of these set rates.20 In early 1785, the West India Committee sent a petition 
to the Treasury complaining that officers in the West Indies were abusing their privileges 
by “exact[ing] more than the established fees.”21 The receipt of a complaint from an 
influential London interest group, and its affinity with the longstanding desire of imperial 
administrators to regulate bureaucratic behavior in accordance with the ‘imperial 
Constitution,’ spurred official action.22 On July 8, 1785, Lord Sydney, as Secretary of 
State, responded by dispatching a brief circular letter to governors in the Caribbean 
concerning the assessment of duties on imported goods entering the ports of the island 
territories. “It having been represented” “that the Officers of the Customs in the West 
India Islands, their Deputies or Clerks, do exact more than the amount of the Fees 
established by Order of the Governor and Council or act of the Legislature, upon 
Entrance and Clearance of Vessels,” Sydney instructed the governors to “take effectual 
Care” that customs officers in their islands obeyed the regulations setting the rates of 
customs fees, and did not extract extra revenue (presumably for their personal use) during 
the execution of their responsibilities.23  
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Sydney’s circular bears comparison to the queries sent to governors by the Earl of 
Dartmouth in 1774, examined in chapter two. In requesting information from colonial 
governors, both Secretaries of State used a similar kind of document to communicate and 
reinforce expectations for bureaucratic behavior. The 1774 circular and the 1785 circular 
differed in that the latter was generated in response to a specific complaint about 
bureaucratic corruption. As a matter of form, Sydney’s letter insisted that customs 
officers obey these rules, but did not explicitly ask governors–as the highest authorities in 
the colonies themselves–to respond to the letter. Unlike Dartmouth’s queries, which 
specified a set of issues upon which the Board of Trade demanded information, Sydney’s 
circular simply demanded the enforcement of existing laws to address the critique of 
corrupt imperial bureaucracy. 
Like the replies to Dartmouth’s queries, the governors replied to Sydney’s circular 
by demonstrating that they understood proper bureaucratic processes (in this case, of 
customs administration). As the beginning of this chapter made clear, the expectation that 
customs officers possessed and demonstrated a precise understanding of administrative 
method had long been in place by the 1780s. Here, what is significant is the endurance of 
these expectations, and of bureaucrats’ desire to demonstrate compliance to them, nearly 
a century later, through the return of paperwork upon metropolitan command.  
Some of governors answered Sydney’s circular in brief and laconic terms, but still 
stressed their “obedience” to the procedures and processes constitutive of the 
administration of the customs. “In obedience to His Majesty’s Royal Will, and Pleasure, 
and for Your Lordship’s Satisfaction,” James Powell, governor of the Bahamas, wrote in 




been ever made of any Officer of the Customs for taking more Fees than those 
Established” by the law of the colony.24 In other replies, governors responded by citing 
paperwork that they had already sent to London as evidence of their compliance. For 
example, on August 22, 1785, Governor Edward Lincoln of the island of St. Vincent 
replied to the July 8 circular by citing his July 2, 1784 letter in which he “had the honor 
to transmit a List of the Fees taken by the Revenue Officers in this Government,” 
stressing that he had “reason to believe no other Fees or additional claims have been 
enacted” since that time.25 Similarly, William Lucas, recently installed as governor of 
Grenada, replied to the circular in September 1785 by demonstrating his adherence to 
expectations about the level of fees by citing documents (which he noted already existed 
in the imperial archive) sent by his predecessor, William Matthew: “I find that your 
Lordship was furnished with Copies of the Dockets of Fees taken by the officers of the 
ports . . . in General Mathew’s Dispatches of 4th May 1784,” Lucas wrote, “and I cannot, 
from the strictest Enquiry, learn that any Fees have been since taken, which were not 
entirely conformable to those Dockets.”26  
Other governors demonstrated obedience to metropolitan expectations not just 
through descriptions of customs paperwork (as with Lincoln, Lucas, and Mathew), but 
also through the provisioning of documentary evidence. Characteristic in this regard was 
the material received from Thomas Shirley, governor of the Leeward Islands. On 
September 7, 1785, Shirley wrote to inform Sydney that he had received the July 8 letter, 
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and would “use the utmost care to enforce an implicit obedience to that order.”27 In his 
correspondence with the Secretary of State, Shirley returned to the topic of the circular in 
a letter of October 2. He transmitted “a copy of a letter which I have just received from 
the Collector and Comptroller” of St. John’s, capital of Antigua, which “seems to enter 
fully into the subject of the fees mentioned in Your Lordship’s dispatch to me of the 8th 
of July last.” “I beg leave to refer Your Lordship thereto,” Shirley continued, “imagining 
it to be applicable to all the Custom House Officers in my Government.”28  
The letter that Shirley enclosed was written by two customs officers at the port of 
St. John’s in Antigua: Samuel Martin (collector) and William Jervis (comptroller). 
Writing to Shirley, Martin and Jervis stressed that they had “communicated the contents” 
of Sydney’s dispatch to all the “inferior Officers and Clerks” at St. John’s, and informed 
Sydney that these bureaucrats stated “that they never demanded or exacted any fees 
whatever.” Indeed, Martin and Jervis emphasized (on behalf of all the customs officials 
in Antigua) “that had we even been inclined to exact more than the Law allows us, the 
penalties inflicted by various Acts of Parliament were sufficient to prevent us.” Stressing 
both their understanding and obedience to these laws, Martin and Jervis concluded by 
emphasizing that they would widely distribute Sydney’s circular among all the other 
customs officers under their immediate supervision.29 By enclosing Martin and Jervis’ 
letter within his own reply, Shirley tacitly emphasized that understanding and compliance 
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with imperial regulations pervaded all the levels of customs administration in the 
Leeward Islands.  
Even without any explicit demand for either a response or documentary evidence 
in the circular, Shirley treated its receipt not merely as a reminder from metropolitan 
authority of proper bureaucratic conduct, but also as a demand to provision evidence 
demonstrating that he and the customs officers complied with expectations. Within the 
structure of governing empire at a distance, that demonstration took the form of 
paperwork. It is thus no surprise that other West Indian governors responded in similar 
ways, including documentation as evidence of their good conduct.30 Shirley’s answer 
demonstrates how the customs circular acted as an instrument conveying and enforcing 
the metropolitan-colonial hierarchy at the heart of the imperial ‘Constitution.’ Imperial 
authority demanded compliance to processes and standards of economic governance 
through the material form of the circular.  
Documents played the same function in the inverse context. Upon reports that the 
customs officers under their authority had failed to meet those expectations, the 
governors emphasized material paperwork as the demonstration of that disobedience. The 
response from William Browne, governor of Bermuda, exemplified this specific 
inflection on paperwork’s role. Sending his reply to the July circular in December 1785, 
Browne described how he had enforced the regulations. Browne informed Sydney that 
upon receipt of the circular, he had sent the customs officers a copy of the letter and 
investigated their conduct.31 In the course of this investigation, the governor received a 
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letter from Robert Traill, one of the officers, unambiguously stressing his compliance to 
the proper fee levels. Traill emphasized that he had “strictly adhered to the rule 
prescribed, that with every charge made by him or for him, a Bill of particulars had been 
given with each, conformable and agreeable to the established fees made in this 
Government about ninety years ago.” Browne included a copy of Traill’s letter.32 Yet, 
according to Browne’s report to Sydney, when requested to provide documentary proof 
of his obedience in the form of “a Copy of the List of fees by which he had regulated his 
Demands,” Traill moved to “retract” his original response, and instead asked the 
governor to return the letter, promising (in Browne’s words) to “send me another more 
conformable to the fact.” 
Traill subsequently sent Browne a list of fees taken by him from merchants as 
customs payments. This list proved no less problematic for Traill. Browne compared the 
new list, to a list of fees extracted by the previous customs collector on the island, one 
Mr. Smith, which the governor had obtained from the old collector’s former clerks. 
Browne concluded from the comparison of the documents “that Mr Traill has taxed the 
Trade of these Islands for the common and ordinary business of his Office the sum of 
£316.5.0 annually over and above what was due to him.” Browne dismissed the idea that 
the excess could be attributed to Traill’s ignorance of the rules, for Traill had received a 
copy of “Mr Smith’s list of fees” upon assuming the office of customs collector, so must 
have known the proper levels. In fact, Browne had discovered in the course of his 
investigation that Traill had initially collected fees in a manner “regulated by Mr. Smith’s 
list.” Traill’s subsequent departure from this guidance must therefore have been 
deliberate: the governor wrote that it was “not credible,” in light of the circumstances, for 
                                                




Traill to claim that he was “ignorant of that, which it so much concerned him to be 
acquainted with.” Browne concluded that the constellation of documents “induce me to 
believe that” Traill “knowingly” abused his office.33  
Browne included transcriptions of a set of documents related to Traill’s case. 
These enclosures, each labeled with a letter, served as evidence vindicating both the 
process by which Browne had investigated Traill’s conduct, and the judgment Browne 
passed on that conduct. This mass of paperwork included Browne’s initial letter to the 
Bermuda customs office requesting a list of fees (“C”); the letter from Traill asserting 
that the Customs Office collected fees in exact compliance with the laws (“D”); 
Browne’s letters soliciting copies of the lists of fees from the other officers in order to 
compare them with Traill’s, and test the veracity of his assertion (“E” and “F”); the 
replies from those clerks with their lists (“H” and “I”); and finally Browne’s letter to 
Traill dismissing him for abusing his responsibilities by extracting the excess revenue 
(“P”). As material support for Traill’s dismissal, this paperwork–in its contents, in its 
physical form, and in its enclosure in the communiqué to Sydney–demonstrated that the 
collector had been investigated and judged in an orderly, not arbitrary manner. By 
exposing the corruption of Traill (and hence the maladministration of the customs in 
Bermuda), Browne’s documents were evidence that the governor was overseeing customs 
administration in conformity with metropolitan expectations. Precisely by showing that 
corrupt practices could be uncovered and their perpetrators held accountable in customs 
administration, Browne signified that the ‘constitutional’ administration of the customs 
was central to his administration. The documentary evidence of bureaucratic abuse 
became a demonstration of good imperial governance.   
                                                




In these ways, the cluster of documents that existed in the circuit of Sydney’s 
letter to the governors, and their replies served as sites for governors to demonstrate their 
compliance to expectations held by imperial authority an ocean away. As with governors’ 
replies to Dartmouth’s queries, the proximate import and significance lay not only in the 
content but also in the transaction. The governors treated the task of completing the 
paperwork as an opportunity to demonstrate competence and compliance. As the 
particular example of Bermuda demonstrates, the most important aspect of that 
demonstration for the governors involved showing that their understanding of these 
expectations. Even when the solicitation of knowledge on behalf of the empire served to 
reveal the corrupt practice of its officials, as with the Bermuda case, governors used 
documents to emphasize their adherence to administrative expectations.  
The functional work performed by Sydney’s circular was to reinforce these 
existing expectations for the correct administration of the revenue in the West Indies with 
respect to customs fees. Furthermore, the circular demonstrated how paperwork external 
to the state–in this case, in the form of the petition of the West India Committee–could 
generate administrative action. Furthermore, while the responses from the governors were 
full of ‘facts,’ the more significant contextual meaning of the circular and replies rested 
in its highlighting of the responsiveness to the state to external petitioning, and the state’s 
interest in enforcing the imperial ‘Constitution’ through paperwork. The circulars were 
the material conduit through which the relationship of hierarchy and authority that lay at 







 During the decade that intervened between the 1764 reform of the fiscal 
bureaucracy of British America and the dispatch of Lord Sydney’s circular on the 
excessive fees extracted by West Indian customs officers, the American Revolution 
fundamentally ruptured the political geography of the British empire in the Atlantic 
world. As the final chapter of the dissertation shows, imperial paperwork also underwent 
a shift, toward an epistemological configuration in which both the content of such 
paperwork came to be treated as a repository of useful knowledge for planning imperial 
strategy, and the archive itself was seen as in need of reorganization to facilitate that end. 
As Lord Sydney’s circular of the mid-1780s reminds, however, this shift did not entail 
any cession of the longstanding use of paperwork as a facilitative technology of 
government and a communicator of metropolitan expectations for administrative conduct. 
Change and continuity were mutually constitutive. 
 As this chapter has argued, the culture of customs governance in the British 
Atlantic was forged through the accountable execution of bureaucratic practices. Their 
transaction inherently involved the production and circulation of paperwork, and thus the 
evidence of their correct transaction–the lever of their accountability lay in the paperwork 
itself. In both examples treated in this chapter, the correct performance of such 
paperwork was intimately and inextricably tied to understandings of the relationships of 
authority at the heart of imperial governance, and the need for a mechanism through 
which obedience to that authority could be expressed, enforced, and audited. Whether in 
the generation of reform or in the enforcement of expectations, paperwork was the 





COMMISSIONS AND PAPERWORK: 
THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
Introduction 
 After the outbreak of the American Revolution ruptured the British Empire in the 
North Atlantic, imperial government embarked in several wartime efforts aimed at ending 
the conflict diplomatically. Among these was the creation a special bureaucratic 
institution, the Carlisle Commission. Created in 1778, the Commission was charged with 
presenting the Americans with Lord North’s peace terms, which aimed to reconcile them 
to the empire. These concessions were embodied in material forms of state paperwork 
circulated to the Americans. They comprised a series of written letters and memos drafted 
by the commissioners under strict instructions from the Secretary of State’s office in 
London as to their contents. The historiography of the American Revolution has relegated 
this diplomatic campaign to a footnote given the quixotic nature of the endeavor: already 
committed to independence by 1778, the rebelling Americans unsurprisingly rejected the 
British peace proposal. But examining the Carlisle Commission from the vantage point of 
imperial paperwork offers insight into two key questions: first, the role of ‘commissions’ 
as an administrative ‘instrument’; and second, the impact of the breakdown of British 
authority in North America during the American Revolution on the constitutional 
relationship that had structured imperial governance for nearly a century. 
In the context of British government, a “commission” constituted a special 




officials designated to resolve a specific problem of government on behalf of the 
sovereign.1 As an instrument of sovereign control, commissions were temporary 
creations, delegated specific powers that enabled them to resolve or manage a particular 
area of policy–at times, as a political tool to be used against the competing claim of 
Parliamentary authority, and in general as a way of reducing the administrative burden 
placed on the Privy Council itself. These powers could be investigatory: indeed, the 
initial management of imperial government in America was performed by a Commission 
of Trade who were instructed to “advise how these plantations may best be managed and 
made useful to the Commonwealth.”2 A commission could also be empowered by the 
Privy Council with a patent that enabled it to execute a specific set of administrative 
actions detailed in a set of special “Instructions.” In either case, commissions were tools 
of royal and central power, created to more strictly control the performance of imperial 
bureaucrats. ‘Commissions’ were to use the delegation of authority they had been 
authorized to act in the particular capacity specified by their “Instructions” – and in no 
other manner.3  
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Over the course of the eighteenth century, imperial government created 
commissions at various points to execute specific administrative tasks, such as the Land 
Commission to the Caribbean appointed by government in 1764 to investigate and 
administer land allocation on captured islands in the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War; 
and the American Loyalist Claims Commission, which addressed claims submitted by 
loyalists for losses of property after the end of the American Revolution. In creating these 
commissions, executive government delegated authority to a defined group of 
‘commissioners’ to administer a specific task. As instruments of royal prerogative, how 
did imperial commissions execute their charge, and what roles did the technology of 
paper play in their creation and operation? Aside from examinations of particular 
commissions, such as the Restoration-era commissions created by the Privy Council to 
administer the American colonies, and the Loyalist Claims commission, scholarship on 
the early modern British empire has paid little attention to their role in imperial 
governance.4  
Extant scholarship on the Carlisle Commission has not attended to its 
constitutional and administrative significance, focusing instead on the biography of its 
secretary, the Enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson, and its role in Revolutionary-
era diplomacy. Viewed as a diplomatic strategy, the Carlisle endeavor is universally 
judged to have been a misguided failure, since the Americans did not accept North’s 
peace terms.5 The following discussion interprets the Carlisle Commission through a 
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different analytic: that of paperwork and the imperial ‘constitution.’ Through the Carlisle 
example, the chapter explores how commissions operated as an instrument of imperial 
government, through which metropolitan administration aggressively structured the 
execution of a bureaucratic task in the midst of political breakdown. The commission’s 
history suggests that one consequence of the rupture of the American Revolution was a 
heightened commitment by imperial administration to control and monitoring of 
bureaucratic activity, one effected by the imperial state’s creation and use of the 
instrument of the ‘commission.’ Considered as a constitutional formation, dependent on 
specific practices of using documents for its execution, the Carlisle Commission’s 
significance is more complex than existing historiography has recognized. Although the 
commissioners failed to convince the Americans to accept reconciliation, the 
commissioners fulfilled their administrative obligations through the transaction of their 
constitutional mandate, one that relied upon the use of the technology of administrative 
paperwork. 
 
Constituting the “Commission” from the Imperial Center: Drafting Documents 
Metropolitan government structured the constitutional responsibilities and powers 
of the Carlisle Commission through the use of specific forms of administrative 
paperwork. What were these documents, and what were their functions? On April 16, 
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1778, four members of the Carlisle Commission–the Earl of Carlisle; William Eden, the 
diplomat and member of the Board of Trade; George Johnstone, former governor of West 
Florida; and Adam Ferguson, the Enlightenment philosopher here serving in the role of 
the Commission’s secretary–departed from Portsmouth, England on the HMS Trident and 
commenced an Atlantic crossing. Upon their arrival, the Commissioners were joined by 
Henry Clinton, commander-in-chief of the British army in North America.  
The Commissioners sailed for America with the charge of offering Lord North’s 
terms of reconciliation to the former colonists. Their Commission had been authorized by 
the British government through the proposal for its creation in Lord North’s Conciliatory 
Bills, and the passage of the legislation by Parliament in early March 1778. The 
Commissioners’ diplomatic authority was codified in a set of official documents–a letter 
from George Germain in his capacity as Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 
a “Commission” enabling the men to act as representatives of the imperial government, a 
set of “Instructions” delineating their duties and charges, and a set of “Inclosures.” In his 
letter, sent to the Commissioners via Eden on April 13, 1778, Germain tasked them with 
“the very Important Business” of “quieting the Disorders at present subsisting in the 
Colonies in North America.” He underscored the importance of the Commissioners’ strict 
obedience to the dictates of royal authority, and their regular return of information on 
their progress as he commanded them to “Correspond” with him on “all such matters as 
you may think of importance for His Majesty’s Information, or upon which you may be 
desirous of receiving any Instruction from His Majesty.”6 The documents were addressed 
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to Carlisle, Eden, Johnstone, and two British officials already in America: General 
William Howe (commander of the British army in North America), and Vice Admiral 
Richard Howe (commander of the Royal Navy’s North American Station).7 With this 
letter, Germain send the diplomats the “Commission” empowering them to act on behalf 
of the Crown. Proclaiming the government’s “earnest desire” “for the quieting and 
Extinguishing of [the] divers [sic] Jealousies and Apprehensions of Danger to their 
Liberties and Rights which have Alarmed many of our Subjects,” this document 
“Commission” formally invested the Commissioners–Carlisle, Richard Howe, William 
Howe, Eden, and Johnstone–with their authority: through the document, they were 
“authorise[d] and empower[ed]” to execute the mission.8 The “Commission” also 
licensed the diplomats to use ‘instruments’–official State Seals and the State Signature– 
to craft a treaty of peace with “Persons or Bodies Politick” in America whom they judged 
“Sufficient” to enter upon terms of agreement.9 
 With the “Commission,” the Secretary of State sent the diplomats a set of 
“Instructions”–the same genre of administrative paperwork that had been used to specify 
the political duties of both the governors examined in Chapter Two, and the diplomats 
discussed in Chapter Four. As with those “Instructions,” the ones that German dispatched 
to the Commissioners delineated the exact tasks they were to execute, and the 
                                                                                                                                            
Another copy is in BL, Add MS 34415, George Germain to William Eden, April 13, 1778, f. 355. The draft 
of the letter is in TNA, CO 5/180, Draft to the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and George Johnstone, 
Esq.r,, April 12, 1778, ff. 1-2. 
 
7 William Howe would resign his position and return to England in June 1778 due to ill health: see TNA, 
CO 5/177, Howe to Germain, June 10, 1778, f. 117. 
 
8 EUL, Commission, 2-3. 
 





expectations for their conduct. Each of these tasks involved acts of transmitting and 
circulating the peace terms to the Americans. Upon arrival in America, the 
Commissioners were instructed “to communicate” their presence to George Washington 
in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Continental Army, and to present 
Washington with the documents that established the Commission as the legitimate 
conveyor of imperial will–“a Copy of the Act of Parliament” that had enabled Germain to 
appoint them, and “a Copy of Our Commission.”10 The Commissioners were then to offer 
Lord North’s concessions for peace to Congress. The most significant of these 
concessions were assurances to the former colonists that if they agreed to peace, no 
standing army would be kept in America if they willingly volunteered to fight for the 
empire; that no alterations in colonial charters would occur without the consent of the 
former colonists; that a small number of representatives from the former colonies would 
be admitted to Parliament; and that the former colonists would not be required to repeal 
their Declaration of Independence.11 The Commissioners were further directed that they 
were “not to make any public Appeal to the Inhabitants of America at large” until and 
unless it was clear that the American leadership would refuse to consent to these terms.12 
If, however, the Commissioners “should at length despair” of making a peace treaty with 
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the Americans, the “Instructions” authorized them to “publish a Proclamation” declaring 
the “earnest Wishes” of Britain “for the Re-establishment of Peace and Union upon firm, 
and lasting Foundations . . .”13  
 Lord North, Alexander Wedderburn (the Solicitor General), and Eden drafted the 
legislation that constituted the Commission and specified its tasks and authority. On 
February 7, 1778, Eden sent Lord North a draft of the bill to appoint the Commissioners, 
requesting his suggestions on alterations and corrections, and specifying the series of 
resolutions that would be brought in Parliament in order to assure the motion’s passage.14 
Lord North subsequently returned a copy of the bill to Eden marked with additions and 
corrections, which the prime minister made by crossing out words on Eden’s proposal 
and inserting his amendments above and below the original sentences.15 Eden then 
consulted extensively with Wedderburn over the exact language and contents of the 
Commissioners’ charges to be specified in the bill, each exchanging drafts and revisions 
with the other.16 Through this process, these administrators strictly prescribed the 
Commission’s powers and tasks: all involved in the drafting agreed that the diplomats 
should have (as Wedderburn wrote) “only such Powers as are necessary.”17 The surviving 
drafts of Eden, Wedderburn, and North’s paperwork are replete with many asterisked 
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additions and insertions scribbled in different hands both above sentences and in the 
margins, as well as deletions of words and sometimes entire paragraphs.18  
Examining the archive of the documents given to the Commissioners by imperial 
administration demonstrates the profound extent to which commissions worked as 
precisely controlled extensions of executive sovereignty. Although Eden both wrote he 
legislation creating the Commission and subsequently served on it, the members of the 
Commission, constituted as such, had no role in creating the terms and contents of their 
tasks. Rather, the peace terms that the Commissioners offered to the Americans were 
drafted by ministerial government in London acting under Crown authority and with 
Parliamentary support. The Commissioners were authorized by the documents entrusted 
to them to engage in bureaucratic communication: the presentation of the peace terms to 
the Americans. As an extension of this authority, the agency of the Carlisle Commission 
would therefore not involve the generation of new political ideas and arguments for 
continued imperial union, but rather execution of the specific procedures delineated by 
the Secretary of State in the “Instructions.” Indeed, as Germain emphasized in his 
subsequent correspondence with the Commissioners, they were to “be careful to make no 
concessions but such as are clearly within the Meaning and Spirit of Your Instructions.” 
He reminded them to “postpone” “consent” to any “further Points” until the 
Commissioners had communicated them back to him and “received His Majesty’s 
pleasure thereupon.”19 The material instruments of the ‘commission’ and ‘instructions’ 
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Instruction,” n. d., ff. 206-229. 
 




thus enabled imperial administrators in Whitehall to precisely specify the nature and 
limits of bureaucratic authority, and dictate imperial actions occurring across the ocean. 
 
Executing “Instructions”: The Commission at Work  
 Landing in New York harbor on May 27, 1778, after a month and a half’s voyage 
across the Atlantic, the Commissioners set to work executing their “Instructions.” The 
Commissioners had been instructed by Germain to “transmit Copies” of the British 
concessions to Congress and General George Washington. Fulfilling this directive, Henry 
Clinton, as commander of the British army in America, composed a letter on June 3 to 
Henry Laurens, president of Congress. The letter accompanied the Commissioners’ 
dispatch of the “printed Copies of three Conciliatory Acts of Parliament” to Laurens. In 
this letter, Clinton expressed his “most sincere wishes” that these copies “would produce 
the desireable [sic] effect which is hoped from them” – namely, the Americans’ 
acceptance of the peace terms. He included a second letter, addressed to Congress, 
appealing to the Americans to accept the concessions, stressing the benefits of imperial 
union, and calling for a meeting between the Commissioners and Congress to discuss 
Lord North’s peace terms. These documents, Clinton explained to Laurens, “will be 
delivered to you by Doctor Ferguson the Secretary to His Majesty’s Commission.”20  
However, the illegitimacy of imperial political authority in the eyes of the 
Americans presented an obstacle to the execution of this work: the need for the correct 
form of paperwork authorizing interaction with the Americans. While he carried a 
document invested with authority by the British state–the concessions to the Americans–, 
                                                





Ferguson (a bureaucrat serving what the former colonists considered an enemy 
government) lacked that paper deemed by the new American state to be of essential 
consequence: the right passport. The fact itself was communicated to Ferguson through 
the formal tools of American paperwork. As the Commissioners subsequently reported to 
Germain, Ferguson found himself “stopped at the Second Guard of the Enemy by a Letter 
from General Washington intimating that the necessary Passport could not be Granted 
without previous Instruction from the Congress” – “Instruction” sent several days later by 
the American Congress.21 The bureaucratic obstacle represented by the British 
commissioners’ lack of the proper document was complemented ideologically by 
Congress’ response to the peace proposal, dated June 17 and received on July 2, 1778. 
Replying in his capacity as president of Congress, Laurens derided the “Paper” as full of 
“propositions so derogatory to the honor of an Independent Nation.” Laurens stated in his 
answer to North’s proposal that Congress would only consider “a Treaty of Peace” in 
light of “solid proof” and “explicit acknowledgment of the Independence” of the 
American state.22 The Americans’ rejection of these British documents represented a 
refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of imperial government.  
Congress’ predictable rebuff of the concessions coincided with the Commission’s 
continued obedience to the hierarchy of imperial government embodied in the form of the 
“Instructions.” In accordance with Germain’s “Instructions,” the Commissioners now 
followed a new strategy: appealing directly to the American public. As the 
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22 EUL, “Letter from Henry Laurens Esquire to His Majesty’s Commissioners,” June 17, 1778, 85-86; the 





Commissioners informed Congress on July 11, 1778, they would move toward 
“Communicating to the Public” “to explain our own proceedings.”23 In engaging in 
public communication of the peace terms, the Commissioners continued to follow the 
“Instructions” of Germain, who had directed them to “publish a Proclamation containing 
a Declaration of the earnest Wishes of Us and Our Parliament for composing any 
Differences that have unhappily subsisted” between Britain and the colonies, and for “the 
Re-establishment of Peace & Union” in the event that direct engagement with Congress 
failed.24 The Commissioners now executed these directions by preparing the 
“Proclamation,” and by publishing their correspondence with Congress in the loyalist 
Royal Gazette on July 15. They sent a copy of the issue of the newspaper to Germain on 
July 19 as a demonstration of their adherence to imperial command.25 However, their 
confidence was evaporating. Writing to Germain on July 7, Carlisle and Eden conveyed 
their opinion that Congress’ “decided Rejection” of the terms of peace left “no Room to 
hope that any success will attend the Commission with which we are honoured [sic]” – 
the only other possible channels, they detailed, were military force; public appeal, such as 
the kind they were now preparing; or “Negociation [sic]” with “separate Bodies of Men 
and Individuals” besides Congress.26 As they informed German on July 26, “the present 
Aspect of Affairs” had made it clear that the continuation of “Pacific advances either to 
                                                
23 EUL, “Letter to Henry Laurens Esq.r and other Members of Congress,” July 11, 1778, 97. 
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the Congress or to the People at large” would only serve “to expose His Majesty and the 
State of Great Britain to Insults of which we should be sorry to furnish the occasion.”27  
By late September 1778, the new public appeal–the “Manifesto and 
Proclamation”–was complete. In strict conformity to the Secretary of State’s 
“Instructions,” the Commissioners in this new text called on Congress to accept Lord 
North’s proposals, and reiterated the British government’s argument for the benefit of 
“Reunion and Coalition” between the American colonies and the motherland. The 
Commissioners began the text in a pessimistic vein, noting that they were “resolved to 
return to England, a few Weeks after the Date of this Manifesto and Proclamation.” 
Intending, however, to “enlarge on some Points” about their endeavor that “may not have 
been sufficiently understood” by the American audience, they moved to “recapitulate” 
“the Blessings” that would attend with “the Re-establishment of Peace.” “We insist that 
the offers we have made leave nothing to be wished in Point either of immediate liberty 
or permanent Security,” they wrote; if the Americans still “rejected” them, the diplomats 
had no choice but to “withdraw from the Exercise of a Commission with which we have 
in vain been honoured . . .”28 The Commissioners then distributed the text by publishing 
it in sympathetic newspapers and mobilizing British military forces to distribute copies to 
Americans.29 Sending a copy to Germain on October 15, the Commissioners confirmed 
that they had conformed to the Secretary of State’s “Instructions” to make a public appeal 
if official negotiation failed. Acknowledging the “Inefficacy of the Measure We have 
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taken” in the context of revolutionary disruption, the Commissioners stated that their real 
purpose in writing and circulating the “Manifesto and Proclamation” was to fulfill their 
“Duty” to convey “an Impression rather of the Benevolence and Spirit of Great Britain 
than of weakness and Want of System.”30 
Once back in Britain in late 1778, the Commissioners prepared to archive the 
paperwork created in the course of their mission. As Carlisle informed Germain on 
December 22, 1778, “Dr Ferguson,” still acting as Secretary, was now “charged with 
dispatches relative to the Commission, and will lose no time in waiting upon you with 
them.”31 Over the course of 1779, Ferguson communicated and coordinated the deposit of 
the documentary records of the Commission within the Secretary of State’s office.32 He 
examined and certified the accuracy of copies of the Commission’s paperwork, made by 
clerks in that office.33 On May 29, Carlisle, Eden, and Johnstone wrote a letter to 
Germain to express their “humble Thanks” and “Acknowledgements” for being entrusted 
with the commission.34 Finally, on May 31, Germain officially disbanded the 
Commission by sending a letter to the Commissioners conveying “Royal Approbation” 
for their efforts. With reference to the long trail of paper that had defined the 
Commissioners’ labor, Germain concluded by expressing his “Regret that a 
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Correspondence, from which I have received so much & so very satisfactory Information, 
is not of a longer Continuance . . .”35 
 
Conclusion: Political Failure, Constitutional Success 
 Viewed as a political effort by the British government to end the American 
Revolution, the Carlisle Commission has understandably not fared well 
historiographically. Not only did this attempt to end the war diplomatically go nowhere; 
its failure was essentially ordained because it presumed incorrectly that the Americans in 
1778 were open to the possibility of rejoining the empire. However, viewed as a 
constitutional endeavor, the Carlisle Commission might be considered differently. The 
reason lay in the distinction between the respective fates of the content of North’s peace 
proposal, and the instrument through which they were conveyed to the Americans: the 
Commission itself. While the peace terms offered by the British government were–
predictably rejected, the Commissioners precisely and correctly executed the 
“Instructions” for their work crafted by politicians. This execution was not simply 
authorized by documents (the “Commission” and the “Instructions”), but also depended 
upon the precise transaction and communication of paperwork for its success. As a 
bureaucratic formation, therefore, the Carlisle Commission demonstrates both the 
continuities of the imperial ‘constitution,’ and its significance of ‘instruments’ for its 
execution, even in the midst of political fracture. Indeed, the British state’s recourse to 
the instrument of the ‘commission’ suggests that the caesura of the American Revolution 
may have reinforced, rather than ruptured, its commitment to the constitutional structure 
of empire, and to the paper tools through which this structure was materialized.  
                                                





MOBILIZING THE ARCHIVES OF STATE AND EMPIRE 
JOHN BRUCE AND THE USES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PAPERWORK 
DURING THE LONG 1790s 
 
Introduction 
 In mid-July 1806, a month after being acquitted of all charges in an impeachment 
trial, Henry Dundas received a letter from two of his secretaries, John Meheux and 
Benjamin Jones, on the status of the paperwork that had flowed through his various 
offices during two decades of government service. As a cabinet member during William 
Pitt the Younger’s two ministries (1783-1801 and 1804-1806), Dundas had stood at the 
apex of British domestic and imperial administration for over two decades, occupying 
positions as President of the East India Company’s Board of Control, Secretary of State, 
War Secretary, and First Lord of the Admiralty. In his Admiralty office, however, 
Dundas had been slapped with corruption charges, leading to a trial that–despite ending 
in his acquittal–tainted his public persona and led to his permanent departure from 
government. Writing from the India Office, where Dundas had spent so much of his time 
while in government, Meheux and Jones enclosed “a general Inventory” cataloguing 
some of the vast number of documents that Dundas had received and written during his 
years in government. They hoped that the inventory would prove useful to Dundas in 
“deciding what should be destroyed and what preserved” of this archive.1 
 The inventory that Meheux and Jones sent to Dundas on this occasion was one of 
several similar catalogs that the pair prepared of his papers. These catalogs encapsulate 
                                                




both the extensive varieties of paperwork in Dundas’ archive, and the complex methods 
of its organization, with memos, letters, and other documents listed under thematic 
headings ranging from “Internal Defence [sic],” “War with France,” and “Union,” to 
“Spanish America” and “Ireland”–indeed, virtually every subject that came before 
government during Dundas’ years in office. These catalogs are also repositories of the 
myriad names of people Dundas corresponded and interacted with, many of them–Pitt, 
Cornwallis, and Grenville, for example–predictably familiar to historians. One name that 
recurs frequently within these catalogs as both a correspondent and supplier of Dundas, 
however, is less known: John Bruce (1744-1826). In the 1806 catalog, under the heading 
“Military & Internal Defence [sic]” and subheading “Defence [sic] of the Coast,” there is 
an entry for a letter, dated March 3, 1798, sent from Captain Archibald Blair to Bruce, 
described as “Transmitting (Memoirs relative to the Andamans).” An “Abstract of Plans 
for manning the Navy with an appendix by Mr Bruce” is entered under the heading 
“Navy” and subheading “Manning the Navy.” Bruce’s name also appears in a bundle of 
material under the heading “War with France,” including his translations of letters from 
French royalists on the military capacities of the revolutionaries; and the list of 
documents concerned with “Mr. Dundas’ own family” includes Bruce’s 1790 “plan for 
finishing” the education of Dundas’ son, Robert, “with a view to fit him for the Bar and 
for Parliament.”2 
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 The appearance of Bruce’s name in the 1806 catalog resonated with his similarly 
frequent recurrences in other catalogs of Dundas’ archive.3 The catalogs show that Bruce 
made a substantial material imprint on Dundas’ archive, supplying or writing documents 
concerned with a vast array of Dundas’ official and personal business, ranging from 
revolutionary politics in Europe to East India Company governance; from military 
planning to the affairs of the Dundas family. Indeed, the catalogs suggest intimate ties 
between Bruce’s writing, the political ascension and career of Dundas, and, in turn, the 
imperial and domestic concerns of British politics in the era of the Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic wars against France. But the relevant historiography –including that on 
Dundas, British politics in the period, and East India Company governance–has little to 
say about Bruce’s life and work, or has relegated him to the status of a footnote.4 Existing 
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historiography on Bruce himself is sparse and limited.5 Indeed, Bruce was hardly well 
known in his own lifetime: a eulogy published upon his death observed that Bruce’s 
“valuable work” had been “printed by Government” but “not published for sale,” leaving 
his writings “not so extensively known as they deserve.”6  
 Bruce’s unfamiliarity to both his contemporaries and to historians belies his 
importance to the history of paperwork and archive in Britain and its empire. This chapter 
seeks to recover Bruce’s labor, explain its significance, and anatomize the role he played 
in defining the character of state paperwork in Britain at the end of the eighteenth 
century. As this dissertation has shown, paperwork served as a facilitative technology of 
imperial government during the eighteenth century. Central administrative institutions 
used paperwork to solicit the demonstration of the correct knowledge and execution of 
specific bureaucratic procedures. At the end of the 1780s, however, something changed 
in the administrative use of documents. To a greater degree than before in British 
imperial history, administrators self-consciously turned to state archives for documentary 
sources from which they could make and justify policy. Furthermore, administrators now 
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envisioned reorganizing state archives so as to render them useful in the work of 
government. At the end of the eighteenth century, the exponential decay in the utility of 
imperial information slowed. Long seen as useful upon its immediate receipt among 
London administrators as confirmation of bureaucratic performance, such information 
now came to be seen as having a potential significance for imperial government long 
after the immediate moment of its creation and circulation.  
 This shift in administrative epistemology arose initially from within the 
bureaucratic machinery of the East India Company.7 The Company’s role in the 
collection, collation, and transmission of knowledge about imperial spaces has been the 
subject of recent historiographical exploration and debate, much of which has focused on 
the often enormous gap between the knowledge upon which the British relied to govern 
India, and the actual texture and practices of everyday life in administered spaces.8 As 
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Jon Wilson has observed, “British officials tried to use a set of scholastic intellectual 
constructions to govern Bengal without any practical, locally rooted sense of how to 
relate those theories to the heterogeneity of everyday life.” This overlap between 
scholarship and administration in the governance of Bengal and British India had no 
equivalent in imperial administration in the British Atlantic. As Wilson argues, this role 
of scholarship emerged out of a bureaucratic need to ‘construct’ an idea of indigenous, 
‘local’ Indian culture as a “coherent, stable object of analysis” that allowed government 
to “establish . . . administration on a certain conceptual footing.” As a result, Wilson 
suggests, “the British government of Bengal was far more dependent on abstract 
conceptual formulations than British government elsewhere.”9  
 John Bruce made a key contribution to the maturation of this approach, and tied to 
it an institutional reform of the archive itself. Turning to official archives for precedents 
and evidence in the form of documents, Bruce drew upon the content of paperwork as he 
composed memos, histories, and military plans aimed at defending and expanding the 
empire, and suppressing radicalism at home. He then circulated these texts privately 
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among government officials, who used them as a source of strategic knowledge, and 
especially to his patron and protector Henry Dundas (James Mill, a far more famous 
historian of the British empire, once observed, with much accuracy, that Bruce served as 
“the advocate of [Dundas’] schemes”).10 Bruce neither invented nor established this way 
of using state papers for policy planning. Indeed, in a broad sense, he was simply 
engaging in the same activities bureaucrats had long engaged when they did paperwork: 
producing documents for the use of other administrators. Furthermore, the practice of 
determining and justifying administrative policy from historical precedent was a deeply 
rooted aspect of British administrative culture, one arguably heightened during the era of 
the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars.11 
However, these continuities between Bruce’s practices; earlier ways of doing state 
paperwork; and deeper traditions of political reasoning should not mask his distinctive 
importance to the history of British imperial bureaucracy and its underlying material 
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practices.12 For several reasons, his appearance on the scene marked a change in the role 
of paperwork in imperial governance. The first reason lies in Bruce’s dual involvement 
and use both imperial and domestic state paperwork for policy planning. Previous state 
archivists, as will be shown, did not use both kinds of archives in these ways. The second 
reason emanates from Bruce’s uniting of a forward-looking approach to state papers with 
a significant institutional reform of the epistemological and physical organization of the 
archives themselves. Through this reform, Bruce sought to create a permanent set of 
bureaucratic repositories of paperwork primed for administrative consultation; and its 
ambitions went beyond previous efforts to rearrange state papers. Bruce achieved this 
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circulation among political elites, ‘modern’ historians have thus far paid the subject very little attention. 
Undoubtedly, this is the consequence of a deeply embedded narrative about the triumph of print culture as 
one of the signatures of ‘modernity.’ Bruce’s practices in particular complicate this narrative both because 
much of his work circulated in unprinted form, and because his work in print was intentionally limited in 
the size of runs and distributed to very restricted audiences in a manner with obvious parallels to 
manuscript culture. There is a significant need for more work on the subject, but thankfully modern 
historians are increasingly interested in the problem. See, for example, Ann C. Dean, “Benjamin Franklin, 
Writing by Hand: Manuscript, Print, and Political Imagination,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural 
Studies, 4 (2004), 89-113. More generally, see Harold Love, Scribal Publication in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Love and Arthur F. Marotti, “Manuscript Transmission 
and Circulation,” in David Lowenstein and Janel Mueller (eds.), The Cambridge History of Early Modern 
English Literature (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 55-80; Elizabeth Yale, 
“Manuscript Technologies: Correspondence, Collaboration, and the Construction of Natural Knowledge in 
Early Modern Britain,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2008; Noah Millstone, “Plot’s 
Commonwealth: The Circulation of Manuscripts and the Practice of Politics in Early Stuart England, c. 
1614-1640,” PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 2011; Melanie Bigold, Women of Letters: Manuscript 
Circulation and Print Afterlives in the Eighteenth Century: Elizabeth Rowe, Catherine Cockburn, and 
Elizabeth Carter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); and Daniel Starza Smith, John Donne and the 
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from two official positions which he occupied from the late 1780s onward, which 
provided him with privileged access to state archives, and which he was the first person 
to hold jointly: Historiographer to the East India Company; and Keeper of State Papers.   
The following discussion examines how Bruce mobilized the administrative 
archive as a source of knowledge and as an argumentative authority for planning policy 
and imperial strategy.13 In Bruce’s hands, ‘state papers’ no longer simply facilitated the 
execution of administrative process. Now, the imperial archive itself became what the 
documents contained inside it had once been: an ‘instrument’ of government. Indeed, as 
this chapter will argue, Bruce articulated a vision of how administrative archives ought to 
function in government, and sought to put it into practice. Warren Hastings wrote in 1784 
with reference to Orientalist scholarship that “every accumulation of knowledge . . . is 
useful to the state”; but rendering that knowledge useful to the state required the presence 
of people to read, interpret, and plan from it–this was the role Bruce fulfilled.14 The 
following discussion begins by exploring how Bruce came to a life of bureaucracy, and to 
                                                
13 Bruce also provided documentary support for the Pitt administration’s campaign against domestic 
radicalism during the 1790s: see, for example, see, for example, his provisioning of precedents on state 
trials to Dundas in relation to the trial of Thomas Muir and the Rev. Thomas Fyshe Palmer in 1793, in 
NAS, GD 152/224/6, including ““Motion in favor of Palmer & Muir for Mr Dundas by John Bruce”; 
“Arguments on Muir & Palmer’s Case given [to] Mr. Dundas, November 1793, when the Subject was 
introduced into Parliament”; “Memo addressed to ‘Mr Dundas’ by John Bruce on ‘Muir’s Trial,’” n. d.; as 
well as NLS, MS 3011, Bruce, “Mem: Trial of Muir at Edinburgh for Mr Dundas,” n. d., ff. 49-51; and 
NAS, GD 152/222/3/1-7, ““Papers relating to House of Commons committee on proceedings of the Society 
for Constitutional Information and of the London Corresponding Society drawn up by John Bruce for 
Messrs Pitt and Dundas in order to answer an opposition question in Parliament furnishing them with 
Precedents,” 1794-1795. See also NAS, GD 152/40, Bruce, “Progress of the Levelling [sic] Opinions in 
Great Britain, Illustrated by the Conduct and Probable Measures of those who promote them,” 1794. Bruce 
also wrote about imperial strategy in the British Atlantic: see Bruce, “On the Petition of the West India 
Planters. – stating the necessity of allowing a free intercourse between the Sugar colonies and the United 
States of America in American Bottoms,” n. d., William Clements Library, Viscount Melville Papers, Box 
2. 
 
14 Warren Hastings to Nathaniel Smith, December 3, 1784, in The Bhăgvăt-Gēētă, or Dialogues of 
Krěěshnă and Ărjŏŏn; in Eighteen Lectures; With Notes. Translated from the Original, in the Sanskreet, or 
Ancient Language of the Brahmans by Charles Wilkins, Senior Merchant in the Service of the Honourable 




a forward-looking view of the archive. The chapter then examines a specific instance of 
Bruce’s common practice of mobilizing paperwork as knowledge and authority for the 
construction of policy: planning the structure of British government at the Cape of Good 
Hope. It concludes by discussing Bruce’s effort to institutionalize his approach by 
reforming the archive itself.  
 
From Edinburgh to a Historical View: Articulating a Vision of the Bureaucratic Archive 
On May 27, 1790, an ex-tutor sat down at a desk in London, and wrote a report 
card to the father of his student. The tutor was John Bruce; the father was Henry Dundas; 
and the student was Henry’s son, Robert. Between 1786 and 1788, Bruce had travelled on 
the Continent with the younger Dundas, supervising and managing Robert’s studies at 
Göttingen and Paris; upon the pair’s return to Britain, Robert matriculated at Cambridge 
to complete his education. Bruce now wrote to Henry to advise him on the proper course 
of study necessary for Robert to enter political life, or, as John wrote, “what line, in these 
circumstances, is he to pursue, in order to qualify himself for Business, professional, and 
public.” The end of Robert’s education–and thus Bruce’s employment as his tutor–raised 
another question: what “Business” John Bruce would “qualify” for now that his services 
as Robert’s educator were no longer needed. Bruce concluded his letter by angling for 
Henry Dundas’ assistance in this regard: “you have had too much experience of my 
attachments to yourself & to your Son,” Bruce wrote, “to doubt, that I shall be ready on 
all occurrences to serve you both.”15 
                                                





Indeed, Bruce wanted Henry Dundas’ assistance in securing his old job: as 
professor of moral philosophy and logic at the University of Edinburgh, from which he 
had taken leave in order to serve as Robert Dundas’ tutor. Bruce had studied at Edinburgh 
beginning in 1764, and ascended to the professorial ranks a decade later as chair of logic 
and metaphysics in place of Adam Ferguson.16 Indeed, it was at Edinburgh that Bruce 
met another student, Henry Dundas, while both were members of a debating club called 
the Speculative Society.17 But while Bruce had been touring the continent with Robert 
Dundas, the Edinburgh professorship he had temporary left was given to James 
Finlayson–without Bruce’s official resignation, and despite Bruce’s anger at being so 
displaced.18 Compounding Bruce’s frustration was the hostile reception of his 1786 work, 
Elements of the Science of Ethics, which had been lambasted in a review orchestrated by 
a rival, Henry Beaufoy, for its “impropriety of expression”; “provincial idiom”; and the 
“haste” and “negligence in the Author.”19 Leveraging ministerial influence, Henry 
                                                
16 NLS, MS 3431, “Act of Council Appointing Messrs. Bruce and Duncan to teach Classes in the College, 
in absence of Professors Ferguson and Drummond,” October 26, 1774, f. 187. 
 
17 Roger L. Emerson, Academic Patronage and the Scottish Enlightenment: Glasgow, Edinburgh, and St 
Andrews Universities (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 339. Bruce was involved in the 
founding of the Speculative Society, whose members debated moral, political, and ethical topics, and 
continued to correspond with the friends and contacts he made in it throughout his life: see Henry Paton, 
“Letters from John Bonar to William Creech Concerning the Formation of the Speculative Society,” in The 
Book of the Old Edinburgh Club, v (Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable, 1912), 166. Although it seems 
prescient only in light of his subsequent career, it is worth noting that in the course of his tenure as a 
member of this group, Bruce wrote an essay exploring how “a member of civil Society” could live in a 
manner as “advantageous to a State” as “those who pursue a military course.” See NAS, GD 152/30, John 
Bruce to Speculative Society, April 5, 1765. More generally, see History of the Speculative Society of 
Edinburgh, From Its Institution In MDCCLXIV (Edinburgh, 1845). For Bruce as a student at the University 
of Edinburgh, see his 1765 notes taken on Hugh Blair’s lectures on rhetoric in EUL, DC 10.6. 
 
18 NAS, GD 152/214/6/19, “Assignation By James Finlayson in favour [sic] of John Bruce,” January 6, 
1790. 
 
19 “Art. XI. The Elements of the Science of Ethics, on the Principles of Natural Philosophy. By John Bruce, 
A. M. Professor of Philosophy, and Fellow of the Royal Society at Edinburgh,” The Monthly Review, June 
1787, 500. For Beaufoy’s role in the publication of the review, see NAS, GD 152/215/14/27-28, Charles 




Dundas secured Bruce the position of “Historiographer to the East India Company,” 
thrusting the former academic (permanently, it would turn out) from the world of 
libraries, lecture halls, and publicity, into that of government, anonymity, and 
paperwork.20  
The path that Bruce traversed to imperial and state bureaucracy establishes that he 
was a significant beneficiary of a broader culture of patronage that brought so many of 
his fellow Scots into government service during the eighteenth century. Like Bruce, many 
of these figures owed their positions to their ties to Henry Dundas.21 As is also well 
known, many Scots involved in the Company, including Thomas Munro, Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, and John Malcolm, also wrote about India’s history. While Bruce might 
appear to fit among these figures, he in fact does not. Unlike them, Bruce had no direct 
experience of Indian culture, no knowledge of Indian languages, and was not principally 
writing in the model of conjecturalist Enlightenment historiography in which the work of 
all three fit.22 For similar reasons, Bruce’s endeavor was also distinct from the long 
                                                                                                                                            
Publications,” The Westminster Magazine, Monthly and Critical Review, February 1785, 98. In an odd turn 
of events, Beaufoy subsequently became Secretary to the East India Company’s Board of Control; after 
reading Bruce’s Historical View, he lambasted the “extravagant opinions which are expressed in particular 
passages”: see NAS, GD 51/3/51, “Copy of a Letter [from H Beaufoy] to Mr Barlow dated 4th April 1795.” 
 
20 NAS, GD 152/104/13/16, Henry Dundas to James Finlayson, November 2, 1790. 
 
21 On the entry of Scots into Company and government service, and the particular role of Dundas’ 
patronage, see Marshall, East India Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976), 12-13; G. J. Bryant, “Scots in India in the Eighteenth Century,” Scottish Historical 
Review, 177 (1985), 22-41; J. G. Parker, “Scottish enterprise in India, 1750-1914,” in R. A. Cage (ed.), The 
Scots Abroad: Labour, Capital and Enterprise, 1750-1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 191-219; T. M. 
Devine, “Scottish Élites and the Indian Empire, 1700-1815,” in T. C. Smout (ed.), Anglo-Scottish Relations 
from 1603-1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 213-230; George K. McGilvary, East India 
Patronage and the British State: The Scottish Elite and Politics in the Eighteenth Century (London: Tauris 
Academic Studies, 2008); and Lenman, Enlightenment and Change: Scotland 1746-1832 (1981, 1992; 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 122-123. 
 
22 Martha McLaren, British India & British Scotland, 1780-1830: Career Building, Empire Building, and a 
Scottish School of Thought on Indian Governance (Akron: University of Akron Press, 2001). As such, it is 




tradition of British administrators in India who engaged in scholastic activity, such as 
Henry Thomas Colebrooke and Colin Mackenzie.23  
Bruce’s own path to office, and his bureaucratic output also differed from that of 
his immediate predecessor as Company “Historiographer.” The position was created as a 
reward for someone else: the Orientalist and Company official Robert Orme. Born in 
Travancore to a Company surgeon, Orme had risen in the Company’s administrative 
ranks from an initial 1744 appointment, at the age of thirteen, as a writer.24 Orme’s 
decades of Company service in India provided him with both intimate knowledge of 
Indian culture and geography, as well as the opportunity to collect manuscript and 
archival material. Company service also connected Orme to Robert Clive, whom he first 
met in 1753. Through Clive’s patronage and friendship, Orme ascended the ranks of 
Company bureaucracy, enabling him to complete the History of the Military Transactions 
of the British in India. In this work, the first volume of which appeared in 1763 to 
widespread public acclaim, Orme offered a heroic chronicle celebrating the British defeat 
of France and its Indian allies during the Seven Years’ War. The printing of the work was 
orchestrated by the Court of Directors as both an act of public relations, and as an effort 
to generate useful knowledge for bureaucrats. As George Colebrooke, chairman of the 
Company, explained, the Company’s intention in financing the printing of Orme’s history 
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23 E. T. Stokes, “The Administrators and Historical Writing on India,” in C. H. Philips, (ed.), Historians of 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 385-403; Rama Sundari Mantena, 
The Origins of Modern Historiography in India: Antiquarianism and Philology, 1780-1880 (New York: 
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24 On the office of “writer,” see Marshall, “British Society in India under the East India Company,” Modern 




was to provide “Information & Instruction” for its “servants abroad as well as for the 
public Good.” By publishing Orme’s work, Colebrooke believed the Company would 
ensure “a fair & Candid Representation of their Transactions in India” to the public. To 
that end, in 1769, Orme was appointed as “Historiographer” to the Company, an office 
created for him which enabled him to access “the Records of the Company” to use “as . . 
. necessary” in his future work, and modeled on the ancient office of “Historiographer 
Royal,” an office created in 1661 that granted the occupant the right to access state papers 
as sources for writing histories.25 Orme’s activity in this office–the composition of the 
second volume of his History of the Military Transactions (published in 1778), as well as 
several other works including Historical Fragments of the Mogul Empire (1782)–firmly 
fall into a broader tradition of Enlightenment-era scholarly production on India.26 
Certainly, there are some similarities between Orme and Bruce’s careers. Like 
Bruce, Orme attained his position as a consequence of powerful patronage. Furthermore, 
Bruce would have identified with Orme’s self-conception as one of the “public Officers” 
of the Company: both Bruce and Orme used the office of historiographer to promote the 
Company’s interests in the public sphere through the publication of historical writing.27 
                                                
25 BL, IOR, E/1/214, George Colebrooke, East India House, to Robert Orme, August 2, 1769, 221; and BL, 
IOR, B/85, Meeting of the Court of Directors, August 2, 1769, 137-138. See also BL, IOR, E/1/52, Robert 
Orme to Colebrooke, August 3, 1769, 452, thanking the Court of Directors for the appointment and its 
granting of “permission . . . of consulting their records.” On the “historiographer royal,” see Denys Hay, 
“The Historiographers Royal in England and Scotland,” Scottish Historical Review, 30 (1951), 15-29, who 
notes that the actual duties of the office were vague, and that it was treated as a sinecure. See also Antii 
Matikkala, The Orders of Knighthood and the Formation of the British Honours System, 1660-1750 
(Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press, 2008), 262-265. 
 
26 On Orme, see Asoka SinhaRaja Tammita-Delgoda, “‘Nabob, Historian and Orientalist: The Life and 
Writings of Robert Orme (1728-1801),” PhD dissertation, University of London, 1991, esp. chapters 4, 5, 
and 8; as well as Nicholas B. Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain 
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Bruce read and used Orme’s History as one the many sources of knowledge he consulted 
in his own researches.28 Yet, the differences between Orme and Bruce’s tenures are far 
more striking. Although Bruce drew upon Orientalist writings in his own work, his 
purpose was to inform the making of policy and the conduct of administration, not 
principally scholarship. Unlike Orme, Bruce had no personal experience of India and, 
indeed, little knowledge of it prior to attaining his position; and also unlike Orme, Bruce 
remained publicly anonymous in his own lifetime.29 Although some of Bruce’s writings 
served to promote the public image of the Company, most of it appeared in manuscript, 
as policy briefs for the information of administrators, especially Dundas; and when 
Bruce’s words did appear in print, this was because of a specific rationale tied to the 
pursuance of a policy or political end. Orme’s work, by contrast, was far more closely 
aligned to the production of scholarship on India, and his work fulfilled the goal of 
promoting the Company’s public image. This objective differed from the highly specific 
policy ends to which Company and government officials enlisted Bruce to write reports. 
The difference between these successive occupants of the Historiographer’s office lies in 
the distinction between a scholarly beneficiary of institutional patronage, and a 
bureaucrat writing in order to satisfy administrative imperatives.   
                                                
28 For Bruce’s notes on Orme’s History, see NAS, GD 152/44/4.  
 
29 Once in the position of “Historiographer,” however, Bruce attempted to acquire some basic knowledge of 
Persian: see NAS, GD 152/223/3, Bruce draft letter to Henry Dundas, December 31, 1789: “I am reading 
different works on Indian affairs, acquiring as much of the Persian language as may enable me to 





In his work as Company historiographer, Bruce benefitted from an extremely 
sophisticated system of record management.30 At its headquarters in Leadenhall Street, 
the Company possessed an enormous amount of written information about imperial 
endeavors in Asia that was largely well organized; moreover, from the mid-1780s, the 
Company’s collection of such information in India had become more extensive, 
deliberate, and organized thanks to administrative reforms undertaken by the likes of 
Cornwallis and Wellesley.31 The Company’s metropolitan archive overlay a 
sophisticated, highly rule-bound system of writing and circulating correspondence 
between India and Britain, facilitated by Company ships (though not a regular packet 
service until after the 1833, by which point the Company had lost all of its monopoly 
privileges), complete with explicit expectations for overseas bureaucrats as to the forms 
and language in which paperwork was to be composed.32 In India itself, the Company 
developed a complex system of administrative paperwork, built upon the labor of a vast 
array of scribes and clerks. As the Company established its footing in India, it effectively 
absorbed extant systems of administrative communication by turning native clerks into 
imperial servants, appropriating the deeply embedded forms of training and expectations 
for bureaucratic performance, as well as the typologies of paperwork, that Mughal rulers 
had developed in the centuries before colonization.33 The Company’s metropolitan 
                                                
30 This paragraph relies on Martin Moir, A General Guide to the India Office Records (London: The British 
Library, 1988); and H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 
1758-1833 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), esp. 151-174. 
 
31 Bayly, Empire and Information, 6-9, 54. 
 
32 Bowen, Business of Empire, 157. 
 
33 See Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “The making of a Munshi,” Comparative Studies of 
South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 24 (2004), 61-72; Rajeev Kinra, “Master and Munshī: A Brahman 




management of paper was initially disorderly; but beginning in 1720, the Court of 
Directors instructed its clerks to order and arrange the records for the purpose of use in 
decision-making; and the importance of the task continued to be reiterated and specified 
by the Court in subsequent years.34 To address the increased volume of correspondence 
generated by the Company’s receipt of the grant of the diwani to Bengal, Bihar, and 
Orissa in 1765, the Court of Directors created the position of Examiner of Indian 
Correspondence in 1769. They appointed Samuel Wilks to this position with instructions 
“to inspect, examine and make the necessary References to and Observations on the 
Important Branches of the Indian Correspondence” in response to its “Directions.”35 The 
next year, the Directors appointed George Oldmixon as “Compiler and Writer of the 
Company’s Foreign Correspondence with their Settlements in the East Indies.”36 In 1771, 
William Barnett was appointed the first Register and Keeper of India Records, with the 
direction to “arrange, number and register” the otherwise “confused and disorderly” 
“Books, Records and Accounts of the several Presidencies and Factories in the East 
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35 BL, IOR, D/26, Meeting of the Committee of Correspondence, November 1, 1769, 33-34. The 
Examiner’s Office was also tasked with drafting many of the Court of Directors’ dispatches: see Moir, 
“The Examiner’s Office and the Drafting of East India Company Despatches,” in Kenneth Ballhatchet and 
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Indies,” “deposited in the Book Office” of India House, and “consisting of many 
thousand Volumes, which are annually increasing.” The rationale for creating the 
position was precisely on the grounds that “frequent recourse” to such records was 
“necessary” to governance.37 The Company’s systematic organization of its records for 
use was enhanced through further bureaucratic innovation during the late 1780s. In 
response to a 1786 proposal from Thomas Wilks, assistant examiner of Indian 
correspondence and records, and the son of Samuel Wilks, the Company divided the role 
into two distinct offices: a Register of Company Records and a Keeper of Company 
Records. Thomas Wilks bemoaned the disordered state of the records, and suggested the 
appointment of a keeper to organize the archives so administrators could consult them for 
“general reference and utility.”38 The Court of Directors adopted Wilks’ proposal in 
March 1787, and from the next year, the positions were separated, with Wilks occupying 
the role of Register, succeeded by his brother William from 1791. Both men engaged in 
the work of organizing, indexing, and transcribing the records.39 
Thanks to these reforms, Bruce confronted a Company archive that had already 
been organized precisely to fulfill the end to which he now put it: “general reference and 
utility” in administrative governance. On September 6, 1789, Bruce sent Dundas a “Plan 
for forming a History of British Affairs in the East Indies,” that would be “prepared from 
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the Materials furnished by Mr. Dundas.” This projected history would encompass three 
parts: the first, a “History of the Events which explain the State of the British Affairs in 
the East Indies” from the establishment of British territorial power in Hindostan to the 
present; the second, a “History of the East India Company” from its origins to the 
present; and the third, a survey of the plans “suggested for the Government of India, after 
the Charter of the Company, shall have expired.” As Bruce indicated in his plan, the 
projected “History” was intended to provide Dundas with a survey of the possible forms 
of government for India after the expiry of the Company’s charter, set to expire in 1793, 
and to advance a case for its renewal.40 In an accompanying letter, Bruce explained both 
his method of labor and progress on this project. Having received Dundas’ approval for 
the “outline” of the history, Bruce was now “at work, ten hours every day” giving the 
proposed “Contents the form of historical detail, with proper references to authorities,” 
found in the “papers” of the Company’s archive. Once this had been completed, Bruce 
wrote, he would “give to the whole” work “that Copiousness of Matter, and simplicity of 
Style, which may either fit it to remain as a State paper with your Board, or to be laid, at 
your & their orders, before the Public.”41  
Bruce elaborated upon the specific written records required for the composition of 
this history in a 1791 memo addressed to William Cabell, then Henry Dundas’ private 
secretary. Dundas had sought a history of the Company’s affairs from before the fall of 
the Mogul Empire in 1747, then from that point to the rise of Hindostan in the mid-1760s, 
and finally from that period up to the present. In order to “fulfill Mr Dundas’ 
                                                
40 NAS, GD 51/3/30/1, “Mr Bruce’s Plan for forming a History of British Affairs in the East Indies,” ff. 
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instructions” for the history, Bruce stated that while he was “in possession of Materials 
(or nearly so) which will fully answer the purposes of Mr Dundas’ instructions to him 
respecting the two first of these periods,” but sought Cabell’s help in procuring several 
other kinds of documents, including “the Company’s abstracts of their Correspondence to 
and from Bengal & Madras” and “to and from Bombay” from the late 1760s to the 
establishment of the Board of Control; the abstracts of the Company’s Sumatra, China, 
and East Indies correspondence, and any further evidence of plans for the “future 
government, & India, or regulation of the Trade to the East Indies” that had previously 
been drawn up. Such material, Bruce wrote, would enable him could “give the past of the 
Subject as fully as possible, that [Dundas’] own plan [for the work] may come out as a 
result from the fullest evidence.” All “papers” that Cabell could “furnish” Bruce would 
“enable” him “to meet, & to fulfill Mr Dundas’s orders, or general instructions to him.”42 
Bruce would continue to submit further requests to Cabell for more contents from the 
Company archives to facilitate the completion of the history.43 At the same time, Bruce 
was also actively conducting research in the State Paper Office on the records contained 
therein to complement his research on Company records.44 
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Over the course of the summer of 1791, Bruce wrote memos and drafts of what 
would become the Historical View of Plans for the Government of British India and 
Regulation of Trade to the East Indies, and Outlines of a Plan of Foreign Government, 
Of Commercial Oeconomy, and of Domestic Administration, for the Asiatic Interests of 
Great Britain. On September 24, 1791, he send Dundas and Pitt several of these drafts, 
noting in a letter to Dundas that “it will, indeed, be the most proud moment of my life, if I 




shall be honoured [sic] with your & with his approbation.” He also informed Dundas that 
in researching the work, he had also devised a plan for unifying the respective archives of 
Company and state. If appointed as “Keeper of the State Paper Office,” Bruce promised 
he would “in the first instance, connect Indian Affairs with that Department, and in the 
next, devote my future studies & industry to bring the whole of it, into a regular 
system.”45 In these “Regulations for the Indian Branch of the State Paper Office,” Bruce 
proposed placing “abstracts” of the history of Indian affairs with reference to 
correspondence and treaties that existed in manuscript copy within the archive. The 
material was to be “methodised” such that “extracts” from it could be “taken” when 
necessary. Bruce ended the memorandum by detailing his own role. “As Keeper of this 
Office, when required by the Secretary of State, or by the India Board, I shall examine 
the archives & make reports, and upon the same plan, shall arrange the transactions, 
Treaties &c: of Great Britain with the different European powers,” Bruce wrote. He 
concluded by emphasizing that the Colbertist archive at Versailles was his “model” for 
this reorganization: “It was, in this way, the French State Papers were simplified” under 
Colbert, he concluded.46 Although Bruce’s reform would not be directly undertaken at 
this point, it was eventually (as this chapter will discuss).  
Bruce’s Historical View was not a general history of British involvement in India, 
though Bruce would continue to work on such a project over the course of his career.47 
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Rather, the Historical View was a summary of the various plans that had been proposed 
for governing India. The work was specifically intended to provide Dundas with 
historical precedents for the renewal of the EIC’s charter and to circulate such precedents 
to the public as arguments that the Company’s interests and those of the British state 
were aligned; and that, therefore, the charter of the Company ought to be renewed. While 
the arguments contained in the text are significant in the intellectual history of the 
Company, the Historical View matters to a history of imperial paperwork in the British 
empire for a somewhat different reason: Bruce’s account of his method of composition, 
and the bureaucratic practices he used the text to further.  
The methodological hallmark of the text lay in Bruce’s mobilization of 
bureaucratic records as the authority upon which future strategies of imperial governance 
and strategy could be based; and the use of both state archives and the cultivation of 
Company, state, and non-official sources as the suppliers of this knowledge. “The 
authorities upon which” the Historical View “rests,” Bruce wrote in work’s preface, 
“have been obtained either from the records of the Company and from the archives of the 
State, or from the communications of those whose official and local knowledge qualify 
them to aid their country upon this important occasion.”48 The production, publication 
                                                                                                                                            
Historical View, however, included an “Advertisement” before the title page stating that “in a short time 
will be published a History of the Affairs of Great Britain in the East Indies,” with an “Appendix” 
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(especially when and why they might be circulated privately, and when in the public sphere), lies beyond 
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(by John Sewell and John Debrett, the latter conventionally considered a Whig 
sympathizer), and circulation of the Historical View was, in Bruce’s intention, supposed 
to regularize and systematize precisely such a circuit of imperial information, predicated 
upon collecting “records,” “archives,” and “communications”; and then using them as 
bureaucratic “authorities.” In distributing copies to key Company servants in 1793, Bruce 
presented the work as an item of exchange for documents to further government interest. 
Sending a “Box of Books” containing a copy of the Historical View to Alexander 
Adamson, a Bombay-based member of the EIC’s Marine Board, Bruce requested that 
Adamson “would in [Dundas’] name, present a Copy” of the Historical View to local 
officials, with a particular end in mind: “Mr Dundas’s object is not only that his System 
may be generally understood in your Settlement,” Bruce explained, “but that those 
Gentlemen to whom you may present the Book would in turn, furnish Information on the 
diversified Subjects of the political & Commercial History of the Countries within the 
Company’s limits” as well as “Information respecting bordering on the Gulfs of Arabia & 
Persia,” and “above all, respecting the Districts which our recent Conquests have 
subjected to your Government.”49 Bruce made similar overtures to other bureaucrats, 
including Sir John Shore (governor general of Bengal) and Charles Oakeley (governor of 
Madras); and to scholarly figures like William Jones.50  
                                                                                                                                            
Relating to the East India Company; With an Appendix Containing Acts and Parts of Acts, Relating to 
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49 BL, IOR/H/456e, Bruce to Alexander Adamson, May 16, 1793, 1-2. 
 
50 BL, IOR/H/456e, Bruce to John Shore, May 17, 1793, 5-7; Bruce to William Jones, May 17, 1793, 9-10; 
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Dundas used the occasion of the Historical View’s completion to push the EIC 
Court of Directors to appoint Bruce to the official position of “Historiographer of the East 
India Company.” The possession of the office would, Dundas wrote to the Court, furnish 
Bruce with “the benefit of a free access to the ancient records of the Company,” 
“essential to the Work in which, under my direction, he is now engaged.”51 The Court 
officially appointed Bruce as “Historiographer” on July 10, 1793.52 Bruce now lobbied 
the Company’s Directors to adopt his proposal for turning its archive that served as an 
active research site where documents could be used to inform immediate policy planning. 
He had first articulated this idea in a 1791 proposal for “Regulations for the Indian 
Branch of the State Paper Office.” Bruce saw the office as the formalization of a specific 
approach to the archive. “As Keeper of this Office, when required by the Secretary of 
State, or by the Board [of Directors], I shall examine the archives & make reports,” and 
to that end arrange the office’s papers.53 Enabled by his official appointment, Bruce now 
pushed his proposal forward. Writing to William Devaynes, chairman of the EIC, in late 
October 1793 on “the measures which have occurred to me” as “necessary” to “fulfill my 
Duties” as “Historiographer,” Bruce requested “a proper Apartment, at the India House, 
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which should become a Deposit for whatever Information I may procure, and to which I 
may desire from your various Offices my diversified Materials” so that he could “form 
them into Chronological Order.” Bruce explained:  
It is here proper for me, to lay before you the line of Duty, which I feel my Office 
imposing upon me. As I advance in collecting & compiling the History of your 
Affairs, I propose to draw up Precies [sic] of Subjects that I may be in a situation 
to make any Researches which the successive occurrences in your business may 
require: and I propose also as the Volumes of the History shall be finished to 
submit them, to the Court’s corrections and Approbation, that they may come to 
Government and to the Public under its Authority.-54  
 
Here, Bruce articulated the role of Company historiographer as the provider of 
documents to government to meet the ‘requirements’ of the “successive occurrences” of 
administration. The archive, in Bruce’s view, was not a repository of the dusty 
documentation of past political activity, but rather a forward-looking site from which the 
knowledge of administrative history–in the material form of ‘state papers,’ rather than as 
an abstract conception of political ‘tradition’ or constitutional ‘spirit’–would allow 
government to address its present and future “business.” Indeed, Bruce and Dundas had 
sought to use documents to meet precisely these ends in the Historical View. How did 
Bruce apply this approach to problems of imperial governance during the rest of the 
1790s?   
 
Planning Imperial Government from Documents: Dutch Precedent and the 
Administration of the Cape of Good Hope 
 Bruce’s work in government consisted of provisioning reports, memos, and letters 
to Dundas and other ministers providing (in some instances) advice on specific 
unresolved questions of administration, and (on other occasions) support for extant 
                                                




policies and official views. On many of the significant issues that arose in domestic and 
imperial government during the 1790s–from the suppression of domestic radicalism55; the 
maintenance of European and imperial order against the destabilizing and aggressive 
threat of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France56; national defense against French 
invasion57; the reform of the India army58; Company finance59; and union with Ireland,60 
                                                
55 NAS, GD 152/40, John Bruce, “Progress of the Levelling [sic] Opinions in Great Britain, Illustrated by 
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58 BL, IOR/A/2/11A, Bruce, “Observations on Lord Cornwallis’ Dispatches of April 2d 1790 for The Right 
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Bruce provided government officials with information, arguments, analysis, and plans for 
action derived from documentary authorities. Dundas commissioned these reports from 
Bruce in response to some proximate political crisis, controversy, or development, which 
Bruce in turn addressed in his research and writing. In each of these reports, therefore, 
Bruce sought to fulfill particular intentions dictated to him by Dundas; but all of these 
documents shared two qualities. First, few of them were published for public 
consumption, and what was published did not generally appear with Bruce’s name 
attached. Instead, his writings circulated privately among ministers or within bureaucratic 
networks for the exclusive use of administrators–they remained “state papers.” Second, 
Bruce’s reports were all grounded in a hyper-empirical strategy of extensive citations 
from, and discussions of, archival documents as argumentative authorities. These 
characteristics of Bruce’s bureaucratic style can be examined concretely by tracing his 
production of one of these reports: a plan for establishing a government at the Cape of 
Good Hope, in which Bruce sought to channel the experience of the region’s previous 
rulers–the Dutch–into a set of precedents to guide British governors of the colony.  
Bruce was significantly acquainted with Dutch history and culture: he had 
travelled to the Netherlands in the 1770s, and compiled a history of Dutch government 
for his own private reference.61 As he explained in the Historical View, the historical 
experience of the Dutch Empire in the East Indies held particular utility as a model, at 
times advisory and at others cautionary, for the English East India Company’s own 
enterprise. Like the British, the Dutch inhabited a territory “which did not afford 
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provisions” requisite to support its expanding population; hence, Bruce wrote, the Dutch 
made “maritime” endeavor their “principal pursuit.” The Dutch had successfully “sent 
their armed ships to the East, established factories,” “erected . . . several, but connected 
East-India Companies,” and managed to become “the rivals and supplanters of the power 
and influence of the Portuguese,” dominating Western trade with the East Indies.62 Once 
Britain had established a commercial trade with the East Indies, Bruce wrote, its pattern 
of commerce “was conducted on nearly the same footing with that of the Dutch; that is, 
exporting treasure and manufactured produced, and importing, either directly from India 
or China, or circuitously from the former and latter country Asiatic produce for the 
Europe market.”63 In its formative years, the English EIC had constantly “imitated” the 
Dutch “nation by trading on a joint stock”; consequently, the EIC’s “commercial 
importance began to increase, and the demands for British exports . . . to become 
greater.”64 If, Bruce reasoned, “the system” of government best “fitted for the 
preservation of the British East-India trade” “must arise out of the nature of that trade, 
and can only be established on the events which have brought the trade to its present 
extent and magnitude,” then the Dutch East India Company–its history and its 
administrative practices–provided the referential lens through which a plan of British 
imperial governance could be developed thanks to the analogy between their respective 
historical experiences.  
At the end of 1795, the shifting tectonics of imperial politics resulted in an 
opportunity for Bruce to bring this conviction in the utility of the Dutch example to bear 
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upon British practice. In September 1795, Britain defeated the newly created Batavian 
Republic (allied with Britain’s principal enemy, revolutionary France) at the Cape of 
Good Hope. Newly in control of the former Dutch colony at the Cape, the British faced 
the challenge of administering the territory in a manner consonant with the East India 
Company’s trading monopoly: administrators confronted the question of whether the 
products of the Cape fell within the EIC’s exclusive monopoly or could be subject to free 
trade. Henry Dundas possessed “no doubt,” as he wrote in early 1796, “that the Cape 
Town, the Port of Exportation from the Cape is not within the limits of the East India 
[Company’s] Charter,” and that “any Agitation of the question should be avoided.”65 To 
solidify this position, Dundas sought a report from Bruce outlining the history of Dutch 
imperial administration at the Cape. Bruce, who had been in the midst of preparing a 
different report for Dundas on reforming the Indian army, was now “obliged to direct my 
attention to the Cape of Good Hope,” and produce a “Historical Sketch” of it for Dundas’ 
“use.”66 Dundas then gave a copy of the resulting report to Lord George Macartney, the 
newly appointed British governor of the Cape, in advance of his departure from London 
to take up the office (which Macartney held from May 1797 to November 1798).67 
Bruce and Dundas endeavored to collect documents upon which such a history 
could be written. They began by canvassing potential deposits within Britain itself. 
Dundas, for example, wrote to a Parliamentary commission charged with administering 
the disposal of all Dutch property seized as prize goods to ask them for “any Charts or 
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Books of the Dutch Possessions in the East India” that they might have obtained.68 The 
commissioners provided an extensive amount of statistical documents of Dutch East 
India Company (hereafter, VOC) accounting and political records from the 1790s 
concerning trade and governance at Batavia, Cochin, and other key locales, alongside 
several copies of internal VOC annual reports “on the state of Dutch Affairs in the East 
Indies.”69 Bruce used his access to both the EIC archives and the State Paper Office to 
gather copies of documents related to subjects ranging from territorial negotiations 
between the British and Dutch that had occurred simultaneously over control of the 
Pacific island of Amboyna to that of the Cape itself.70 Although Bruce transcribed or 
wrote summaries of many of these documents, making them potentially useful for 
research, these state archives appear to have provided him with limited information about 
Dutch imperial activities at the Cape, a circumstance that his Company contacts 
recognized.71 “In drawing up the account of the Cape of Good Hope you would 
undoubtedly find much difficulty from the contents of materials which were immediately 
within your reach,” Alexander Adamson, a bureaucrat on the EIC’s Marine Board, would 
later write to the historiographer. “The means however of overcoming these are now 
happily within the power of Mr Dundas,” Adamson continued, for Dundas’ powerful 
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position within the Company would enable Bruce to obtain “abundant information on the 
subject, not only clear, but authentic.”72 
Adamson was correct. Bruce’s connection to Henry Dundas facilitated his 
collection of valuable material by enabling the Historiographer to leverage the power of 
Company bureaucracy to collect documents. Indeed, the most important of these sources 
was the Secretary of State’s nephew, Philip Dundas, governor of Bombay. Upon 
ascending to the office of Historiographer, Bruce had established a correspondence with 
Philip Dundas, recruiting him as a key contact whose proximate position and connections 
to “instructed servants” of the Company on the ground, possessed of “the advantage of 
local observation and knowledge,” made him capable of provisioning Bruce with “the 
fullest information” on subjects related to “the general interests of the East India 
Company.”73 From 1794, Philip Dundas regularly dispatched documents obtained 
through his position in India back to Bruce in London, intending to supplement what the 
historiographer could gather through his “unrestrained access” to the records of India 
House and other metropolitan repositories.74 Philip Dundas proved particularly helpful in 
provisioning material on the VOC. In October 1795, British troops captured the Dutch 
factory of Cochin, in Kerala, and Philip Dundas subsequently sent Bruce “some Papers” 
the British had found in the former Dutch fort, including a “translation” of a lengthy “M. 
S. S. in the Dutch Company’s Records” consisting of instructions written in 1677 by  
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Hendrik van Rheede, the Dutch botanist and governor of Malabar, to his successor, which 
contained a detailed description of the practices of Dutch imperial governance and 
information on the region.75 
Henry Dundas also supplied Bruce with relevant documents on the Cape held in 
the Secretary of State’s office. Most significant among these were copies of Dundas’ 
correspondence with the three military officers–Lieutenant General Alured Clarke, 
Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone, and Major-General J. H. Craig–who spearheaded 
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the British takeover of the Cape. True to normal bureaucratic practice, these officers 
dispatched regular written updates on their endeavors to London administrators as they 
established control at the Cape in late December 1795. These letters served as a running 
commentary on the state of the Dutch establishment and the resources extant at the Cape, 
especially those of Craig, who had been appointed commander of affairs at the Cape 
immediately after the British takeover, and who provided Dundas with extensive 
information about the organization of Dutch administration there. Other Company 
officials, especially the EIC marine officer John Cochrane, furnished Bruce with letters 
and documents containing information on what Cochrane described as “the Political 
Advantages of the Cape of Good Hope to Great Britain,” especially stressing its potential 
productivity as a supply site for the British West Indies and trading outpost that would 
“furnish a revenue” “fully adequate to the expences [sic] of Settlement.” Like the military 
officials who wrote to Dundas, Cochrane in his exchanges with Bruce emphasized 
connections between Dutch government at the Cape, and the region’s utility to British 
imperial interests: the Cape’s strategic centrality would provide “stability to [British] 
Possessions in India,” since it had proved useful to the Dutch in assisting the French in 
“meet[ing] our Fleets in India.”76 
Bruce also reached beyond EIC and official networks to his personal connections 
to obtain material knowledge on the Cape, and especially about Dutch administrative 
practices there. A key source was Sir Joseph Banks, president of the Royal Society, who 
had visited the Cape in 1771 while accompanying Captain Cook on his circumnavigation 
of the globe, and who Bruce was personally acquainted after the Society rewarded him 
                                                





with a membership in 1793 recognition of the achievement of the Historical View.77 
Bruce solicited Banks’ replies to a questionnaire concerning “the geography and 
topography of the Cape,” “the extent of the Dutch Settlements,” “the State of the 
Fortifications,” and the potential for “the natural Productions of the Colony” to serve as 
“Raw Materials to the Manufactures of Great Britain.” In particular, Bruce asked Banks 
for information on the administrative practices of the Dutch government at the Cape. His 
questionnaire to Banks included requests for information on “the Military Force which 
the Dutch have employed at the Cape,” the “dependence” of the Cape “upon the 
Directors of the Dutch East India Company in Europe,” and for an account of the “best 
Authorities, for a correct Account” “of the Dutch East India Settlements,” both at the 
Cape and throughout the rest of its empire. Banks replied with an extensive description of 
the territorial extent of the Dutch settlement at the Cape; and an account of its 
manufactures and productions (especially the growing trade in Cape wine), the character 
of the Dutch administrative establishment, and the struggles of the Dutch to construct 
adequate fortifications to defend the settlement.78 Finally, Bruce had access to a variety 
of published sources on the VOC from which he also drew information on its Cape 
colony, including François Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien, a five volume history 
of the Dutch VOC written by a former minister who had travelled across the Dutch 
empire in the East Indies, and which had appeared between 1724 and 1726; Peter Kolb’s 
The Present State of the Good Hope, a two-volume abridged English translation 
published in 1731 of a longer 1719 work by a German astronomer and considered at the 
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time as the most authoritative European source of knowledge on the Khoikhoi, the 
aboriginal inhabitants of the Cape; and the Nieuwe algemeene beschrijving van de Kaap 
de Goede Hoop, a two volume set of extracts taken from the original Dutch edition of 
Kolb’s work published in 1777.   
From these sources, Bruce wrote a report that described the history of Dutch 
government at the Cape from which a blueprint for British administration could be 
derived, informed by the lessons of the Dutch precedent. In the process of research, 
Bruce read, annotated, and digested the paperwork he had collected in order to render it a 
useful source of knowledge, which lead him to recognize gaps in his materials and to 
solicit further information. In November 1796, for example, Bruce presented Dundas 
with a “Retrospect” of the “History of the Dutch East India Company from such 
Documents, as the Paper Office & literary friends have afforded me,” but noted that 
because “the evidence in the last Section is imperfect,” he had sought further official 
“reports” before finalizing the text. Bruce requested that Dundas forward “any 
communication” “received” “in your late dispatches” from the “Cape, which would aid” 
in “rendering” a fuller “Sketch of its history.”79 The ultimate result was a 443 page 
manuscript entitled “Sketches of the Political and Commercial History of the Cape of 
Good Hope,” presented to Lord Macartney, to which Dundas appended a set of 
“Suggestions respecting the Cape of Good Hope” that comprised instructions for its 
administration. Over five sections, Bruce described the geography of the Cape; surveyed 
its natural products; outlined the structure and historical evolution of Dutch “civil, 
criminal, and financial” administration at the Cape; discussed the “Military  
                                                





Establishment” there; and concluded with a set of “Plans for the Government and trade of 
the Cape of Good Hope.”  
How did Bruce use the documents he had collected in his research, especially 
those concerning the Dutch VOC, in writing the report? In a note in the first section (on 
the “Geographical Description of the Cape of Good Hope and progress of the Dutch in 
forming it into a Settlement”), Bruce explained his use of sources. He would rely on 
those “Dutch Authors who are of the highest Authority upon this Subject,” especially the 
Nieuwe algemeene beschrijving van de Kaap de Goede Hoop, which had been 
“recommended” “as being more correct than” Valentijn’s Oud en Nieuw Oost-Indien.80 
Writing on aspects of the history of the Cape settlement upon which there was already an 
extensive and well-established printed literature, unpublished documents would be 
referred to in a specific way: as Bruce explained in the remainder of the reference note, 
“Facts” would be “extracted” from the printed “works” and then “compared” “with the 
Communications from Sir Joseph Banks &c and recently with the Dispatches received by 
Mr Dundas.” For example, describing the bays bounding the Cape, Bruce explained in a 
reference note that he had drawn his information on this point from printed sources, 
because “little improvement seems to have been made upon the old Dutch Maps of the 
Cape, as that to be found in Valentijn has been, with a few variations copied in modern 
charts.” Yet, Bruce continued, “Sir Jos. Banks is of opinion that the Map” derived from 
“Capt. Riou’s Translation of Van Reenens Journal is the most correct Sea Chart of the 
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East Coast of Africa of which the public are yet in possession.”81 Bruce here referred to 
Bank’s own opinion in his reply to Bruce’s queries on the Cape that “the best map of the 
Cape Country is that annexed to Capt. Riou’s Journal of Jacob van Reenen,” a work that 
had been published in 1792.82 Here, paperwork–specifically, Banks’ answers to Bruce’s 
questionnaire–served as a trusted, eyewitness account against which the relative authority 
of competing printed authorities could be measured. In a similar manner, Bruce quoted 
and cited the letters of Major General Craig to Dundas as confirmation of the accuracy of 
the Nieuwe Beschrying’s description of one specific district of the Cape–Van Waveren’s 
Land–as particularly fertile and productive.83 In this geography-focused first section of 
the report, Bruce used paperwork primarily as a mode of verifying the accuracy of the 
knowledge he had derived from printed authorities.  
In the next two sections of the Sketches, which outlined (respectively) the 
commercial potential of the Cape’s natural resources and the structures of Dutch imperial 
administration, Bruce used paperwork as a stand-alone source of fact, rather than a tool of 
verification. In the section on trade, Bruce repeatedly cited the material provided to him 
by Banks, John Cochrane, as well as the answers to Bruce’s questionnaire regarding the 
Cape (the same as had been sent to Banks) obtained (via Pitt’s office) from an obscure 
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82 NAS, GD 152/44/3, “Joseph Banks’ answer to John Bruce’s queries respecting the Cape.” The work 
referred to was published as A Journal of a Journey from the Cape of Good Hope undertaken in 1792, by 
Jacob Van Reenen and other Countrymen, in search of the Wreck of the Hon. the East India Company’s 
Ship the Grosvenor; to discover if there remained alive any of the unfortunate Sufferers. With additional 
Notes, and a Map. By Capt. Edward Riou (London, 1792). 
 





informant named the Chevalier de Font.84 Describing the Dutch cultivations at the Cape, 
Bruce relied almost entirely upon this documentation. For example, the evidence that 
“Wheat, Barley . . . are produced at the Cape in considerable Quantities” by the Dutch; 
that the “cultivatable” quantity of grapes at the Cape was “susceptible of great 
Improvement”; and the substantiation of Bruce’s observation that the “Navy might . . .be 
supplied with any quantity of Salted provisions from the Cape” since “considerable 
quantities” “prepared of the Dutch Shipping” were now abandoned for British use, all 
were substantiated with references to “Mr. Cochrane,” “Sir Jos Banks, and the “Chev. de 
la Font.” 85 
Bruce similarly treated paperwork as a source of authoritative information in his 
description of the organization of Dutch colonial administration at the Cape. Here, he 
relied almost exclusively upon Dundas’ correspondence with the military officers (Craig, 
Elphinstone, and Clarke). Bruce’s citations for his discussion of the respective structures 
of the Dutch treasury, judiciary, and system of land regulation, were all to the 
correspondence from these officers. Indeed, in composing this section of the report, 
Bruce closely copied the descriptions made by the officers in their letters, in some cases 
replicating their words nearly verbatim. For example, Clarke had written to Dundas that 
upon the British seizure of the Cape, the British had confronted a “very awkward and 
distressful Situation” with regard to the system of “Receipts and payments of all public 
Monies,” since (Clarke remarked, in a critical appraisal of Dutch bureaucrats) “those who  
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Detail from Bruce's report on the Cape, KCL edition, demonstrating his citation method 
are charged with the expenditure of public Money are not perfectly upright, and the 
greatest Care is not taken.” Clarke informed Dundas that he had therefore thought it 
necessary that all disbursements should be made through the  
Commissary General, who I talked with and cautioned particularly upon the 
Subject, though we really do not, at present, know how to devise any means to 
remedy it–for if Government was either by an Order, Advertisements for 
Contracts, or in its Payments, to make a distinction in the value of what is 
procured for either hard Money or Paper, it might cause such a depreciation of the 
latter as would become very detrimental to the People of the Colony who possess 
it in general, and to Government, in particular, who probably will not receive any 
other in payment of Taxes &c. for some time to come. This business is of a very 
delicate nature . . .86 
 
In his discussion of the letter, Bruce’s phrasing tracked closely to the original:  
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 At the time of the conquest, such was the outward situation, in which the King’s  
interest in the Colony was placed, from all receipts & payments of Monies being 
made in paper Currency, which had experienced from 15 to 20 p Cent of discount, 
Genl. Clarke thought it necessary to appoint a Commissary General, to see and  
devise Means for remedying the evil, giving it as his opinion, that if any 
distinction was to be made, in the value of what is procured, either for hard 
Money or Paper, that it would cause such a depreciation of the latter, as would be 
detrimental to the people of the Colony in general, and to the Government in 
particular who cannot expect to receive the payment of Taxes but in paper 
Currency, for a considerable time; adding, that the subject is of a delicate nature, 
& ought to be matter for immediate consideration &c regulation.87 
 
Entirely consistent with his earlier referencing practice, Bruce cited ““Genl. Clarke’s 
Letter to Mr Dundas 12 Nov” as his source for this passage. Bruce continued this process 
of compiling, replicating, and summarizing documents in writing the rest of the section; 
true to pattern, Bruce copied the table of the revenues of the Dutch colony at the Cape 
between 1784/5 and 1793/4 enclosed by Elphinstone in his October 24, 1795 letter to 
Dundas into the manuscript, as well as the tables of land tax collected by the Dutch Cape 
government transmitted in (as Bruce wrote in his citation) “M. G. Craig’s Letter to Mr. 
Dundas 18th December 1795.”88 In the geographical section of the manuscript, Bruce had 
used paperwork to corroborate the veracity of printed knowledge; now, in this section on 
Dutch imperial administration, he treated paperwork as a repository of ‘facts’ from which 
an account of extant practices could be derived. Digesting and interpreting a mass of 
sources, Bruce rendered the archive of material he had collected into a narrative for 
administrative use. 
 How did Bruce’s patron, Henry Dundas, use Bruce’s report? In a brief set of 
“Suggestions respecting the Cape of Good Hope,” appended to the beginning of Bruce’s 
report, Dundas explained the ways in which the Dutch experience would be useful for 
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determining British policy toward its new acquisition. Dundas derived complex lessons 
from the Bruce’s account. The British ought not to simply copy the Dutch in their own 
establishment, the Secretary of State argued. In Dundas’ view, the EIC ought to be 
prevented from establishing a direct trading monopoly over the Cape, and especially not 
to follow what he called the Dutch model of “delegate Administration,” by which the 
Dutch VOC had been granted a commercial monopoly over the Cape. While “such a 
delegate Administration was natural for the Dutch to adopt,” Dundas wrote, the 
“propriety of giving over to the East India Company, the entire Government of this 
Settlement” was questionable. While the Dutch had “considered that Settlement in no 
other light but as subservient to their Indian Trade,” and consequently “governed” the 
Cape “upon those principles of grievous and oppressive Monopoly which have always 
marked the policy of the Dutch in India,” such a model was inappropriate for the British 
empire. Indeed, Dundas wrote, the British ought to “adopt a system directly the reverse” 
of the Dutch, and allow the Cape to exist as a free trade zone, “retained in His Majesty’s 
own hands” and “administered by a Government acting under His authority.” 
Paradoxically, Dundas reasoned, this would protect the Company’s monopoly over the 
Indian trade: while any move “to open the Trade to India to every Adventurer who might 
think proper to engage it” would “risk the political situation We hold in India,” Dundas 
believed “those considerations” “in no respect apply to an intercourse with the Cape”: 
there was, in short, “no reason why the Trade between Great Britain and the Cape of 
Good Hope” ought to be “regulated” by an extension of the Company monopoly. 
Gesturing directly to Bruce’s report, Dundas argued that “refer[ring] to the practice of the 




Cape. Outlining a plan for the actual bureaucracy for the future British government of the 
Cape, Dundas referred again to Bruce’s “accompanying Sketch of the Establishments 
under the Dutch Government” as support for his assertion that the extant administrative 
system inherited by the Dutch could be temporarily maintained by the British in the 
immediate future.89 
 Attending contextually to the processes through which Bruce researched, wrote, 
and circulated the “Sketches of the Political and Commercial History of the Cape of 
Good Hope” illustrates how he mobilized documents as active sources in the construction 
of imperial strategy, and the way in which the paperwork he himself produced sought not 
just to facilitate the execution of governance, but indeed to inform its constitution in a 
new imperial space (the Cape). In pursuing this method, Bruce put into practice the view 
of archival governance he had articulated in the context of the production of the 
Historical View. Bruce continued to replicate this process throughout the rest of the 
1790s in writing reports for Dundas and other ministers on other questions of domestic 
and imperial governance, and continuing to utilize official networks to obtain 
administrative paperwork from imperial bureaucrats, especially in relation to his ongoing, 
and unfinished project of writing a comprehensive history of British involvement in 
India.90 By the end of the decade, in fact, he was actively seeking to institutionalize this 
approach through restructuring the state archives themselves.  
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90 See, for example, BL, IOR, E/4/646, Bengal Public Department Records, “Circular,” from Court of 
Directors to Presidencies, March 29, 1797, paragraph 115, instructing Company servants to “transmit” 
“such information on the Chronology, Geography, Government, Laws, Political Revolutions, the 
progressive stages of the useful Arts, Manufactures and Sciences, and of the fine Arts” “in order to enable 






Remaking the State Paper Office: Political and Historical Visions of the Archive, c. 1800 
 As he researched and wrote reports, Bruce labored extensively on the records 
contained in the State Paper Office–established in 1578 under Queen Elizabeth as a 
central archive of state paperwork, located in Whitehall itself–as he rendered its material 
contents usable as authorities and sources of knowledge in his resulting efforts.91 The 
process made Bruce acutely aware of the disorganized state of the records themselves, 
and convinced him that the archive needed to be rearranged to better facilitate the active 
use of its contents for policy planning and justification, similar to the plan he had devised 
in 1791 for the use of the East India Company’s records.92 A year later, Bruce was 
granted the official “Patent” appointing him to an office that would empower him to 
execute that objective: the position of Keeper and Register of State Papers for Life.93 By 
the late 1790s, shaped by his significant reliance on the state and Company archives for 
                                                
91 On the early establishment of the State Paper Office, see R. B. Wernham, “The Public Records in the 
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Society to commemorate the tercentenary of the publication of Dugdale’s Antiquities of Warwickshire 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 11-30; F. Smith Fussner, The Historical Revolution: English 
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“From abbey to archive: managing texts and records in early modern England,” Archival Science, 10 
(2010), 249-266; Michael Riordan, “‘The King’s Library of Manuscripts’: The State Paper Office as 
Archive and Library,” Information & Culture: A Journal of History, 48 (2013), 181-193; and the classic 
accounts by F. S. Thomas, A History of the State Paper Office; With a View of the Documents Therein 
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92 See pages 220-222, as well as NAS, GD 152/223/3/17, Bruce draft letter to Mr. Russell, February 7, 
1790, noting that a “catalogue of the papers actually at the Board, and (could it be had) of those at the India 
House would be of the highest moment – I shall have the subject in view, and lay before you at our first 
private conversation a plan for reducing this scattered branch of public authorities to order, somewhat in the 
manner of the de affairs etrangeres in France; I am perfectly persuaded it will meet the views which I have 
heard you entertain . . .” 
 
93 TNA, SP 45/75, “Patent to John Bruce Esqr, Keeper and Register of Papers of State,” November 15, 





the production of his histories, Bruce sought to use this appointment to fulfill this vision, 
with Henry Dundas’ endorsement and assistance. 
 In mid-1799, Evan Nepean, Dundas’ under-secretary of state, drafted a letter to 
Lord Grenville, foreign secretary, in the name of his boss, summarizing John Bruce’s 
utility to Dundas over the previous decade. Nepean wrote that Dundas had “found it 
indispensably necessary” in the conduct of his office “to have frequent recourse to the 
State Paper office, for information, on various points.” Noting Bruce’s 1792 patent to 
occupy the office, Nepean observed that Bruce’s “Reports” had “opened the means, of 
facilitating the Dispatch of every part of the business, in the various departments of the 
Secretaries of State, to which the Duties of his office are in immediate subservience.” The 
previous June, Dundas had “directed” Bruce “to draw up Regulations, for the Paper 
Office” “to enable him, more effectually to render the King’s archives usefull [sic]“ to 
government, regulations which it would be “of great benefit, to the public service, to 
adopt.” Nepean concluded by asking for Grenville’s support in “establish[ing] Mr Bruce 
fully in his office, under these Regulations” with a salary, “so as to render his 
arrangements and Reports, not only usefull [sic] to the present Secretaries of State but the 
means of preserving the best materials for the future proceedings of Government.”94 
 Dundas had, in fact, been pushing for Bruce’s appointment in this regard for 
several years. In August 1795, for example, Dundas had written to Grenville stressing 
that Bruce ought to be established as keeper “not to be a Sinecure, but to do those very 
duties which Bruce’s Commission supposes to be done by him.” Dundas stressed that 
Bruce had already been using the State Paper Office in such a manner in his researches; 
                                                






the resulting reports had demonstrated not merely the utility of Bruce’s work, but also the 
poor condition of the state archives. Dundas had been “shocked to see that in a Country 
like this it’s ancient Muniments should be going so rapidly to destruction”; with Bruce’s 
appointment, these archives could both be better used and preserved.95 
Bruce’s salaried establishment as Keeper of State Papers became official at the 
start of 1800, positioning him to implement the “Regulations” that Dundas alluded to in 
his letter to Grenville. Bruce’s “Regulations” reflected his particular interpretation of the 
evolution of state paperwork in Britain, one he elaborated in a 1799 history of the State 
Paper Office he prepared alongside his plan for its reform. According to Bruce, official 
documents had been collected and preserved in that office for a long period, but only 
under Henry VIII was the position of “Keeper or Register of Papers” established by royal 
appointment. During Henry’s reign, Bruce wrote, the state papers were kept in “Rooms, 
over the Old Gateway at Whitehall.” However, in examining the records of the State 
Paper Office itself, Bruce stated that he had been unable to locate “any authentic 
Documents” evincing that “any Regulations were framed, for arranging the Royal 
Archives” upon the establishment of the office, beyond the principle that the library was 
known as the “King’s Library of Manuscripts, regarding Matters of State and Council.” 
According to Bruce, a situation of general disorganization, including the deposit of 
bureaucratic records across several different offices, had persisted in the management of 
state archives well through the appointments of several other Keepers until February 
1714, when Hugh Howard assumed the position. Howard had made the first effort to 
“bring the whole together,” order the papers into the form of a “Library” within 
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Whitehall, and collect official papers intermingled into the private archives of former 
Keepers and Secretaries of State. The next major development in Bruce’s account of the 
institutional management of government documents occurred during the reign of Queen 
Anne, when a position of “Collector and Transmitter of Papers of Council and State” was 
appointed as an “intermediate office” between the Secretaries of State and the State Paper 
Office. The Transmitter’s role was to receive state paperwork from the undersecretaries 
and first clerks of the different government departments from “20 years back,” and 
forward it to the Paper Office to be “methodized and digested” into chronological order. 
But the execution of this process had proceeded in a largely haphazard manner because 
the Keeper lacked “proper Rooms into which to receive the Papers,” and no funding to 
hire clerks or deputies. Absent any bureaucratic capacity to organize them, the Office’s 
records had been dumped in “Rooms adjoining to the Board of Trade.” The situation 
persisted until 1750, at which point an unrelated effort to renovate part of Whitehall 
“brought about a temporary Change in the Situation of the Public Archives.” The papers 
were now found to be in a “State of Decay, and in danger of perishing,” leading to their 
division between a room in the Treasury (where many now still remained) and rooms 
adjoining the Board of Trade in an effort at better maintenance. Upon the dissolution of 
the Board in 1782, these papers began a migration that eventually saw them land in an 
Old Waste House in Middle Scotland Yard rented by the government, where Bruce 
reported that they now stood.96 
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 An effort was ongoing, Bruce wrote, “to arrange and methodize the Papers” 
through a specially appointed, small commission of two and sometimes three people. 
However, Bruce indicated, the truly significant reorganization of the state papers would 
come through his own efforts. According to Bruce, his predecessor in the office of 
Keeper, Stanier Porten, “does not appear to have taken part in the Business of the State 
Paper Office,” a point which Bruce buttressed by quoting from and citing a statement 
made by Porten before a Parliamentary commission investigating clerical emoluments in 
which the former keeper had admitted that he had treated the office as a “Sinecure.”97 
(Indeed, Porten’s account had led the commission to recommend abolishing the office of 
Keeper.)98 
 In the 1799 report, Bruce described his own appointment and labor as Keeper as 
very different from Porten’s. Upon his appointment, and “under the orders of Mr. 
Secretary Dundas and the Duke of Portland,” Bruce wrote that he had “made researches 
at the Paper Office, and Reports on the different Subjects, upon which precedents were 
required” for the administration. He had also not concerned himself with the 
commissioners in charge of binding and organizing the papers, per say, but rather had 
engaged in a set of different tasks, which he described in great detail. Instead of treating 
the State Paper Office as a repository of ancient records, Bruce wrote that he had actively 
used the office by provisioning administrators with document-based information useful 
for decision-making. Upon receiving Orders from the Secretaries or Under Secretaries of 
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98 For the recommendation that the SPO be abolished, see Report of the Commissioners Appointed to 
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State” seeking “Precedents” to resolve specific political dilemmas (“existing Cases”), 
Bruce had “directed his Researches, either to the Home Record, or to the Volumes of 
Correspondence with Foreign Powers, compared the circumstances detailed in them, with 
the Acts, or with Treaties which followed, and with the Records of Parliament . . .” 
“[F]rom these Authorities,” Bruce stated, he had “drawn up his Reports” advising the 
ministers upon the appropriate action.  
Furthermore, Bruce reported that had also begun to rearrange the archives 
themselves to better facilitate this work of governing from documentary precedents. 
Following the recommendations of the Commission on organizing the state papers, Bruce 
had sought to rearrange the archives to make them useful to the task of administration, or 
in his words, “to bring his Department, into a Situation, in which his active Duties might 
be useful to his Superiors, the Secretaries of State.” Bruce concluded his report by 
attaching a set of proposed “Regulations for the State Paper Office if Made an Office of 
Reference,” whose adoption would “render this most valuable Deposit of the King’s 
Archives, worthy of the Sovereign of a great Nation.” The term “reference” in this 
context encapsulated Bruce’s idea that his own practices on behalf of Dundas ought to be 
formalized as the mandate of the State Paper Office itself: that the archive ought to be a 
source for constructing and justifying policy, its contents literally ‘referred’ to by 
administrators. 
In these “Regulations,” Bruce proposed to alter the arrangement of the records so 
as to render them “useful” for administrative governance. He suggested that all of the 
foreign correspondence of the British state with European powers be arranged both 




which he termed a “department,” to which it pertained–and chronologically within these 
different geographical organizations. “Abstracts” or “registers” briefly summarizing the 
paperwork in each of these geographic files were also to be created, corresponding to the 
number of the bound volume containing the referenced material. This organization served 
the end of bureaucratic utility: “These Abstracts [were] to be considered as Registers of 
Office,” Bruce wrote, “to which References might be made, as occasions required.” The 
“originals” of all “Treaties” were to be placed alongside the relevant correspondence. 
Imperial paperwork was to be organized according to a similar logic, “formed into 
distinct Branches, America, West Indies, East Indies, &c.” Similar to the European 
diplomatic paperwork, “abstracts” describing the subjects and contents of the 
correspondence were to be drawn up, but these abstracts were to specifically address “the 
period and circumstances which led to the acquisition of the Territory, and to the 
progressive Changes and Improvements which it may have experienced, during each 
Reign.” 
The “Duties of the Keeper” of State Papers–the responsibilities, in short, that 
Bruce envisioned for himself–were to center not on the custodianship of records, but 
rather their active use in shaping policy and political strategy. According to Bruce, the 
Keeper was “to receive the orders of His Majesty’s Ministers, upon any immediate 
occurring Circumstances, which may require an investigation of the National Archives,” 
and to “draw up Reports, in answer to these orders, stating the information which the 
Records of Office furnish”–exactly the sort of report that Bruce had been preparing 




Such Reports, Bruce wrote, “would obviously facilitate public Business.” To support this 
assertion, Bruce directed the reader of his memorandum to an attached “Note.”99 
 In this “Note,” Bruce sought a precedent for this organization of the State Paper 
Office in the approach to state paperwork that had prevailed in absolutist France, 
specifically the Depôt des Affaires étrangères at Versailles. The exemplary figure was 
Louis XIV’s minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Upon his own ascension to administrative 
office, Bruce wrote, Colbert had “found” “that the public Archives, though carefully 
preserved, were often of no use, in the actual Dispatch of Business.” Colbert then moved 
to establish the Depôt with subdivisions of departments, and to arrange state paperwork 
to make it useful for conducting public business.100 Consequently, “when any public 
transaction required a Research for authorities from the State Papers,” French paperwork 
would be actively consultable. Over time, Bruce observed, Colbert’s arrangement had 
fallen into an “imperfect Situation” due to the “Magnitude of the Materials” contained in 
the archive; but successive ministers ultimately improved upon Colbert’s framework, and 
arranged the archives in a manner that directly paralleled the way Bruce now proposed to 
rearrange the state papers of Britain. The French archive had been divided into two key 
departments, one of which preserved “Deeds and Records” establishing French royal 
                                                
99 TNA, SP 45/75, John Bruce, “Regulations for the State Paper Office if Made an Office of Reference,” 
1799. All emphases are in the original. 
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sovereignty over its domestic and foreign territories, and the history of their acquisition; 
and the other which held diplomatic correspondence related to France’s dealings with 
foreign powers, with the papers “chronologically arranged and bound up in Volumes.” 
The role of the Keeper (“Garde”) in the French arrangement was to supply records that 
would inform the pursuit of administrative governance. The Secretaries of State would 
make enquiries for records and information on specific subjects. The “Garde” would then 
undertake (or direct his subordinates to undertake) the requested research, and make a 
report based on the documents advising the Secretary. Under the ministry of the Duc de 
Choiseul in the late 1750s and 1760s, Bruce observed, domestic and foreign paperwork 
had been physically separated, with the foreign correspondence arranged in terms of 
country and in chronological order. “The French always ascribed their quick Dispatch of 
Business, with foreign Nations, as well as the Secrecy of their Cabinet” to this 
organization of the archives. The French model, Bruce wrote, “prevented the bustle 
attending Researches in different Offices,” “rendered the Answers of the King to the 
Memorials of Foreign Powers correct,” and “prevented on all occasions, state secrets 
from being known to the Emissaries or Spies of Foreign Courts.”101  
Bruce’s invocation of what he believed to be Colbert’s method of archival 
organization as the relevant precedent for the centralized reorganization of British state 
paperwork sat alongside his own desire to revivify the original role of the Keeper of State 
Papers in administrative government. The intention behind the chartering of the State 
Paper Office in 1578, and the concomitant creation of a position of ‘clerk’ (later, 
‘keeper’) of papers was the provisioning of useful knowledge from historical records to 
                                                





the Privy Council. Beginning with its initial occupant, Thomas Wilson, holders of the 
office of keeper supplied royal administration with precedents drawn from the official 
archive, rendering English state paperwork (in Nicholas Popper’s words) “a principal 
component of governance.”102 Much like Bruce, Wilson had sought to consolidate control 
of state paperwork in the hands of the office itself, famously endeavoring to seize state 
papers that had been accumulated in the private archive of Sir Robert Cotton.103 Building 
upon practices of official collection, seizure, and use of manuscripts and records by the 
Crown in the aftermath of the dissolution of the monasteries, both Wilson and other 
keepers regularly lent papers from the office out to both administrators as well as 
scholars.104 This provisionary model of using state paperwork for both precedent and 
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Century England,” Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society, 9 (1987), 133, as well as 
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policy-making was institutionally replicated across British administration: from 1726, for 
example, the Treasury established a position of “Keeper of Papers,” which, though 
largely a sinecure, was understood to involve tasks such as methodizing, digesting, and 
arranging the office’s papers “so that he may be ready to inform the Secretaries and 
Clerks of the precedents when necessary.”105 Bruce was well aware of this history 
because he had read the internal records of the keepers dating back to Wilson; annotated 
some of them; and–in the case of warrants and patterns granted to successive keepers–
transcribed selections for his own use as he wrote his “Historical Sketch” and plan for the 
reorganization of the State Paper Office.106  
As with the East India Company’s archive in his position as Historiographer, 
Bruce benefitted in his role as Keeper from extant efforts to arrange and methodize the 
contents of the State Paper Office. Moreover, just as the Company records had been 
arranged for usage long before Bruce appeared on the scene, so too had the efforts to 
organize the files in the State Paper Office been geared toward administrative use. They 
had grown out of the continuity, well into the eighteenth century, of the early modern 
practice of opening up the records of the State Paper Office, located in Whitehall, for the 
use of scholars; and of long established practices of government-sponsored printing of 
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historical state paperwork, though often for official, rather than public use.107 Perhaps the 
most notable scholarly user of the State Paper Office in the eighteenth century was 
Thomas Birch, secretary to the Royal Society, who gained access to the records in the 
late 1740s and 1750s through his friendship with Philip Yorke, second early of 
Hardwicke. Transcribing from the records, Birch used them in the composition of 
published, scholarly histories.108 In the process of using the records, “kept in 4 or 5 
Rooms at the Top of the Turret belonging to the old Gate Way at Whitehall,” Birch and 
Yorke observed that the records were in poor condition. The papers were “poorly bound 
up in Books, & poorly tied in Bundles, which were “ill formed, ill preserv’d, & cover’d 
with Dust.” The catalog was “not exact nor complete,” and they could find “no papers of 
earlier Date than Henry VIII, nor later than Charles II.”109 This concern was reinforced in 
1764, when John Pownall, secretary to the Board of Trade, seeking some old records of 
the Privy Council, was directed by a clerk at the State Paper Office to search for them in 
an abandoned room in Whitehall, and found the state papers in a disorganized, 
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dilapidated condition.110 The immediate response was the establishment of a 
Parliamentary commission helmed by three antiquaries– Sir Joseph Ayloffe, Thomas 
Astle, and Andrew Ducarel–who were instructed “to methodize, regulate and digest the 
said papers and Records and to cause such of them as are decayed and in Danger of being 
destroyed to be bound up and secured, and to make exact Calendars and Indexes” to the 
collection.111 Although an earlier effort had been made in 1732 to organize the records of 
the Tower of London, the 1764 reform represented a much more sustained attempt at 
organizing the public records.112 In the intervening decades, the records commissioners 
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had worked to arrange and methodize the contents of the State Paper Office, drawing up 
calendars and catalogues to facilitate use.113 
Dundas subsequently endorsed Bruce’s recommendations for the rearrangement 
of the State Paper Office; and, advised by the Solicitor General John Freeman-Mitford 
that the adoption of Bruce’s plan would require a modification of the standard patent 
given to the Keeper of State Papers, a new warrant was prepared on January 5, 1800, 
which also officially approved Bruce’s proposed “Regulations.”114 According to the 
warrant, Bruce’s “Regulations” had been drawn up and approved “with a View of 
rendering the State Paper Office more directly and immediately useful as an Office of 
Reference, as also to preserve the Valuable Documents which it contains from the 
Destruction which the present perishing State of many of them give but for much reason 
to apprehend, and to recover, if possible, such as are wanting to fill up the Chasms of 
many important periods of our Political History.”115 The official “Regulations for the 
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State Paper Office” signed by Lord Grenville, Portland, and Dundas, were substantively 
the same as Bruce’s proposed “Regulations for the State Paper Office if Made an Office 
of Reference,” and included the statement that the purpose of the State Paper Office lay 
in supplying the Secretaries of State with paperwork useful to addressing political 
questions: the Keeper was “to receive the Orders of His Majesty’s Secretaries of State, 
upon any immediate, occurring circumstance, which may require and Investigation of the 
King’s Archives.” The official regulations stressed that the documentation contained in 
this archive constituted a tool for administrative decision-making, that access to it ought 
to be restricted to elite officials, and that any request for documents had to be approved 
by the Secretary of State: “No original Paper, after transmission, to be delivered out of 
the Paper Office, except the same shall be required by an Order, under the Hand of one of 
His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State.” A second royal warrant of January 5, 1800 
officially established the salaried positions of Keeper, clerks, housekeeper, and 
messenger for the office.116 
On March 4, 1800, a copy of the Warrant was transferred to Bruce, and the next 
day, Bruce wrote to thank Dundas for the opportunity that he was now officially 
entrusted. Bruce emphasized the importance of Dundas’ support to this professional 
achievement. “When I was first provided for, in Life, by your Patronage, it was my 
Ambition to justify your recommendations,” he wrote. “The same Ambition,” he 
continued, “has uniformly directed me, in the successive duties which you have assigned 
me, and I now beg to assure you, shall invariably guide me, in the Situation, in which, by 
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your liberality, I am about to be placed.”117 A set of rooms on two floors of Whitehall 
were designated for the use of the State Paper Office’s staff, including a large office on 
the first floor for Bruce which included a mahogany writing desk and presses for storing 
papers.118 
Patent in hand, Bruce now commenced the work of reorganizing and rearranging 
the archive to implement his vision of making it useful for administration. Much practical 
work remained to be undertaken on the infrastructure of the State Paper Office itself 
(including fireproofing and repairing the designated rooms in Whitehall, which Bruce 
described as being “in a most ruinous and exposed Situation”).119 But by late summer of 
1800, Bruce was moving to implement his (now official) arrangement. On July 31, Bruce 
wrote to Dundas regarding the complications of negotiating between his own personal 
loyalty to the Secretary of State, and the function of the State Paper Office as one of more 
‘public record.’ A separate Parliamentary committee was set up to publish some of them 
of ‘historical’ interest for public consumption; but unlike the committee on methodizing 
the State Paper Office, the terms of its access to records was unclear.120 The 
commissioners had sent Bruce two resolutions instructing him to move all the records in 
the House of Lords up to the year 1770 to the State Paper Office “to be arranged and 
indexed,” and to “consider and report to this Board” a “Selection” of records intended to 
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form a supplement to the Restoration historiographer Thomas Rymer’s famous Foedera, 
a publication of official records of diplomatic treaties between England and foreign 
powers, by continuing the project to include materials up to the ascension of George II.121  
From Bruce’s standpoint, the commissioners’ letter raised the problem of whether 
the State Paper Office was in fact fitted to the purpose of supplying Parliament with such 
records absent a direct order from the ministry. For Bruce, the question was highly 
significant, for it placed his vision of the office as the proprietary archive of the Secretary 
of State in the balance. If Parliament could request access to records from the State Paper 
Office directly, then it would not be an archive under proprietary ministerial control. 
Forwarding copies of the letters from the Commissioners to Dundas, Bruce explained to 
his patron that the requests posed “a Question of the highest official delicacy” “with 
respect to my duty to His Majesty, and to His Secretaries of State”: 
 Whether, - as the Papers and Records of this Office comprehend all the successive  
Secret Measures of Government in it’s [sic] Internal Administration, and in it’s  
[sic] Political Connexions [sic] with Foreign States, described in my Patent . . .  
this Office can be deemed a Public Record Office?  
Bruce’s had a clear opinion on the subject: the State Paper Office ought to exclusively 
serve administration with paperwork and references–not act as a “Public Record Office.” 
Bruce’s argument relied, like his reports, on citing documentary precedent: he had found 
that an earlier Parliamentary ‘Committee of Records’ formed in 1719 had not considered 
the State Paper Office as one of ‘public record,’ and that “the History of these Papers” 
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since 1719 demonstrated that they were properly the custody of either the King, the Privy 
Council, or the Secretary of State.122  
In the moment, Bruce’s position in favor of leaving the proprietary control of the 
records in ministerial hands triumphed. In late August 1800, John King, undersecretary of 
state, directed Bruce to inform the Parliamentary commissioners that “any directions” for 
supplying documents or records or abstracts and reports on records, “should come from 
His Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of State.”123 Hence, rather than the Commissioners 
selecting the records from the State Paper Office for the supplement to Rymer’s Foedera, 
Bruce himself undertook the task.124 It was in this way clarified that the sitting ministry 
had to grant permission for all requests to consult the records of the State Paper Office: 
exactly the consolidation of executive control over paperwork and archive that Bruce had 
envisioned. All requests for records by the Parliamentary commissioners had to first be 
directed to the Secretary of State, who would then direct Bruce to conduct searches in the 
office and provide copies of records, rather than allow the Commissioners to access the 
archives on their own.125 Over the next several decades, the Commission fulfilled its 
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initial plan of creating calendars of paperwork deemed of ‘historical’ interest contained in 
specific offices of state (such as the Docket Rolls of the Court of Common Pleas, the 
Court of the King’s Bench, and the Exchequer); overseeing the production and printing a 
wide selection of ‘historical’ official records for public consumption, including 
Doomsday Book, and the catalogs of the manuscripts in the Cotton and Harleian libraries; 
and creating a “complete & authentic Edition” of the Statutes of the Realm.126 These 
practices of publication persisted well through the twentieth century, continuing on even 
as the State Paper Office itself shifted locations around London from Whitehall to St. 
James’ Park to Duke Street to Fetter Lane, and beyond; and changed its name, first to the 
“Public Record Office” (formed in 1838), and then to the “National Archives” (in 2003).  
Upon application to the Secretary of State, others could be granted permission to 
inspect records in the SPO. Although the kinds of requests, and the range of requesters 
(from private individuals, to other bureaucrats in different offices of government), were 
vast, in each instance, permission to inspect the records had to be granted directly from 
the sitting administration, which would then inform Bruce that approval had been 
granted.127 As Bruce arranged, calendared, and organized more records over the next 
years, these procedures were reinforced; in 1804, for example, the Secretary of State 
instructed Bruce to provide the Commissioners “a List of all the Calendars belonging to 
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the State Paper Office” pertinent to the newly indexed records, and then to make requests 
for “Selections” from “Originals . . . under proper Regulations.”128  
In accordance with Bruce’s vision, the major provisioning of records from the 
State Paper Office went directly to the Secretaries of State. The customary practice saw 
the Secretaries of State direct Bruce to send them papers concerning a specific point upon 
which administration required archival guidance.129 From his room in the State Paper 
Office, fitted with a writing table, desk, separate table for library books, an inkstand, and 
several chairs, Bruce fielded these requests from the Secretaries.130 For example, in early 
July 1800, Bruce received an order to search in the SPO for correspondence on “the will 
of the late King William” as it pertained to the Jewels of Queen Anne; to “make Extracts 
from the said Papers”; and then to deliver these to administrators. Bruce’s response 
demonstrates his praxis of supply: he sent extracts of three “Papers, selected, as 
Evidence, bearing on the Subject,” including lists of jewels belonging to Queen Anne that 
he had found in the office.131 Similarly, in early 1801, Grenville requested “the Volume 
of Danish Correspondence for the Year 1780,”132 as well as “the Original Treaty between 
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England & Sweden concluded in the Year 1661,” which Bruce in turn supplied.133 These 
requests could pertain to colonial affairs as much as to domestic governance: in January 
1803, for example, Bruce was asked by the Lords of Trade and Plantation for a 1729 
memorial sent to them in order to address a question “relative to the Jurisdiction of the 
Bahamas Government over the Turks Islands.”134 The next year, the Ordnance Office 
requested a Copy of a Report by an Ordnance officer from 1707 regarding tolls on traffic 
around the East End of the Thames.135  
At the same time, the SPO continued to receive deposits of records from other 
parts of government, consolidating government paperwork in a single archive. Some of 
these records included paperwork related to the Revolutionary-era governance of the 
British Atlantic. In February 1807, for example, a significant deposit of records related to 
the governance of the American colonies, previously in possession of the Board of Trade, 
and now located in the Home Department of the Secretary of State’s office, were 
transferred in the SPO’s custody. These included many of the records examined in earlier 
chapters of this dissertation, including those of the Carlisle Commission; eighteenth 
volumes of “Plantations General” records; “Answers to Circulars (American)”; and over 
one hundred volumes of both incoming and outgoing correspondence with the American 
colonies between the 1760s and 1780s.136 As a result of their relocation to the State Paper 
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Office, these records could now be lent to other government offices. For example, in 
February 1815, the State Paper Office received several boxes of the records of the 
American Loyalist Claims Commission from the Secretary of State’s office; several years 
later, the Treasury borrowed these records from the office.137  
 Yet, the institutionalization of Bruce’s vision of state paperwork and the 
bureaucratic archive through the adoption and implementation of his plan for the 
organization of the State Paper Office notwithstanding, there was something notable 
about the way in which Bruce related to paperwork from around 1800. He no longer 
continued to produce the elaborate, document-based reports that had dominated his 
bureaucratic labors over the previous decade: an odd development, given that he had 
sought to organize the SPO to better facilitate that function. Indeed, Bruce spent most of 
his tenure as Keeper, up to his 1826 death, principally involved in the reorganization and 
management of records and staff, very different from his work in the 1790s.  
 What explains this odd coda to the story? Partly, one might point to Bruce’s 
involvement in time-consuming occupations after 1800: he prepared a three-volume 
history of the East India Company under his own name, which was published by the 
EIC’s Court of Directors138; and he embarked on a short parliamentary career. An 
alternative explanation might hypothesize that the gradual transition and rise of liberal 
                                                                                                                                            
from the State Paper Office, under Orders, to the Secretary of State’s Office, Home Department, and not 
returned.” For similar transfers, see TNA, SP 45/50, John King to Bruce, June 30, 1803, transferring 
“Population Returns of the Kingdom.”  
 
137 TNA, SP 45/52, “Order from Lord Sidmouth to Mr. Bruce to receive five Boxes of ‘American Claims’ 
into the State Paper Office,” February 8, 1815; “Order from Mr Harrison, Secretary to the Treasury, to 
deliver Five Boxes of Papers of American Claims, to Charles Greenwood of the Treasury, and inclosing 
Order from Mr. Secretary Peel to the like effect,” October 7, 1822; and “Receipt for Wm. Cotton, Esq.r of 
the Treasury, for Five Boxes of Papers & the Keys thereof, relative to ‘American Claims,’” October 10, 
1822. 
 





government in Britain induced a particular political epistemology around both paperwork 
and the archive.139 Both of these explanations have credence. But the more immediate 
reason why Bruce’s practices of material reportage diminished lay on the abrupt 
evaporation of his immediate audience: with the fall of Pitt’s government in 1801, Henry 
Dundas was no longer Secretary of State, and thus no longer in a position to be 
provisioned with paperwork from the State Paper Office by the man whose career he had 
largely made: John Bruce.140 Although Dundas returned to government in Pitt’s second 
ministry as Lord of the Admiralty between 1804 and 1806, he no longer occupied the 
specific position–Secretary of State–that would allow him privileged access to the State 
Paper Office’s records. Although Bruce’s successor as Keeper of State Papers, Henry 
Hobhouse, did attempt to collaborate with Robert Peel, as Home Secretary to the Duke of 
Wellington’s government, on restricting the use of the office by researchers, these 
curtailments eventually abated. Dundas’ successors as Secretary of State never used the 
office as a source of documentary precedent; indeed, successive mid and late nineteenth 
century keepers acted more like custodians of a historical archive, rather than one whose 
contents could provide bureaucrats with documentary precedents. Indeed, in the choice of 
Hobhouse as Keeper, Peel selected a man who had previously served on the commission 
                                                
139 That there might be a particular archival–if not material–epistemology associated with liberal 
government in Britain has recently been suggested by Patrick Joyce. See Joyce, “The politics of the liberal 
archive,” History of the Human Sciences, 12 (1999), 35-49; and The State of Freedom: A Social History of 
the British State since 1800 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chapter 4. 
 
140 Robert Bruce continuously reminded John of this fact in their correspondence, impressing upon him that 
“you can never act opposite to Dundas, or you lose all you hold at present.” See NAS, GD 152/213/5/7(2), 





for publishing state papers as historical documents, and who devoted his tenure in office 
to facilitating that end–rather than using the office as a policy-making apparatus.141 
 Ultimately, Bruce’s own vision of the office was entirely eclipsed from 1852, 
when the Keeper established that anyone who sought to “consult the Records for literary, 
historical, antiquarian, genealogical, topographical, and similar purposes” could obtain a 
“card of admission” “without payment of Fees.”142 Significantly, the name of the office 
shifted over time from the “State Paper Office,” to the “Public Record Office,” and 
ultimately to the “National Archives”–each change a symbolic expansion, as well as 
abstraction, of the idea of the proper owner of these records. The modern history of the 
British state archive might therefore be understood as the triumph of a vision of the 
official archive far different from Bruce’s own: one based on the idea that government 




                                                
141 On Hobhouse and Peel’s restrictions, and their eventual abatement, see Galen Broeker, “Jared Sparks, 
Robert Peel and the State Paper Office,” American Quarterly, 13 (1961), 140-152, as well as BL, Add MS 
19071, Henry Hobhouse to Rev. Dr. Andrew Brown, June 3, 1829, f. 137, granting him “permission to 
inspect the records deposited in His Majesty’s State Paper Office, which relate to the three last American 
Campaigns of the war 1756; and also the Colonial proceedings from the Epoch of the Stamp Act to the 
Peace of 1783.” For Hobhouse’s work on the Commission on publishing state papers, see NAS, GD 
152/222/2/5, “Letter from Henry Hobhouse to Mr. Bruce, transmitting Copy of Commission for printing 
and publishing State Papers,” June 29, 1825. See also Hobhouse’s obituary in The Gentleman’s Magazine, 
July 1854, 79-80. On the broader context of nineteenth century European governments restricting access to 
state archives, see Philipp Müller, “Archives and history: Towards a history of ‘the use of state archives’ in 
the 19th century,” History of the Human Sciences, 26 (2013), 27-49. 
 
142 The Twenty-Sixty Annual Report of the Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, February 16, 1865 
(London, 1865), iv. On the later history of the office, see Philippa Levine, “History in the Archives: The 
Public Record Office and Its Staff, 1838-1886,” English Historical Review, 101 (1986), 20-41; and Levine, 
The Amateur and the Professional: Antiquarians, Historians and Archaeologists in Victorian England, 






When John Bruce died in 1826 at the age of 82, an obituary appeared in The Scots 
Magazine that tellingly captured the fundamental aspects of his life and work. Henry 
Dundas, “well aware” of Bruce’s “abilities,” had “procured for him the office of the 
Keeper of the State Paper Office, and Historiographer of the East India Company.” In 
these positions, the article stated, Bruce “was not idle.” Bruce’s “indefatigable exertions” 
had transformed the state archives from a condition of “the greatest confusion” into one 
of “the greatest order,” rendering bureaucratic documents “available to the different 
departments of the Government, whose chiefs had occasion to refer to them for 
precedents and information.”143 The obituary captured the essential praxis of a 
government servant whose life and labors have all but eluded modern students of British 
imperial history. Rather than the public fame of Enlightenment letters he had initially 
sought as a moral philosopher, Bruce instead achieved bureaucratic significance, his 
career defined not by the publication of texts for public consumption, but instead by the 
largely invisible (but politically far more consequential) labor of paperwork. Not 
surprisingly, it was Henry Dundas who perhaps best understand John Bruce’s geist: 
“there is not another Man in the World to be found,” he once observed of his beneficiary, 
“who would rest the Joy of his life in being buried in old Records and happy whenever he 
called upon by any Secretary of State, to report the result of his researches.”144 Through 
those researches, in the reportage of those results, and in the institutionalization of his 
                                                
143 “John Bruce, Esq. F. R. S.,” The Scots Magazine, May 1826, 637-638. The obituary was subsequently 
reprinted in The Gentleman’s Magazine, July 1826, 87; and M. F. Connolly, Biographical Dictionary of 
Eminent Men of Fife, Of Past and Present Times, Natives of the Country, or Connected With It By 
Property, Residence, Office, Marriage, or Otherwise (Edinburgh: Inglis & Jack, 1866), 91. 
 





method, Bruce staked out a significant role in the intertwined histories of empire, 
documents, and archives, even if one condemned to the amnesia of posterity.145  
                                                
145 See the claim by Elizabeth Shepherd in her influential Archives and Archivists in 20th Century England 
(Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2009), 41, that “government policy and legislation to 1950 showed that 
records and archives were not perceived as sufficiently important to the mechanism of government and the 
judicial system, to economic growth, to national or international relations or other key government 
concerns, to require legislative time or government funds.” While that may be true for the twentieth 
century, Bruce’s labor, and the broader history of early modern management of state papers in Britain, 







In March 1851, The Gentleman’s Magazine published an article examining the 
“Accessibility of Our Historical Manuscripts” in relation to official institutions in Britain, 
including the State Paper Office. The contents of the Office, the author argued, 
constituted a vital national resource. While “English history may be guessed at . . . from 
other sources,” the author contended, “it can never be written without access to the 
materials in the State Paper Office.” Yet, the article continued, the conditions of access to 
the office were highly unsatisfactory: “no one, without the permission of a Secretary of 
State, and then for only some definite purpose fully explained to the Secretary of State 
beforehand” could be granted permission to read documents in the office. The author 
contrasted the terms of access at the State Paper Office against those that pertained at the 
British Museum:  
When a student goes to consult the manuscripts in the British Museum, he find 
catalogues ready for his inspection, he hunts through them as he likes, he writes 
for what he pleases, he is not asked whether he wishes to copy or to collate, there 
is no obligation upon him to give in lists of the documents which he wants to see 
or to transcribe. 
 
By contrast, a very different environment confronted the researcher at the State Paper 
Office: 
At the State Paper Office he finds himself under an entirely different systems: he 
is hemmed in between the lines of his permission strictly construed, no 
information as to the contents of the office is open to him, there is nothing to 
guide him how to proceed without application to the keeper, he has to trouble this 
gentleman or that gentleman at every turn of his course . . . he cannot see anything 
or obtain anything without inquiry and explanation; sharp eyes keep watch lest he 
should overstep the limits of his bond; the very air of the place seems to whisper 




The writer saw the distinction as unjustified, precisely because he believed that the 
records in both locales were the same. The “official correspondence” “of the kind 
preserved in the State Paper Office” had “two distinct uses,” the author contended. 
Initially, this use was “in connection with the business to which they relate,” but it was 
merely “temporary”: “It dies out. The acting parties and their descendants disappear. New 
rights supersede old ones . . . a diplomatic correspondence of Henry VIII or Elizabeth . . . 
can have no possible practical bearing upon public or private business of the present 
day.” The byzantine restrictions and bureaucratic ordeal of having to apply to the 
Secretary of State for permission to consult records in the State Paper Office was 
therefore entirely unjustified; because the records contained therein were historical and 
irrelevant for “public or private business of the present day,” the author reasoned, they 
ought to be open to all, without restriction.1 
 This view of state paperwork as ‘public record’ ultimately triumphed the next 
year, from which point on anyone could consult the records with paying a fee. Since that 
time, the British state has gradually liberalized access to official paperwork, especially 
through the 1958 Public Records Act, which established the requirement that government 
departments transfer their records to the Public Record Office no later than thirty years 
after their creation, and that these records are made available for consultation no later 
than fifty years from their creation; the 1967 Public Records Act, which reduced this 
                                                
1 “The Present State of English Historical Literature. I. Accessibility of Our Historical Materials. 1. The 
State Paper Office,” The Gentleman’s Magazine and Historical Review, March 1851, 227-235. For similar 





‘fifty year rule’ to thirty years; and the current requirement, established by the 2010 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, which further lowered the delay to 20 years.2  
 By the middle of the nineteenth century, then, British state archives had come to 
reflect an administrative culture characterized by government’s possession of 
increasingly more sophisticated ways of routinizing the collection, management, and use 
of information, and of expanding public access to this information.3 It is all to easy to 
read this subsequent history as a logical outgrowth of the processes and uses of paper that 
this dissertation has tracked; yet, that would be a mistake, for it would succumb to the 
error of treating ‘paperwork,’ as well as its conceptual relatives ‘bureaucracy,’ 
‘information,’ ‘knowledge,’ ‘politics,’ ‘the state,’ and ‘government,’ in both a 
teleological and trans-historical manner.4 Put differently, the world in which the 
Gentleman’s Magazine critiqued the difficulty of accessing material it deemed 
‘historical’ precisely because the author understood it as having no bureaucratic use was 
not that of John Bruce; but it was also not the world of Dartmouth and his queries or the 
remark book.  
                                                
2 Still, the UK government maintains a variety of legal mechanisms to prevent the circulation of 
information it deems ‘secret’: see David Banisar and Francesca Fanucci, “Wikileaks, Secrecy, and Freedom 
of Information: The Case of the United Kingdom,” in Benedetta Brevini, Arne Hintz, and Patrick McCurdy 
(eds.), Beyond WikiLeaks: Implications for the Future of Communications, Journalism and Society (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 178-190. 
 
3 For these developments, see Jon Agar, The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the 
Computer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 
 
4 On this point, see, for example, Quentin Skinner, “The state,” in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. 
Hanson (eds.), Political innovation and conceptual change (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 90-131; Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of 
Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact: 
England, 1550-1720 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); Daniel Rosenberg, “Data before the Fact,” in 
Lisa Gitelman (ed.), Raw Data is an Oxymoron (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2013), 15-40; and Paul 
Duguid, “The Ageing of Information: From Particular to Particulate,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 76 
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which examines the shifting meanings of concepts as iterated speech acts, and the variety that this 
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 In fact, by asserting that archives were sites of ‘historical research’ whose 
contents had “no possible practical bearing upon public or private business of the present 
day,” the writer of the Gentleman’s Magazine revealed just how different the nineteenth 
century concept of administrative paperwork was from what pertained in the prior 
century. When it came to ‘historical research,’ documents had long shelf-lives; but when 
it came to governance, the writer suggested, they no longer did. This was precisely the 
opposite attitude of that adopted by John Bruce and, indeed, his early modern 
predecessors like Thomas Wilson: for them, paperwork of past and present was deeply 
consequential to the active work of government.  
 That shift between a moment in which governing the British state and empire 
from archival precedent appealed to senior administrators, to one in which state archives 
and the documents they held fell out of administrative use and were popularly declared to 
have “no possible practical bearing upon public or private business,” represented the end 
of a particular way of thinking about administration. John Bruce was the last practitioner 
of this style of reasoning. It may not be implausible to suggest that this transition also 
represented a shift from an ‘early modern’ culture of official information in which 
physical documents held privileged roles as authorities, to a ‘modern’ political 
epistemology that increasingly privileged other kinds and sources of information in 
administrative decision-making. As government (from the beginning of the nineteenth 
century) increasingly demanded information of immediate circumstances and conditions, 
administrators drew upon a new kind of knowledge–statistics–that documented the here-
and-now. Officials came to see the documentary remains of past transactions as 




necessarily diminish–but, it seems, administrators increasingly did not seek it in the 
particular media of old documents. Part of the significance of John Bruce to the history of 
the British state and empire may lie in his status as the last truly ‘early modern’ 
administrator: the last who, like Thomas Wilson and his predecessors in the office of 
Keeper of State Papers, saw archives and documents as central to the work of 
governance. If valid, this suggests that a common view of the late eighteenth century 
British state as a ‘modernizing’ regime–especially because of the impact of European and 
imperial war on its administrative capacities–merits complication.5 While the size of 
bureaucracy and the state’s institutional capacities expanded immensely in this period in 
response to the pressures placed on government by these events, the way in which these 
developments have been understood obscures a more complicated story about 
administration in this period: government’s continued reliance upon centuries-old 
practices of bureaucratic knowledge-making for its operation, one based on a conception 
of the British ‘constitution’ as localizable in concrete documents rather than abstract 
principles, for its operation. The particular moment of Bruce’s rise–in the years when 
British government confronted an existential threat from Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France–suggests that wartime pressure on the British state generated not simply 
‘modernizing’ developments, but also the intensified continuity of an older, distinctively 
‘early modern’ way of archival governance. Consequently, a history of imperial 
                                                
5 See, for example, John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 
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paperwork suggests the need for a reappraisal of the meanings and temporalities that 
historians have ascribed to Great Britain’s ‘modernization.’ 
 
II 
 What role did documents play in the governance of this ‘early modern’ empire? In 
excavating the particular histories of forms and material practices of administration, this 
dissertation has argued that documents functioned as a facilitative technology through 
which metropolitan administration articulated, communicated, and enforced 
constitutional norms of good governance within the bureaucratic community forged by 
empire. In particular forms, such as “Instructions,” paper served as a technology that 
allowed for the concrete inscription of these norms so bureaucrats could know them; and 
in other kinds of ‘instruments,’ such as “queries,” “remark books,” or letters, paper 
enabled bureaucrats to demonstrate their understanding, and fulfill associated 
expectations for good governance. In this way, the significance of paper to imperial 
government inhered in the immediate temporality of its transaction: the time period 
spanning its creation, deployment, completion, return, and review. When bureaucrats 
correctly used documents at each stage of this process, the imperial constitution was 
successfully materialized as an administered reality. As the dissertation suggests, this 
configuration remained entrenched in British imperial administration throughout the late 
eighteenth century, showing no alteration despite the political pressures of war and 
revolution. Rather, the change in this configuration was additive: the rise of the archive, 
its repository of old documents, and the temporality of the administrative past as a set of 




the transaction of documents themselves. Moreover, this change was not an innovation: 
instead, the assertion of the archive as a tool of imperial government reflected the 
expansion of an early modern vision of the role of state archives beyond the borders of 
England to the wider imperial polity. 
 
III 
 Writing the administrative history of the British empire in terms of the meanings 
that contemporaries assigned to the circulation of documents, and the history of their 
custodianship raises a set of problems that this dissertation cannot fully resolve, but 
which further research might address. Recent reflections on the state of British imperial 
historiography have emphasized the significance of one of these problems: the need to 
consider the relationship between British imperial governance in the Atlantic world, and 
its experience in Asia.6 The foundational structure of East India Company 
administration–and the role of paperwork as the glue that solidified that structure as a 
governed space–bears significant comparison to its Atlantic counterpart. The Company 
was literally forged through a document–the petition by London merchants to the Crown 
of September 1599, asking to be granted trading privileges to the East; the Charter 
granted by Elizabeth I in 1600 according the Company its privileges also established the 
                                                
6 For recent calls and efforts along such lines, see Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 
1600-1850 (New York: Random House, 2004); P. J. Marshall, The Making and Unmaking of Empires: 
Britain, India, and America, c. 1750-1783 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Philip J. Stern, 
“British Asia and British Atlantic: Comparisons and Connections,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 63 
(2008), 693-712; Stern, “History and Historiography of the English East India Company: Past, Present, and 
Future!,” History Compass, 7.4 (2009), 1160-1161; and H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth Mancke, and John G. Reid 
(eds.), Britain’s Oceanic Empire: Atlantic and Indian Ocean Worlds, c. 1550-1850 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012); and Jonathan Eacott, Selling Empire: India in the Making of Britain 
and America, 1600-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016). For a slightly later 
period, see also David Lambert and Alan Lester (eds.), Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial 





fundamental importance of recordkeeping by insisting that the Company keep “books” of 
its accounts.7 A number of recent studies have emphasized that (in Philip Stern’s words), 
“Company government at every level was . .  . a delicate balance of strict hierarchy and 
consultative government, conditioned by an institutional culture defined and constantly 
reinforced by ritual, procedure, and ceremony,” where “writing” and paperwork served as 
the “backbone” that kept “a geographically dispersed political system as coherent” and 
governed.8 Many of these statements could also be used to describe the administrative 
culture of the British Atlantic.9 Further research might examine the paperwork regimes of 
British governance in both the Atlantic and Indian Oceanic spheres together, exploring 
overlaps, similarities, and differences in material practices emanating from their 
respective constitutional set-ups.  
 At a broader level, the dissertation raises a question about the nature of the 
knowledge involved in administrative governance. As each of the chapters show, paper 
‘instruments’ in the British empire during the eighteenth century both transmitted and 
                                                
7 See Henry Stephens, The Dawn of British Trade to the East Indies, as Recorded in the Court Minutes of 
the East India Company, 1599-1603, September 24, 1599 (London: Henry Stevens & Son, 1866), 1-7; and 
“Charter Granted to Queen Elizabeth, to the Governor and Company of Merchants of London, Trading into 
the East-Indies,” December 31, 1600, in John Shaw (ed.), Charters Relating to the East India Company 
From 1600 to 1761 (Madras, 1887), 14.  
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solicited knowledge. The character of this knowledge was highly specific: it 
fundamentally concerned the expectations for official behavior cultivated by superiors 
and communicated to their servants. Documents operated as sites where bureaucrats 
performed compliance with these expectations. This formal role of paperwork as the site 
for demonstrating knowledge of administrative relationships of command appears to have 
been endemic to early modern governing regimes; and the literature on how these 
relationships came to be constituted is now well-developed.10 The present study has 
explored their contours in the context of the eighteenth century British empire, and the 
ways they were forged at a distance; and demonstrated their enduring importance for 
administrative governance during an era of significant political change. The character of 
this epistemology privileged the demonstration of knowledge of process, procedure, and 
hierarchy, and in this sense appears somewhat distinct from the propositional knowledge-
cultures of philosophical and literary expression that dominated “Enlightenment” Europe 
during the same period. The work of completing forms, circulating documents, and 
arranging archives involved kinds of knowledge and expertise that were not clearly the 
same as those involved in writing philosophical treaties, political tracts, or making 
                                                
10 See Labaree, Royal Government in America, chapter 1; Giora Sternberg, “Epistolary Ceremonial: 
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parliamentary speeches. Focusing specifically upon bureaucratic epistemology, the 
dissertation thus contributes an important complement to extant studies of knowledge and 
the eighteenth century British empire that have emphasized the alliances and affinities 
between imperial government–in both statist and corporate forms–and the epistemic 
cultures of both the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment.11 Imperial bureaucracy, 
this dissertation has suggested, focused far more upon the demonstration of knowledge of 
process, rather than the production of ‘fact.’ Further research will be necessary to 
understand just how distinctive these forms of bureaucratic knowledge were from their 
proposition-based counterparts.  
 Finally, in writing a history of state and empire through the analytic of the 
material practices of bureaucracy, Paperwork, Governance, and Archival Knowledge in 
                                                
11 For overviews of the intersection between propositional knowledge and the British empire in the long 
eighteenth century, see Richard Drayton, “Knowledge and Empire,” in P. J. Marshall, The Oxford History 
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the British Empire During the Age of Revolutions joins recent work that has significantly 
challenged the normative structuralist and post-structuralist approaches to 
conceptualizing the state. Over the past two decades, scholars have asserted the need for 
accounts of governance that attend to the co-extensive production of knowledge and state 
power, a goal which has been pursued by centering the role of cultural practices in 
histories of modern state formation.12 This literature has increasingly emphasized the 
centrality of documents as the conduit through which administrative knowledge was 
procured and produced by bureaucratic regimes.13 Such an approach places to one side 
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extant accounts of culture within state-formation that emphasize theory over the 
contingencies of practice, whether these theories are Marxist, “state-centric,” “rational-
choice,” or even ‘cultural-theoretical.’ Rather, this emerging literature, which this 
dissertation joins, seeks to understand the historical specificity of governance through 
paperwork.14 Tracing the evolution of documentary practices in the specific context of 
British imperial governance suggests a need for historians to think further about the 
contextually particular relationship between the practices essential to statecraft, and the 
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